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ABSTRACT 
The degree to which statutory goals are pliable is likely to affect 
significantly the ability of an agency with regulatory or management 
responsibilities to achieve those objectives in the face of novel challenges 
or changing circumstances.  This Article explores this dynamic by 
comparing the degree of “give” provided by the goals of the regimes 
governing management of the five types of federal public lands in 
responding to the challenges posed by climate change.  It asserts that the 
extent of climate change adaptation in which an agency engages is 
influenced by a program’s legal adaptive capacity—the mutability of the 
goals pursued under its authorizing legal framework.    
Though a few scholars have explored the concept of adaptive 
capacity as it applies to law, most focus on the impact of procedural 
discretion on the ability to manage change.  A comparative analysis of 
federal land adaptation to climate change demonstrates that a management 
regime’s legal adaptive capacity is influenced not only by procedural 
flexibility, but also by the flexibility the agency has in defining and pursuing 
a program’s substantive goals.  Counterintuitively, for this reason, the land 
regimes most closely tied to resource preservation goals have generally 
lagged behind those with mixed conservation-commodity development 
mandates in preparing for climate change.  Accordingly, the Article 
suggests ways to enhance the substantive legal adaptive capacity of land 
management agencies to promote ecological health in the face of climate 
change, and evaluates tradeoffs implicated when policymakers choose more 
appropriate levels of such adaptive capacity.     
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INTRODUCTION 
 The degree to which statutory goals are pliable is likely to affect 
significantly the ability of an agency with regulatory or management 
responsibilities to achieve those objectives in the face of novel challenges 
or changing circumstances.  This Article explores this dynamic by 
comparing the degree of “give” provided by the management goals 
governing the five types of federal public lands in response to the challenges 
posed by climate change.  It asserts that the comparative rapidity and extent 
of climate change adaptation in which a natural resources management 
agency engages is influenced by the adaptability of the goals identified in 
its authorizing legal framework.  This Article identifies this intrinsic 
mutability as a program’s legal adaptive capacity.   
 Though some scholars have explored the concept of adaptive 
capacity as it applies to law, almost all focus on the extent of agency 
procedural discretion and its influence on an agency’s ability to manage 
change.1  As demonstrated by a comparative analysis of federal land agency 
                                                          
1 See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA 
L. REV. 1, 21-22 (1997) (proposing normative model for more adaptive regulatory 
process); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive 
Problems in the Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CAL. L. REV. 59, 97-
98 (2010) (proposing adaptive process for managing complex regulatory problems); 
Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present 
to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153 1156-57 (2009) (advocating integration 
in climate change legislation of institutional design features that impede future alterations); 
  
 
2 
adaptation to climate change, a regulatory or management regime’s legal 
adaptive capacity is influenced not only by the extent of procedural 
flexibility the implementing agency enjoys under its organic statute and 
other sources of law, but also by the degree to which the underlying 
program’s substantive goals are capable of accommodating shifts in 
management approaches in response to change.  Accordingly, the Article 
recommends changes in the substantive legal adaptive capacity of federal 
land management agencies that are likely to enhance their ability to better 
address the considerable effects of climate change.     
 Various agencies manage the approximately twenty-eight percent, 
or 635-640 million acres, of the land in the United States that is federally 
owned.2  The four largest landholders are natural resource management 
agencies.  These include the United States Forest Service (USFS) in the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA), which manages nearly 193 million 
acres,3 and three agencies in the Department of Interior (DOI):  the National 
Park Service (NPS), which manages approximately 80 million acres; the 
Bureau of Land Management (BLM), which manages nearly 248 million 
acres of land; and the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), which manages 
approximately 89 million acres of land as well as 217 million acres of 
marine refuges and monuments.4  Additionally, more than 109 million 
acres5 of federal conservation lands have been designated by Congress as 
federal wilderness, subject to an additional regulatory overlay under the 
Wilderness Act of 1964.6 
 Anthropogenic climate change will result in significant physical and 
biological effects on all of these federal land systems.  These changes, in 
turn, will raise challenges to the capacity of the agencies under existing 
federal land management laws to manage uncertainty and promote effective 
                                                          
Alejandro E. Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve? Lessons from a Study in Maladaptive 
Management, 55 UCLA L. REV. 293, 331, 349-51 (2007) [hereinafter Camacho I]; 
Alejandro E. Camacho, Adapting Governance to Climate Change: Managing Uncertainty 
Through a Learning Infrastructure, 59 EMORY L.J. 1, 36-40 (2009) [hereinafter Camacho 
II]; Robin Kundis Craig & J.B. Ruhl, Designing Administrative Law for Adaptive 
Management, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1, 4 (2014); Robert L. Glicksman & Sidney A. Shapiro, 
Improving Regulation through Incremental Adjustment, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1179 (2004); 
Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management as an Information Problem, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1455 
(2011); Donald T. Hornstein, Complexity Theory, Adaptation, and Administrative Law, 54 
DUKE L.J. 913 (2005). 
2 Ross W. Gorte et al., Federal Land Ownership: Overview and Data, CRS Report for 
Congress 1 (2012), available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42346.pdf. 
3 Id. at 1, 13. 
4 Id. at 1, 13. 
5 See The Beginnings of the National Wilderness Preservation System, 
http://www.wilderness.net/index.cfm?fuse=NWPS&sec=fastfacts (last visited Sept. 22, 
2014). 
6 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (2006). 
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conservation.7  Scholars and policymakers thus increasingly urge changes 
to existing natural resources laws and institutions to better manage these 
new fundamental challenges, largely highlighting the need for mechanisms 
that promote procedural adaptive capacity by increasing access to 
information and flexible implementation.  Few, however, have considered 
how a legal regime’s substantive goals may affect the adaptive capacity of 
that regime to respond to climate change. 
 To varying degrees, the federal government has slowly turned its 
attention to climate change adaptation planning and implementation, 
spurred by directives issued by President Obama between 2009 and 2014.8  
One might anticipate the pace and degree of climate change adaptation 
activity to largely track the historical orientation of each land management 
agency to ecological conservation, given the risk that climate change will 
disrupt the ecological functioning of the natural resources these agencies 
manage.  In particular, some might expect that, in light of their focus on 
resource preservation, the FWS and the NPS would be more attentive to the 
potential effects of climate change and more apt to embrace the task of 
preparing to adapt to these changes than the USFS and the BLM, which for 
at least part of their histories emphasized extractive and consumptive uses.9   
 We posit, however, that because the management goals of the 
statutory mandates under which the BLM and the USFS operate are pliant 
enough to accommodate changed conditions, these agencies actually have 
a greater legal adaptive capacity to engage in productive ecosystem 
protection in preparation for climate change than the FWS and the NPS.  
The two agencies’ multiple-use, sustained-yield mandates provide them 
with broad authority to pursue management actions that maintain ecological 
function, notwithstanding physical changes that pose novel management 
                                                          
7 See infra Part II. 
8 See infra Part III.A; U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, CLIMATE CHANGE 
ADAPTATION IN UNITED STATES FEDERAL NATURAL RESOURCE SCIENCE AND 
MANAGEMENT AGENCIES: A SYNTHESIS vi (Jessica E. Halofsky et al. eds, April 2015), 
http://www.globalchange.gov/sites/globalchange/files/ASIWG_Synthesis_4.28.15_final.
pdf [hereinafter USGCRP, SYNTHESIS] (“Although adequate scientific databases, 
analytical tools, and decision support aids are generally available to assist with adaptation, 
on-the-ground projects and plans relevant to resource management have been implemented 
unevenly across agencies.”). 
9 See Robert B. Keiter, Ecosystems and the Law: Toward an Integrated Approach, 8 
ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 332, 335 (1998) (stating that “federal land management 
agencies traditionally have relied upon the multiple-use concept to give priority to 
commodity production”).  Cf. Robert L. Fischman, et al., Planning for Adaptation to 
Climate Change: Lessons from the US National Wildlife Refuge System, 64 BIOSCIENCE 
993, 993 (2014) (“If any system of nature reserves in the United States could demonstrate 
best practices for climate-change adaptation, it would be the National Wildlife Refuge 
System (NWRS), managed by the [FWS].”). 
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challenges.10  The malleability of the goals set forth in the two agencies’ 
organic statutes positions them well to swiftly engage in meaningful climate 
change adaptation activities.  In contrast, the FWS and the NPS are charged 
primarily with what we label “historical preservation”—maintaining 
current ecological conditions or restoring managed lands to former 
ecological conditions.  Thus, although the two agencies possess significant 
procedural flexibility to advance their statutory objectives,11  the substantive 
goals they are directed to pursue may directly conflict with promoting 
ecological health and are increasingly difficult if not impossible to attain for 
some federal land units as climate changes.12 In addition, Congress 
established federally designated wilderness areas primarily to minimize 
active human management or disturbance—“wildness preservation”—and 
secondarily to promote historical preservation.13  As a result, all four land 
management agencies have limited capacity to actively manage wilderness 
areas in the face of the threats posed by climate change. 
  A review of existing climate change adaptation activities by the 
four federal land management agencies reflects the legal adaptive capacity 
that their respective organic statutes suggest.  Agencies that manage federal 
lands subject to statutory goals that place more emphasis on promoting 
historical fidelity (such as national parks) or on minimizing active 
management (wilderness areas) have developed more modest adaptation 
measures.  Federal lands governed by statutory goals that place less 
emphasis on historical or wildness preservation, principally those under the 
charge of the USFS, have engaged in more robust adaptation planning and 
measures, even if those measures did not take full advantage of the USFS’s 
legal adaptive capacity.  However, the BLM’s analogous and relatively 
                                                          
10 See infra Part III.B-C. 
11 See, e.g., Western Watersheds Project v. Salazar, 766 F. Supp. 2d 1095 (D. Mont. 2011), 
aff’d in part, 494 Fed. Appx. 740 (9th Cir. 2012); Defenders of Wildlife v. Salazar, 698 F. 
Supp. 2d 141, 149 (D.D.C. 2010), aff’d, 651 F.3d 112 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
12 See Alejandro E. Camacho, Transforming the Means and Ends of Natural Resource 
Management, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1405, 1407 (2011) (arguing that “key preservationist goals 
of natural resources law premised on historical preservation (the protection of resources or 
landscapes in their historical condition) or passive management (minimizing human 
involvement with nonhuman systems) will be increasingly costly, difficult, and even 
impossible to meet” as a result of climate change); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Gaming 
the Past: The Theory and Practice of Historic Baselines in the Administrative State, 64 
VAND. L. REV. 1, 53 (2011) (“Building adaptation strategies around historic baselines to 
resist climate change thus is a losing proposition”); id. at 56 (characterizing historic 
baselines as “maladapted” to climate change adaptation).  Cf. Robin Kundis Craig, 
“Stationarity Is Dead”—Long Live Transformation: Five Principles for Climate Change 
Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 9, 17 (2010) (arguing that existing 
preservationist natural resources laws “no longer reflect[] ecological realities”); id. at 34-
35 (claiming that “preservation paradigm” “threatens to dislocate the goals of natural 
resources law from the ecological realities of a climate change era”). 
13 See Camacho, supra note 12, at 1407. 
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substantial legal adaptive capacity has not yet translated into significant 
adaptation planning or concrete adaptation activities.14   
 Though the absence of clear and enforceable directives requiring the 
BLM to exercise legal adaptive capacity could have been a factor, it is 
evident that legal adaptive capacity alone does not determine the extent of 
adaptation actually pursued or achieved.15  Factors like budgetary 
resources,16 agency leadership, entrenched culture and tradition, and 
resources can strongly influence a regime’s record on adaptivity, and we do 
not discount the role that such factors may have played in the degree to 
which the federal land management agencies have responded to the 
challenges posed by climate change.17  Nonetheless, attending to a regime’s 
substantive goals can help increase the likelihood that the program 
effectively manages unanticipated challenges or changing circumstances 
and remove obstacles to doing so.18  Indeed, if a statutory goal or 
management standard forbids the administering agency from altering its 
management approach in the face of change, then even an agency with 
leaders who prioritize responsiveness to climatic changes and a culture in 
which employees throughout the agency commit to pursuing leadership 
goals is not likely to engage in effective climate change adaptation. 
 The Article proceeds in five parts.  Part I discusses the concept of 
legal adaptive capacity in regulatory or management institutions.  It 
distinguishes between the substantive and procedural dimensions of legal 
                                                          
14 See Kelli M. Archie et al., Climate Change and Western Public Lands: A Survey of U.S. 
Federal Land Managers on the Status of Adaptation Efforts, 17(4) ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 20 
(2012), http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol17/iss4/art20/ (concluding based on surveys 
completed in 2011 by federal land managers in Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming that the 
BLM “has taken a less targeted approach to adaptation planning” than the other three land 
management agencies).  Cf. Victor B. Flatt, Adapting Laws for a Changing World: A 
Systemic Approach to Climate Change Adaptation, 64 FLA. L. REV. 269, 291 (2012) (“In 
theory, [the multiple use] legal mandate should be the ‘best’ option for climate change 
adaptation because it provides a ‘resilient’ law that can alter resource usage without 
statutory change.  In practice, however, it has proven to be just the opposite, as agencies 
routinely cling to a static balance of uses.”). 
15 Agency management structure, which is an aspect of procedural legal adaptive capacity, 
may play a role in the BLM’s slow response to the challenges posed by climate change.  
See infra notes 468-472 and accompanying text. 
16 A survey of employees of the four land management agencies in three western states 
during 2011 identified budget constraints as one of the most significant barriers to both 
adaptation planning and implementation.  See Archie et al., supra note 14.  Another 
important factor was lack of information at relevant scales.  Id.  Additional factors included 
personnel constraints, lack of perceived importance to the public, and lack of public 
demand for action.  Id. 
17 See infra Part IV; USGCRP, SYNTHESIS, supra note 8, at vii (“Accomplishments in 
preparing for climate change differ across the many agencies responsible for managing 
land and water resources and for providing the science needed for resource management.  
This is to be expected, given the diversity of agency missions, organizational culture, 
programmatic structure, and scientific capability.”).  
18 See infra Conclusion. 
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adaptive capacity, and assesses potential tradeoffs of integrating more legal 
adaptive capacity into a regulatory or management regime.  Part II briefly 
relates the concept of legal adaptive capacity to anthropogenic climate 
change, explaining how this phenomenon is exerting enormous pressure not 
only on the federal lands but also the processes and goals of the regimes that 
manage them. 
 Part III assesses and compares the existing legal adaptive capacity 
and climate-related adaptation activities of five federal land systems.  After 
briefly summarizing White House and department-wide directives by the 
Secretaries of the Interior and Agriculture, it considers lands administered 
by the USFS and the BLM that are governed by flexible multiple-use, 
sustained-yield mandates.  It then discusses the legal adaptive capacity and 
adaptation activities provided for national wildlife refuges, national parks, 
and designated wilderness, which are subject to mandates that, to varying 
degrees, focus on historical or wildness preservation.  Part III illustrates that 
though the various federal agencies have similar procedural legal adaptive 
capacities, the relatively narrower substantive legal adaptive capacity 
afforded agencies in managing the national parks, national wildlife refuges, 
and wilderness areas is likely hindering the ability to effectively adapt those 
lands to climate change in ways consistent with applicable statutory goals 
and with promoting ecological health. 
 Based on the emerging federal experience with climate adaptation 
planning and implementation measures, Part IV offers observations about 
the role of legal adaptive capacity in promoting timely and effective 
adaptation.  We focus primarily on the significance of substantive legal 
adaptive capacity because the literature on the tradeoffs implicated by 
procedural adaptive capacity in environmental law is much more extensive. 
Part V urges changes in the substantive standards that govern federal land 
management to enhance legal adaptive capacity by placing greater emphasis 
on promoting ecological function on lands governed by the multiple-use 
mandate, and by detaching management goals from strict adherence to 
historical or wildness preservation where climate change is likely to render 
those goals ineffective at promoting ecological health.     
I. A THEORY OF LEGAL ADAPTIVE CAPACITY  
   The concept of legal adaptive capacity draws from the growing 
scholarly literature seeking to characterize and understand the dynamics of 
ecological systems.19  The ecological literature introduced the concepts of 
both resilience and adaptive capacity as phenomena in the natural world.   A 
natural system’s resilience measures its ability “to absorb impacts and 
                                                          
19 See generally SOCIAL-ECOLOGICAL RESILIENCE AND LAW 235 (Columbia Univ. Press 
Ahjond S. Garmestani & Craig T. Allen, eds., 2014). 
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continue to function, while adaptive capacity refers to a system’s ability to 
change to adjust to new conditions.”20  Because of the convulsive changes 
associated with it, climate change will test the resilience and adaptive 
capacity of natural systems.21   
   Scholars have also applied the concept of adaptive capacity to 
human social systems, including in the context of climate change 
adaptation.  The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, for example, 
defines adaptive capacity as “the ability or potential of a system to respond 
successfully to climate variability and change, and includes adjustments in 
both behaviour and in resources and technologies.”22  Researchers have 
identified adaptive capacity as a “necessary condition for the design and 
implementation of effective adaptation strategies so as to reduce the 
likelihood and the magnitude of harmful outcomes resulting from climate 
change.”23  In this context, scholars have studied the role of factors such as 
education, income, health, knowledge, technology, and institutions on the 
capability of communities to adapt to risks related to climate change.24  
Limited attention, however, has been given to the influence of the adaptive 
capacity of legal regimes in shaping climate change adaptation. 
   Like natural systems, legal systems may be more or less adaptive to 
change.  When Congress creates an administrative agency, it typically 
identifies goals in the organic statute from which the agency derives its 
authority and prescribes standards to which the agency must conform in its 
pursuit of those goals.25  As scholars of regulation in different contexts have 
recognized, “[a]ll regulators must adapt to change in order to remain 
effective.”26  The same holds true for agencies acting as resource managers.   
As Karl Llewellyn recognized in describing the common law system of 
adjudication, “an adequately resilient legal system can . . . absorb the 
                                                          
20 Craig, supra note 12, at 23. 
21 See Emma L. Tompkins & W. Neil Adger, Does Adaptive Management of Natural 
Resources Enhance Resilience to Climate Change?, 9(2) ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 1, 1 (2004), 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol9/iss2/art10/print.pdf (arguing “that a system’s 
capacity for resilience . . . is an important element of any sustainable response to climate 
change”). 
22 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: WORKING 
GROUP II: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 727 (2007). 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 727-28. 
25 In the absence of standards that supply an “intelligible principle” to guide agency 
discretion, the statute may violate separation of powers principles.  See Whitman v. Am. 
Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2011).   
26 Brett McDonnell & Daniel Schwarcz, Regulatory Contrarians, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1629, 
1635 (2011).  Among other things, “regulators’ failure to evolve can [stem from] the 
continuation of rules or policies that have become ineffective or counterproductive in light 
of market change, or that were simply mistakes in the first place.”  Id. at 1636. 
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particular trouble and resolve it each time into a new, usefully guiding, 
forward-looking felt standard-for-action or even rule-of-law.”27   
   Law can facilitate (or hamper) adaptation through both substantive 
and procedural means.  We refer to this adaptability as legal adaptive 
capacity.  In our conception, legal adaptive capacity denotes the formal 
regulatory or management regime’s capacity to adapt to changes in the 
phenomena it regulates.  For our purposes, this regime includes rules 
promulgated by public legal institutions, including legislatures, courts, or 
administrative agencies (including agency regulations, manuals, plans, and 
guidance).  As we use the term, legal adaptive capacity does not refer to 
other factors, such as resource constraints or agency culture, which may 
nonetheless influence the adaptive capacity of a regulatory regime.28 
   The scope of a regime’s legal adaptive capacity turns on two axes.29  
First, a legal regime, including one administered by an administrative 
agency, may have goals that are more or less capable of accommodating 
changed conditions.  The degree to which statutory goals are capable of 
accommodating change measures the regime’s substantive legal adaptive 
capacity.  Second, an agency may have more or less flexibility in 
determining the processes or organizational structure it will use in pursuing 
organic statute goals.  We refer to that kind of flexibility as procedural legal 
adaptive capacity.  Thus, J.B. Ruhl has noted that it is “important to 
distinguish between the resilience of the legal system’s underlying structure 
and processes and the stability of the substantive content of the law.”30  
Nonetheless, the significance of legal adaptive capacity—and in particular 
                                                          
27 KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 513 (1960). 
28 See generally CHRISTINE PARKER & VIBEKE LEHMANN NIELSEN, EXPLAINING 
COMPLIANCE: BUSINESS RESPONSES TO REGULATION (2011) (discussing formal and 
informal legal influences on regulatory compliance).  Modern sociological literature draws 
“a central distinction” between social structure and culture.  Alejandro Portes, Institutions 
and Development: A Conceptual Reanalysis, 32 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 233, 236 
(2006); Gérard Roland, Understanding Institutional Change: Fast-Moving And Slow-
Moving Institutions, 38 STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE INTL. DEV. 109 (2004) (distinguishing 
between “slow-moving” institutions such as culture and “fast-moving” institutions such as 
legal rules).  In discussing adaptive capacity, other scholars have used the term more 
broadly to encompass some of these other factors. See, e.g., Mostafa Mahmud Naser, 
Climate Change, Environmental Degradation, and Migration: A Complex Nexus, 36 WM. 
& MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 713, 756-57 (2012); Marissa Knodel, Conceptualizing 
Climate Justice in Kivalina, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1179, 1206 (2014). 
29 See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, General Design Principles for Resilience and Adaptive Capacity in 
Legal Systems – With Applications to Climate Change Adaptation, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1373, 
1379 (2011) (“The legal system, like any system, can be defined by its structure (e.g., 
constitutional division of powers) and processes (e.g., administrative decision 
procedures).”). 
30 Id. at 1383.  Because this article focuses primarily on substantive legal adaptive capacity, 
we do not dwell on the relationship between structural and procedural adaptive capacity.  
Differences in agency organizational structure nevertheless may affect a program’s 
adaptive capacity.  See infra notes 468-475 and accompanying text (discussing how the 
BLM’s organizational structure may impair its capacity to respond to climate change). 
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substantive legal adaptive capacity—has been under-explored by the legal 
and broader scholarly literature.  In particular, it is important to consider the 
tradeoffs of more or less procedural and substantive adaptive capacity in 
designing a legal regime. 
   Drawing on the ecological concept of adaptability or resilience, this 
Part elaborates on these different components of legal adaptive capacity and 
provides examples of how the scope of an agency’s legal adaptive capacity 
can affect its ability to successfully pursue statutory missions.  In particular, 
we focus on how the scope of each kind of legal adaptive capacity can 
influence agency efforts to respond to novel challenges or changing 
circumstances such as changing ecological dynamics.  We also consider 
potential generic tradeoffs of integrating more or less adaptive capacity into 
a regulatory regime. 
A. Substantive Legal Adaptive Capacity 
 Substantive legal adaptive capacity refers to the extent to which a 
legal regime’s goals are capable of responding to changed conditions.  An 
agency with a high degree of substantive legal adaptive capacity has the 
authority under its organic legislation to adjust its interpretation of 
regulatory goals or the means of pursuing them to meet new challenges or 
accommodate changed circumstances.31 At the other end of the spectrum, a 
program with limited adaptive capacity has relatively rigid goals that do not 
allow agencies to alter regulatory or management approaches 
notwithstanding changed conditions. Of course, substantive legal adaptive 
capacity is only meant to identify the extent of elasticity in regulatory goals; 
as such, two regulatory regimes may have similar levels of substantive legal 
adaptive capacity but regulatory goals that are significantly different. 
 An example of extensive substantive legal capacity is provided by 
the Clean Air Act (CAA), which sets as its fundamental goal protection and 
enhancement of air quality to promote the public health and welfare.32   In 
Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court addressed a challenge to a denial 
by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) of a petition to regulate 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from new motor vehicles.33  The agency 
argued that GHGs did not qualify as “air pollutants” over which it had 
regulatory jurisdiction.34  It claimed, among other things, that climate 
change was such an important problem that unless the CAA “spoke with 
                                                          
31 See J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law As A Complex Adaptive System: How to 
Clean Up the Environment by Making A Mess of Environmental Law, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 
933, 938 (1997) (“Law . . . has the capacity to operate as a complex adaptive system.”). 
32 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (2006). 
33 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
34 The CAA requires EPA to limit emissions of “any air pollutant” from motor vehicles 
which may contribute to health or welfare endangerment.  42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006). 
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exacting specificity,” Congress could not have intended that EPA regulate 
GHGs that contribute to it. 35  The Court rejected EPA’s limited conception 
of its regulatory power.  It characterized the statutory definition of an “air 
pollutant”36 as “sweeping” and “capacious.”37  It made no difference that 
Congress may not have been cognizant when it adopted the statute in 1970 
of the risks posed by GHG emissions: 
While the Congresses that drafted § 202(a)(1) might not have 
appreciated the possibility that burning fossil fuels could lead to 
global warming, they did understand that without regulatory 
flexibility, changing circumstances and scientific developments 
would soon render the Clean Air Act obsolete.  The broad 
language of § 202(a)(1) reflects an intentional effort to confer the 
flexibility necessary to forestall such obsolescence.38 
Other courts have similarly construed the CAA as affording EPA broad 
flexibility to protect public health and welfare from air pollution in the face 
of uncertainty concerning evidence that is “on the frontiers of scientific 
knowledge.”39 
 The two different domestic regulatory regimes that govern the 
allocation of water provide a nice contrast between regulatory standards that 
provide more and less substantive legal adaptive capacity.  As Tony Arnold 
has recognized, a critical question is “whether American water law regimes 
                                                          
35 EPA also contended that Congress designed the CAA to address local air pollutants, not 
substances with consistent atmospheric concentrations, and that Congress declined to 
require EPA to regulate GHG emissions.  Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 512. 
36 The Act defines an “air pollutant” to include any “substance or matter which is emitted 
or otherwise enters the ambient air.”  42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (2006). 
37 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 528, 532. 
38 Id. at 532.  More generally, the environment’s responses to human activities “have a 
tremendous capacity . . . to take us by surprise despite our intensive efforts to study and 
predict them.”  Ruhl, supra note 31, at 954. 
39 Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1976).  Although the pliability of the 
CAA’s goals and the breadth of its definition of an air pollutant allowed EPA to regulate 
GHGs, an air pollutant that was not the focus of congressional concern in 1970, 
nevertheless not all of the statute’s substantive regulatory programs are well-suited to 
tackling climate change.  The national ambient air quality standards, for example, would 
not easily accommodate regulation of GHGs because they assume different localized 
pollutant concentrations, whereas GHG concentrations are uniform worldwide.  See Holly 
Doremus & W. Michael Hanemann, Of Babies and Bathwater: Why the Clean Air Act's 
Cooperative Federalism Framework Is Useful for Addressing Global Warming, 50 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 799, 821 (2008) (“The one conspicuous misfit between the present Clean Air Act 
and the global warming problem is the Act's reliance on national air quality standards.”); 
cf. Jacob Kavkewitz, Comment, Jamming the Square Peg through the Round Hole: EPA’s 
Options for Implementing Efficient Climate Change Regulation Under the Clean Air Act, 
4 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1001, 1002 (2013) (“Even though the CAA is not an ideal 
structure for addressing climate change, it is the most feasible option currently available 
domestically for making serious progress in reducing GHG emissions.”). 
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can become increasingly adaptive to changing conditions and sudden 
disturbances.”40  Arnold’s answer is two-fold.  He characterizes U.S. water 
law as “full of inflexible rules that inhibit adaptive responses to disturbances 
and changes,”41 pointing specifically to the prior appropriation system of 
water rights that governs water allocation in most western states.  In its 
traditional form, that system is composed of “a hard-edged, or ‘crystalline,’ 
set of rules” that, by creating vested property rights in permit holders, “locks 
in and protects historical uses, many of which were established over a 
hundred years ago in the western United States, without regard to whether 
those uses embody current views on the ‘highest and best use’ of limited 
water.”42  Among the advantages of the prior appropriation system are 
“predictability and certainty to support economic investment in 
consumptive uses of water.”43  Such advantages come at a substantial cost, 
however: 
The rigidity of the priority system discourages or prevents 
adaptive sharing of water during shortages.  The combination of 
measuring rights in specific quantities of appropriated water and 
the use-it-or-lose-it rule deter improved efficiencies and adaptive 
water conservation efforts.  The persistence of defining beneficial 
uses by historic rules and uses prevents regulators or courts from 
determining that some water uses are no longer well-adapted to 
the conditions in which they occur.44 
Arnold contrasts this rigidity with “the looser ‘muddy’ riparian doctrine 
followed in more water-rich areas.”45  Under that system for allocating 
access to water, “[a] riparian owner’s rights are limited by the requirement 
that his or her water use must be reasonable.  What is reasonable depends 
in part upon each riparian owner’s water use vis-à-vis other riparian owners, 
                                                          
40 Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Adaptive Water Law, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 1043, 1043 
(2014). 
41 Id. at 1057. 
42 Id.  Under a prior appropriation system, appropriators who secured their allocative rights 
before others did so are entitled to their full allocations before junior appropriators are 
entitled to any of theirs.  See, e.g., Aransas Project v. Shaw, 930 F. Supp. 2d 716, 738 n.28 
(S.D. Tex. 2013), rev’d on other grounds, 756 F.3d 801 (5th Cir. 2014), opinion amended 
and superseded, 774 F.3d 324 (5th Cir. 2014).  Prior appropriation doctrine may have lost 
some of its hard edges over time, however.  See Charles F. Wilkinson, In Memoriam: Prior 
Appropriation, 1848-1991, 21 ENVTL. L. xvi (1991).  The incorporation of market 
mechanisms into prior appropriation systems, for example, may allow reallocation of water 
rights to those who now value them most highly.  See A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of Prior 
Appropriation in the New West, 41 NAT. RESOURCES J. 769, 772 (2001); see generally 
James L. Huffman, Water Marketing in Western Prior Appropriation States: A Model for 
the East, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 429, 448 (2004). 
43 Arnold, supra note 40, at 1058. 
44 Id. at 1058. 
45 Id. at 1057; see generally Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Evolution of Riparianism in the 
United States, 95 MARQUETTE L. REV. 53, 87 (2011). 
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the public’s rights, and the circumstances of each case.  The test is a flexible 
one capable of changing over time . . . .”46 
 To the extent that substantive adaptive capacity includes not only 
the flexibility of a regime’s fundamental goal but also the controls and 
strategies employed to achieve that goal, the familiar distinction between 
rules and standards is also relevant to an assessment of the scope of a legal 
regime’s substantive adaptive capacity.47  Rules tend to be “clearly defined 
[and] highly administrable,” thus providing more certainty and regulatory 
efficiency, while standards “produc[e] ad hoc decisions with relatively little 
precedential value,”48 and thus are more concerned with the effectiveness 
of decision-making than efficiency.49   Professor Arnold draws on this 
distinction in describing an adaptive legal system as one that adapts to 
changing conditions by using “context-regarding standards and flexible 
discretionary decision making, in contrast to legal abstractions, rigid rules, 
and excessive limits on action and authority.”50  Others regard “the levels 
of clarity and flexibility” provided as “crucial to the distinction between 
rules and standards.”51  As Kathleen Sullivan has recognized, “[r]ules tend 
toward obsolescence.  Standards, by contrast, are flexible and permit 
decision-makers to adapt them to changing circumstances over time.”52  The 
distinction between rules and standards blurs at the edges, however, as “the 
categorical distinctions being attempted are not binary but more akin to a 
pluralism, continuum or synthesis.”53 
                                                          
46 Sherry A. Enzler et al., Finding a Path to Sustainable Water Management: Where We’ve 
Been, Where We Need to Go, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 842, 858 (2013). 
47 Frederick Schauer calls the distinction “tediously familiar.”  Frederick Schauer, The 
Tyranny of Choice and the Rulification of Standards, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 803, 
804 (2005). 
48 Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 
1685, 1685 (1976).  As Professor Schauer has put it, rule adopters make most of the 
substantive choices at the time of the drafting, while standards allow choices “to be made 
at the moment of application.”  Schauer, supra note 47, at 803.   
49 See Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards 
Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23, 36 (2000) (“[B]ecause rules are specified ex ante, even 
complex rules will sometimes fail to take account of all factual variations that might arise 
ex post which might be relevant to optimal tailoring of legal boundaries.”). 
50 Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Resilient Cities and Adaptive Law, 50 IDAHO L. REV. 
245, 253 (2014). 
51 Michael Faure et. al., The Regulator’s Dilemma: Caught Between the Need for Flexibility 
& the Demands of Foreseeability, Reassessing the Lex Certa Principle, 24 ALB. L.J. SCI. 
& TECH. 283, 292 (2014). 
52 Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 66 
(1992); see also Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 400 (1985) 
(claiming that “standards are seen as more appropriate when flexibility, individualization, 
open-endedness, and dynamism are important”). 
53 Alejandro E. Camacho, Going the Way of the Dodo: De-Extinction, Dualisms, and 
Reframing Conservation, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 44) 
(available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2478815). 
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B. Procedural Legal Adaptive Capacity 
 Procedural legal adaptive capacity measures the degree to which a 
legal regime’s process is able to adjust to new policy directions or 
information or changed factual circumstances.  According to Professor 
Arnold, “[a]n adaptive law system recognizes and embraces iterative 
processes among multiple participants, instead of linear decision-making 
and implementation processes by a single authority.”54  At one end of the 
spectrum of procedural adaptability is the U.S. Constitution, which, among 
other things, creates a rigorous process for amendment.  The Constitution 
“displays little tolerance for structural or process change.  It was designed 
to be hard to alter in design.”55  
 Other forms of lawmaking tend to be more procedurally adaptable, 
but not uniformly so.  The Anglo-American common law system, for 
example, is in some ways more procedurally adaptive than the legislative 
process.  A common law court has the capacity to distinguish previous cases 
when it addresses fact situations that differ from those previously 
presented.56  If Congress wants to amend a statute to address a new situation 
not covered by existing law, or because changed circumstances have 
undercut the effectiveness of existing law, it must follow the 
constitutionally prescribed method for changing the law – adoption of the 
same bill by both houses of Congress and either presidential signature or 
legislative override of a presidential veto by a two-thirds vote.57 
 Within the realm of administrative law, statutes make it easier for 
agencies to shift course in some contexts than in others.  The Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA), for example, imposes more rigorous procedural 
requirements for the adoption of formal than informal rules.58  Thus, an 
agency subject to formal rulemaking procedure is likely to have to devote 
                                                          
54 Arnold, supra note 50, at 253. 
55 Ruhl, supra note 29, at 1380.  Cf. Lazarus, supra note 1, at 1180 (describing “strong 
structural bias within our existing lawmaking institutions in favor of government acting 
slowly and incrementally.”); id. at 1198 (arguing that the Constitution makes lawmaking 
difficult “to guard against potential overreaction to more immediate impulses of the 
moment”). 
56 See, e.g., Ruhl, supra note 29, at 1381 (describing the American common law system as 
“an example of ecological resilience” with “a high capacity for swings in behavior in 
response to changing conditions without altering the system’s basic structure and process 
design”).  Justice Holmes’ “claim that legal doctrines evolve in response to changes in the 
social environment has become virtually a canon of professional faith for American 
lawyers.”  E. Donald Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 COLUM. L. 
REV. 38, 51 (1985).  Cf. Hornstein, supra note 1, at 921 (describing view that when 
common law doctrines were inefficient and judges made mistakes, people adversely 
affected by those rules “would have a greater incentive to litigate and relitigate them”). 
57 U.S. CONST. art. I, §7, cl. 2. 
58 Compare 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-557 (2006) with id. § 553(b)-(c). 
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more time and resources to rule promulgation than if it need only comply 
with notice-and-comment procedures.59  If an agency chooses to adopt a 
nonbinding non-legislative rule, most APA rulemaking requirements do not 
apply at all.60 
 Another aspect of regulation that leads to differential procedural 
legal adaptive capacity is the extent to which it relies on what one of us has 
referred to as “front-end decision-making” processes or “back-end 
adjustments.”61  Front-end requirements are designed to rationalize 
regulation on the basis of rational choice theory, microeconomic efficiency 
models, and cost-benefit analysis.62  “Back-end” mechanisms allow 
policymakers to make incremental adjustments in regulatory approaches or 
applications based on factors such as the actual impacts of regulation, 
changed circumstances, or information that was unavailable at the time of 
initial regulatory adoption.63  Reliance on back-end adjustments, such as 
variances, exceptions, or deadline extensions, mitigates the problems 
resulting from the bounded rationality facing agencies when they seek to 
design a one-shot solution at the inception of the regulatory process.64  The 
authority to make back-end adjustments creates regulatory flexibility that 
can mitigate unfair or unintended results, thereby increasing the legitimacy 
of regulatory efforts.65  That enhanced flexibility may come at a price, 
however, as reliance on back-end adjustments can water down regulatory 
standards and allow regulators to cater to the desires of regulated entities or 
beneficiaries in ways that may not be transparent.66 
 Professor Ruhl characterizes much of environmental law as fixated 
on reliance on front-end approaches such as environmental assessment and 
cost-benefit analysis, producing a system that “shows no signs of being 
                                                          
59 Cf. ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN & RICHARD E. LEVY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: AGENCY 
ACTION IN LEGAL CONTEXT 378 (Foundation Press 2d ed. 2014) (arguing that more 
extensive rulemaking procedures may “reduc[e] regulatory output” due to lengthier and 
more costly process); Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The Transformation of the U.S. Rulemaking 
Process—For Better or for Worse, 34 OHIO N. UNIV. L. REV. 469, 473-74 (2008) (finding 
that hybrid procedures contributed to a decline in rulemaking output of agencies like EPA).   
60 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2006). 
61 Glicksman & Shapiro, supra note 1, at 1179. 
62 Id. at 1183. 
63 Id. at 1179. 
64 See SIDNEY A SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK: 
RESTORING A PRAGMATIC APPROACH 23 (Stanford 2003) (describing bounded rationality 
as the result of “time, resource, and cognitive constraints that make it virtually impossible 
to verify that the solution [reflected in a regulation at the time of its adoption] chosen is 
optimal”). 
65 Glicksman & Shapiro, supra note 1, at 1185-87 (describing the potential benefits of back-
end adjustments). 
66 Glicksman & Shapiro, supra note 1, at 122-23. 
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flexible.”67  He asserts that this lack of flexibility tends to thwart efforts to 
adjust laws and “move toward ecological resilience strategies when 
variability is on the rise and prediction is unreliable.”68  Numerous other 
scholars have similarly criticized the procedural rigidity of environmental 
laws69 and administrative regulation more generally.70 One of us has 
previously characterized current natural resource management laws as 
directing “virtually all agency attention and resources . . . at the initial 
decision, regardless of how little information there is to make the decision.  
Once an initial decision is made, whether regarding an individual project or 
an entire program, the agency rarely revisits it in any systematic way to 
adjust the decision or learn from its successes or limitations for future 
actions.”71  As a result, “natural resource decision making reflects a static, 
front-end approach to resource regulation and management.”72   
 Many scholars urge greater reliance on a back-end technique that 
has received much attention in the environmental law literature, adaptive 
management.73  Adaptive management allows incremental policy and 
decision adjustments at the “back end,” under a framework in which altering 
course if conditions warrant is an essential ingredient.74  An adaptive 
management framework is “evolutionary . . . , relying on iterative cycles of 
goal determination, model building, performance standard setting, outcome 
monitoring, and standard recalibration.”75  It therefore provides greater 
adaptive capacity than a regulatory approach that creates procedural 
constraints on pursuing changes in initial regulatory strategies.  However, 
adaptive management may not be appropriate in all circumstances,76 and 
less rigorous alternatives to formal adaptive management, such as 
                                                          
67 Ruhl, supra note 29, at 1392. 
68 Id. at 1393. 
69 See, e.g., Camacho II, supra note 1, at 36-40. 
70 See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 1, at 3, 35; Michael C. Dorf & Charles E. Sabel, A 
Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998). 
71 Camacho, supra note 12, at 1414. 
72 Id. 
73 See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, Taking Adaptive Management Seriously: A Case Study of the 
Endangered Species Act, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1249 (2004). 
74 J.B. Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management—Is It Possible?, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & 
TECH. 21, 30 (2005); see also Bradley C. Karkkainen, Panarchy and Adaptive Change: 
Around the Loop and Back Again, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 59, 75 (2005). 
75 Ruhl, supra note 29, at 1391. 
76 See, e.g., HOLLY DOREMUS ET AL., CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, MAKING GOOD 
USE OF ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT 5-9 (2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1808106 (stating that adaptive 
management should only be used if there are information gaps, good prospects for learning, 
and opportunities for adjustment in the regulatory process). 
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contingency planning,77 also seek to incentivize iterative planning and 
periodic adjustments (and thus increase procedural adaptive capacity).78 
 Other forms of flexible decision-making processes that have 
received attention in the environmental policy arena include new 
governance and dynamic federalism.  “New governance” theory favors 
“collaborative, multi-party, multi-level, adaptive, problem-solving” 
governance, whose central organizing principles are “stakeholder 
participation, collaboration among interests, diversity of and competition 
between instruments, decentralization of governance structure, integration 
of policy domains, flexibility, and an emphasis on noncoerciveness and 
adaptation.”79  Dynamic federalism, in which regulatory jurisdiction is 
presumptively within the authority of both the federal and state 
governments, “builds scalability, modularity, and response diversity into 
the system.”80  Back-end adjustment regimes such as adaptive management 
or new governance are examples of regulatory approaches with a relatively 
high degree of procedural legal adaptive capacity.  
 The manner in which an agency’s structure is prescribed by statute, 
regulation, or other sources of law of course is connected to its procedural 
legal adaptive capacity.81  Scholars have discussed the relationship between 
structure and process in other contexts.82  The nature of an agency’s vertical 
hierarchy, for example, may determine the number of participating decision 
makers and the need for internal appeal or review procedures.  Similarly, 
scholarship has noted that how well an agency integrates scientific 
information into decision making or the extent of intra-agency 
                                                          
77 See, e.g., Gregg P. Macey, The Architecture of Ignorance, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 1627, 
1667 (2013) (discussing use of contingency planning to accommodate data gaps in 
environmental law). 
78 Camacho, supra note 12, at 1449. 
79 Ruhl, supra note 29, at 1397.  See Chelsea Rose Johansen, Solving “The Gravest Natural 
Resource Shortage You’ve Never Heard of”: Applying Transnational New Governance to 
the Phosphate Industry, 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 933 (2013).  For skepticism about the 
value of “institutional experimentation . . . under the new governance banner,” see Donald 
T. Hornstein, Resiliency, Adaptation, and the Upsides of Ex Post Lawmaking, 89 N.C. L. 
REV. 1549, 1555-56 (2011); Douglas Nejaime, When New Governance Fails, 70 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 323 (2009). 
80 Ruhl, supra note 29, at 1398, 1401.  See generally Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the 
Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159 (2006); Xuan-
Thao Nguyen, Dynamic Federalism and Patent Law Reform, 85 IND. L.J. 449 (2010). 
81 As noted above, Professor Ruhl distinguishes between a legal system’s structure and 
processes.  See Ruhl, supra note 29, at 1379. 
82 See, e.g., Jonathan Rothchild, Law, Religion, and Culture: The Function of System in 
Niklas Luhmann and Kathryn Tanner, 24 J.L. & RELIGION 475, 494 (2009) (referring to 
“the relationship between structure and operation (process), or norm and action, or rule and 
decision”).  For further discussion of the manner in which agency structure can affect legal 
adaptive capacity, see infra notes 468-472 and accompanying text (discussing the impact 
of the BLM’s decentralized structure on its approach to climate change adaptation). 
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centralization or coordination can influence the capacity of an agency to 
adapt.83  Indeed, proponents of adaptive management have emphasized the 
development of formal organizational structures that can promote adaptive 
decision making.84 
C. Legal Adaptive Capacity and Values Tradeoffs  
The absence of either substantive or procedural legal adaptive 
capacity may hinder an agency’s ability to accommodate changed 
circumstances in pursuing statutory goals.  The lack of adaptability is 
troublesome if existing legal rules produce outcomes that were once desired 
but are no longer acceptable.85  As Richard Lazarus has argued, 
“[f]lexibility is necessary to allow for the modification of legal requirements 
over time in light of new information.”86  Yet, legal adaptive capacity is not 
uniformly desirable.87  Donald Hornstein has noted that “there is such a 
thing as too much adaptivity” and substantive resilience and adaptability in 
a legal system is not “an unalloyed good.”88  As the debate over the 
desirability of rules and standards reveals, adaptive and non-adaptive legal 
systems each have advantages and disadvantages.  In choosing the desirable 
form and extent of adaptability, those designing a legal system need to 
assess and strike a balance between the benefits and costs of adaptability. 
A regime with limited substantive legal adaptive capacity has 
certain advantages over a more loosely defined and adaptable system.  
Because decision-makers, such as agencies, have less flexibility, they may 
apply legal rules more consistently than if their ability to craft contextual 
legal solutions is more expansive.  Consistency in decision-making may 
promote stability and fairness and protect against arbitrariness.89 A non-
adaptive system is also likely to generate more predictable results, creating 
                                                          
83 See, e.g., Robert L. Fischman, The National Wildlife Refuge System and the Hallmarks 
of Modern Organic Legislation, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 457, 555 (2002) (discussing FWS’s 
weak integration of data influencing its ability to respond to new circumstances); Lawrence 
Susskind et al., A Critical Assessment of Collaborative Adaptive Management in Practice, 
49 J. APPLIED ECOLOGY 47 (2011) (discussing cases of weak integration of scientific 
information into decision making influencing capacity of a regulatory program to adapt).   
84 See, e.g., Camacho II, supra note 1; Dorf & Sabel, supra note 70. 
85 See Ruhl, supra note 29, at 1382. 
86 Lazarus, supra note 1, at 1157.   
87 Id. at 1205-07 (proposing limits on capacity for certain future alterations to legislation 
addressing climate change). 
88 Hornstein, supra note 79, at 1552. Hornstein refers to a resilient legal system that returns 
to path-dependent roots or is based on “suspect or even despised intellectual foundations.” 
Id.   
89 See Sullivan, supra note 52, at 62.  Rules may generate unfair results, however.  See 
Ruhl, supra note 29, at 1402 (noting tradeoffs between a legal system’s resilience and the 
stability of its substantive content). 
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a degree of certainty that an adaptive system likely cannot match.90  
Certainty, in turn, may create incentives for affected interests to commit to 
actions and investments they may avoid if legal outcomes are 
unpredictable.91  In addition, a non-adaptive system may be more efficient 
to administer because decision-makers such as agencies choose from a 
limited number of prescribed solutions rather than inventing new 
approaches on a case-by-case basis.92 
In contrast, a legal system characterized by significant substantive 
legal adaptive capacity is likely better at allowing decision-makers such as 
agencies to reach results that promote relevant policy goals in unanticipated 
or changed circumstances.  A regime that lacks such capacity is likely to 
sacrifice the potential to tailor decisions to changing conditions in ways that 
promote regulatory or management goals.93   A substantively adaptive 
system thus can reduce the risk that the quest for consistency leads to the 
application of fixed and bright-line rules to factual contexts for which they 
were not designed or are otherwise ill-matched.94   
Substantive legal adaptive capacity also may increase the risk that 
agencies will abuse their discretionary authority.  For example, flexible 
goals provide an increased capacity to promote the interests of favored 
constituencies instead of the broader public interest.95  Statutory constraints 
on substantive flexibility can minimize such “slippage.”96  One important 
question for policymakers, therefore, is whether they regard it as more 
important to create a substantively nimble legal system or to reduce the risk 
that agencies vested with broad flexibility to accommodate solutions to 
novel challenges will stray from or subvert statutory goals.97   
                                                          
90 Cf. Eric Biber, Adaptive Management and the Future of Environmental Law, 46 AKRON 
L. REV. 933, 948 (2013) (arguing that flexibility creates uncertainty, which “creates 
significant costs—economic, social, psychological” for communities in which adaptive 
management is occurring). 
91 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 
1179 (1989) (arguing that rules promote desirable predictability). 
92 Sullivan, supra note 52, at 63 (explaining how rules promote economies for legal 
decision makers). 
93 Camacho, supra note 53, at 44. 
94 Sullivan, supra note 52, at 62 (noting that “bright-line rules are arbitrary at the border). 
95 See Craig, supra note 12, at 64 (“Of course, increasing regulatory flexibility always 
opens the door to potential abuse.”); see also Robert L. Glicksman, Ecosystem Resilience 
to Disruptions Linked to Global Climate Change: An Adaptive Approach to Federal Land 
Management, 87 NEB. L. REV. 833, 836-37, 862 (2009) (describing the problematic nature 
of excessive grants of discretion).  Some have argued, for example, that the flexible 
multiple use mandate that governs USFS and BLM land management has resulted in such 
a skewing of agency priorities.  See, e.g., Jan G. Laitos &Thomas A. Carr, The 
Transformation on Public Lands, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 140, 212 (1999).  
96 Biber, supra note 90, at 949. 
97 Cf. Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 
1, 5 (2014) (identifying “the central challenge of the modern administrative state: how to 
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Choosing the desirable level of a legal system’s procedural legal 
adaptive capacity turns on similar tradeoffs. A non-adaptive system that 
relies on front-end decision making is likely to be less resource-intensive.  
An iterative process such as adaptive management has both direct 
implementation costs and opportunity costs,98 as do information-sharing 
frameworks.99  In addition, some forms of process flexibility (such as the 
authority to craft policy through non-legislative rules) can lead to reduced 
public participation, which can impair the information base on which 
agencies make decisions and reduce accountability.100  Further, flexibility 
and back-end techniques may delay decision-making to a time when 
resource constraints prevent or impair the quality of agency management 
actions.101  Furthermore, agencies purporting to engage in adaptive 
management or other forms of iterative decision-making may actually be 
“kicking the can down the road” by deferring difficult decisions to an 
undetermined future time.  Such an approach obviously reduces 
accountability.102 Policymakers should consider whether they are 
comfortable with the likelihood that experimentation with context-specific 
solutions will sometimes fail.  Such failures may result in lost or impaired 
resources; however, reliance on an inflexible management regime to deal 
with changed circumstances may produce similar or even greater harm.103  
Finally, reducing uncertainty beyond a certain point may be impossible, and 
problems may demand immediate attention that do not provide the luxury 
of learning through iterative approaches such as adaptive management.104 
On the other hand, heightened procedural legal adaptive capacity 
may allow agencies to act more quickly than under a less adaptive system.  
An agency that has the choice of pursuing statutory policies through either 
                                                          
balance the pragmatic need for administrative flexibility with respect for the rule of law 
and democratic values”). 
98 See id. at 945-46.  For further discussion of the disadvantages of reliance on adaptive 
management and similar forms of process flexibility and dynamism, see HOLLY DOREMUS 
ET AL., CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, MAKING GOOD USE OF ADAPTIVE 
MANAGEMENT 5-9 (2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1808106. 
99 See Flatt, supra note 14, at 284 (noting that detrimental impact of underfunding on 
information-sharing). 
100 Biber, supra note 90, at 949.  See also Gregory N. Mandel & Gary E. Marchant, The 
Living Regulatory Challenges of Synthetic Biology, 100 IOWA L. REV. 155, 195 (2014). 
101 Biber, supra note 90, at 950. 
102 See DOREMUS ET AL., supra note 92, at 11 (“One of the most significant weaknesses of 
adaptive management to date has been that agencies have promised future adaptation but 
not delivered it.”); J.B. Ruhl & Robert L. Fischman, Adaptive Management in the Courts, 
95 MINN. L. REV. 440, 461 (2010) (discussing “temptation of adaptive management . . . to 
lavish attention on the iterative process at the expense of addressing the substantive 
management criteria required by law”). 
103 Biber, supra note 90, at 947. 
104 Id. at 940-42.  
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legislative or non-legislative rules, for example, can respond more quickly 
to the need for action by avoiding the procedural steps that accompany 
adoption of a binding rule.  Another important potential advantage of more 
iterative forms of expansive procedural legal adaptive capacity is to afford 
agencies and other decision-makers the flexibility to make decisions based 
on less-than-perfect information, monitor the results, re-evaluate the initial 
decision, and, if appropriate, adjust future management.105  Many scholars 
and policymakers have extolled the benefits of adopting processes that 
integrate continued monitoring and adjustment, including increased 
effectiveness, legitimacy, and potentially even long-term implementation 
costs.106  The benefits of increased procedural adaptive capacity may be 
particularly strong in regulatory contexts where there is incomplete 
understanding and the regulated system is changing.107 
In short, those designing or refashioning a legal regime, including 
one that governs natural resource management in the era of climate change, 
should consider the tradeoffs involved in identifying the appropriate degree 
of both substantive and procedural legal adaptive capacity.  Of course, the 
desirability of more or less adaptive legal regimes will depend on context, 
and the assessment of such tradeoffs may itself vary if the regime’s 
underlying circumstances fundamentally change.  Adaptability, substantive 
or procedural, may be the superior choice in situations characterized by 
dynamism and complexity, but not where those features are lacking and 
malleability gains do not offset the loss of values like predictability and 
accountability.108 
II. CLIMATE DISRUPTION AND LEGAL ADAPTIVE CAPACITY 
 Unfortunately, global climate change is shifting both the physical 
and regulatory landscape for federal conservation lands to such an extent 
that it makes reconsideration of the legal adaptive capacity of longstanding 
management regimes appropriate.  Over the next several decades, climate 
change is widely anticipated to have significant effects on the various 
                                                          
105 See Craig & Ruhl, supra note 1, at 4. 
106 See, e.g., BYRON K. WILLIAMS ET AL., ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT WORKING GROUP, 
ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT: THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR TECHNICAL GUIDE 17 
(2007); Freeman, supra note 1, at 28; Alejandro E. Camacho, Mustering the Missing 
Voices: A Collaborative Model for Fostering Equality, Community Involvement and 
Adaptive Planning in Land Use Decisions, Installment Two, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 269, 
307-14 (2005) (detailing studies analyzing flexible, collaborative processes and finding 
better quality decisions, more public acceptability, and decreased long-term cost); Dorf & 
Sabel, supra note 70, at 285. 
107 See DOREMUS ET AL., supra note 92, at 5. 
108 See Biber, supra note 90, at 958-59.  Biber adds, however, that “where dynamism and 
complexity [are] so high that learning is impossible, we might again be better off with 
relatively rigid, inflexible standards based on front-end analysis.” 
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federal lands.109  Even if significant and widespread mitigation strategies 
are adopted that substantially reduce carbon emissions worldwide, federal 
lands will experience substantial and potentially detrimental effects for 
decades.110  All four major land systems will be affected.  Species may 
become separated from key habitat in federal wildlife refuges.  For example, 
projected sea level rise may significantly alter habitat at coastal refuges for 
protected plant and animal species.111  Sea-level rise is expected to affect 
173 wildlife refuges.112  Climate change is also anticipated to significantly 
alter the natural resources in national parks.  According to the U.S. 
Geological Survey (USGS), for example, some of the largest glaciers in 
Glacier National Park may melt by 2030.113  On the BLM public lands, 
climate change may exacerbate existing stressors such as wildfires and 
invasive species, impairing the BLM’s ability to manage those lands for 
multiple uses.114  Persistent droughts, for example, may force the BLM to 
limit livestock grazing to protect drought-stressed plant and animal 
species.115  Wildfires, invasive species, and extreme weather events are 
already affecting national forests, and will be exacerbated by climate 
change.116  These physical and biological changes raise fundamental 
challenges to the resilience of natural ecosystems117 and thus to the agencies 
charged with managing the nation’s federal public lands.  
 More fundamentally, there is growing recognition that these 
physical and biological effects are already putting substantial stress on 
existing natural resource legal regimes, and these regimes increasingly will 
                                                          
109 See Robert L. Glicksman, Governance of Public Lands, Public Agencies, and Natural 
Resources, in THE LAW OF ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE: U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL 
AGENCIES 441-79 (Michael Gerrard & Katrina Kuh eds., ABA 2012); Robert L. 
Glicksman, Facing Unprecedented Stewardship Challenges: Climate Change and Federal 
Land Management, in CLIMATE CHANGE: A READER 422-39 (William Rodgers et al. eds., 
Carolina 2011); Glicksman, supra note 95, at 839-51. 
110 Cf. Robert L. Glicksman, Climate Change Adaptation: A Collective Action Perspective 
on Federalism Considerations, 40 ENVTL. L. 1159, 1160-62 (2010) (discussing climate 
change to which the world is already committed, notwithstanding future mitigation efforts). 
111 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Various Adaptation Efforts Are Under 
Way at Key Natural Resources Management Agencies, GAO-13-253, at 13 (2013), 
http://www.gao.gov/products/gao-13-253). 
112 U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., National Wildlife Refuge System: Climate Change 
Planning, http://www.fws.gov/refuges/planning/ClimateChangePlanning.html.  
113 GAO, supra note 111, at 14.  
114 See RANGELAND FIRE TASK FORCE, AN INTEGRATED RANGELAND FIRE MANAGEMENT 
STRATEGY: FINAL REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR 1, 14 (2015), 
http://www.forestsandrangelands.gov/rangeland/documents/IntegratedRangelandFireMan
agementStrategy_FinalReportMay2015.pdf [hereinafter FIRE MANAGEMENT]. 
115 Id. at 16-17.  
116 Id. at 9.  
117 See Alejandro Camacho & T. Douglas Beard, Maintaining Resilience in the Face of 
Climate Change, in SOCIAL-ECOLOGICAL RESILIENCE AND LAW 235 (Ahjond S. 
Garmestani & Craig T. Allen, eds., 2014). 
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have trouble coping with these stressors.118  Climate change considerably 
elevates the level of uncertainty for resource management due to the 
increased complexity and various potentially confounding variables.119  
This increased uncertainty, when combined with the limited adaptive 
capacity of existing natural resource laws and management institutions,120 
is a more serious concern than climate change’s potential physical 
effects.121  Climate change raises serious impediments to the capacity of the 
laws and institutions governing public land management to serve the 
purposes for which they were established.122  
 Various scholars thus assert that existing law and institutions need 
to adapt to manage effectively the challenges raised by climate change.123  
More precisely, scholars and policymakers increasingly acknowledge that 
climate change necessitates improved procedural adaptive capacity.  Many 
have encouraged the integration of procedural or structural adaptation 
strategies to increase regulatory institutions’ ability to manage the 
uncertainty of climate change, such as scenario planning,124 adaptive 
management,125 or agency structures that promote learning through the 
                                                          
118 See Craig, supra note 12, at 30 (asserting that climate change adaptation “challenges . . 
. the existing capacity of legal institutions”); Ruhl, supra note 29, at 1375-76. 
119 J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change and the Endangered Species Act: Building Bridges to the 
No-Analog Future, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1, 15 (2008); Camacho II, supra note 1, 13-15. 
120 See ROBERT L PETERS, BEYOND CUTTING EMISSIONS: PROTECTING WILDLIFE AND 
ECOSYSTEMS IN A WARMING WORLD, DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE 20, 22 (2008), available at 
http://www.defenders.org/publications/beyond_cutting_emissions.pdf; THE WHITE HOUSE 
COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, PROGRESS REPORT OF THE INTERAGENCY CLIMATE 
ADAPTATION TASK FORCE 4 (March 16, 2010), available at 
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121 See Camacho II, supra note 1, 12-15 (demonstrating how existing governance is poorly 
equipped to deal with impediments to climate change adaptation due to unprecedented 
uncertainty). 
122 Similar challenges to existing legal regimes are often posed by technological changes.  
See, e.g., Mandel & Marchant, supra note 100, at 162. 
123 See, e.g., Camacho II, supra note 1, 64; Craig, supra note 12, at 16; Victor B. Flatt & 
Jeremy M. Tarr, Adaptation, Legal Resiliency, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers: 
Managing Water Supply in A Climate-Altered World, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1499, 1500 (2011). 
124 See generally ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: SCENARIOS, VOLUME 2 (Steve 
R. Carpenter et al. eds., 2005). 
125 Tompkins & Adger, supra note 21, at 1–2; J. Michael Scott et al., National Wildlife 
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ECOSYSTEMS AND RESOURCES 37, 121 (Susan Herrod Julius & Jordan M. West eds., 2008), 
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Camacho II, supra note 1, at 70-76. 
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collection, dissemination, and use of information about climate effects and 
management strategies.126   
 However, few scholars or policymakers have paid sufficient 
attention to the significance of substantive legal adaptive capacity.  
Professor Craig has described a mismatch between climate change 
adaptation and the preservation and restoration goals in certain pollution 
control and natural resource laws.127  Similarly, one of us has raised 
questions about the long-term compatibility of natural resources laws that 
primarily focus on promoting historical or wildness preservation with the 
promotion of ecological health in the face of climate change.128  Eric Biber 
and Elisabeth Long have addressed the capacity of agencies managing 
wilderness to accommodate climate change.129  The remainder of this 
Article systematically evaluates the relationship between federal land law 
goals and the production of effective responses to climate change impacts 
as an example of how substantive legal adaptive capacity can influence 
responses to unanticipated regulatory challenges or changing 
circumstances. 
III. ASSESSING FEDERAL LAND LEGAL ADAPTIVE CAPACITY AND 
CLIMATE ADAPTATION 
Although Congress has not adopted comprehensive climate change 
adaptation legislation, federal agencies have engaged in adaptation planning 
activities for over a decade, to varying degrees.  The five major federal 
natural resource management systems—national forests, public lands, 
national wildlife refuges, national parks, and designated wilderness—have 
been subject to a similar suite of initiatives at the White House or 
Departmental level to engage in climate change adaptation activities.  The 
President, DOI, and USDA have repeatedly directed and provided guidance 
to agencies to integrate climate change adaptation into their policies and 
programs.  Nonetheless, these five land systems have been subject to a wide 
                                                          
126 See Camacho II, supra note 1, at 1 (recommending development of “adaptive 
governance” framework); PROGRESS REPORT OF THE INTERAGENCY CLIMATE 
ADAPTATION TASK FORCE, supra note 112, at 6 (recommending “a commitment to 
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Camacho, supra note 120, at 1825-31. 
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Resource Law under Climate Change, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 244-45 (2010); Camacho, 
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variation in the types and degree of climate change adaptation.130  This Part 
explores the extent to which legal adaptive capacity correlates with the 
extent of adaptation planning and implementation activities to date for each 
of the five land regimes. 
Historically, the approaches to land and resource management have 
differed sharply among federal land systems.  The BLM and the USFS, 
often referred to as multiple use agencies,131 for significant parts of their 
histories, tended to be driven—and some assert captured—by consumptive 
uses.132  The USFS has been considered by many to be primarily focused 
on timber harvesting.133  The BLM has long been closely linked to 
facilitating grazing134 and mineral development.135  These two agencies’ 
organic statutes, the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA)136 
and the National Forest Management Act (NFMA),137 are largely 
pragmatic, utilitarian, and instrumental.138  They literally endorse 
sustainability – which, under at least some interpretations, amounts to 
maintenance of ecological function or integrity139 – and delegate broad 
discretion to do what is necessary to achieve it.  The substantive 
management mandates under these two statutes are also highly flexible.  
The multiple-use, sustained-yield standards that govern the BLM and the 
                                                          
130 Cf. Archie et al., supra note 14 (finding that “[t]he only statistically robust predictor of 
being farther along in the adaptation process was the agency identity itself”). 
131 See generally 3 GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC 
NATURAL RESOURCES LAW ch. 30 (2d ed. 2007). 
132 See, e.g., Holly Doremus, Science Plays Defense: Natural Resource Management in the 
Bush Administration, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 249, 282 (2005). 
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PRIA, and the Multiple Use Mandate, 14 ENVTL. L. 1, 16 (1983) (“Multiple use, sustained 
yield is basically a utilitarian principle . . . .”); Scott W. Hardt, Federal Land Management 
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REV. 345, 378 (1994). 
139 See Lia Helena Monteiro de Lima Demange, The Principle of Resilience, 30 PACE 
ENVTL. L. REV. 695, 808 (2013); Aphrodite Smagadi, Analysis of the Objectives of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity: Their Interrelation and Implementation Guidance for 
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USFS “breathe discretion at every pore.”140  Accordingly, we argue that the 
BLM and the USFS have relatively expansive legal adaptive capacity and 
are therefore relatively well positioned to engage in meaningful climate 
change adaptation activities.141 
Wilderness management aside, the USFS has in fact responded with 
greater alacrity and precision to the White House or Departmental prompts 
than agencies responsible for managing any of the other land systems.  This 
includes the BLM, even though presidential directives apply equally to the 
two agencies and DOI began imposing adaptation mandates on its agencies 
about a decade before USDA.  Though differences in the extent that goal 
modification was compulsory may account for these disparities, the BLM’s 
slower responsiveness is likely due in part to other factors that hindered its 
willingness or ability to take advantage of its adaptive authority.142 
Other federal land systems are subject to different management 
prescriptions.  The FWS143 and the NPS,144 which are sometimes 
characterized as dominant use agencies,145 are often regarded as more 
committed to the conservation of the natural resources they manage than the 
USFS or the BLM.146  One might therefore expect the FWS and the NPS to 
be more attentive to the potential effects of climate change on their 
jurisdictional lands and to be more apt to embrace the task of preparing to 
adapt to these changes.147   
Yet, the rules governing the NPS’ and the FWS’ management 
authority afford them less substantive legal adaptive capacity than provided 
for national forests and BLM lands.    The organic statute and interpretive 
policies that govern management of the national parks, and the FWS’s 
implementing regulations and policies for the National Wildlife Refuge 
                                                          
140 Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 661 F.3d 1209, 1235 (10th Cir. 2011); Perkins v. 
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141 Cf. Archie et al., supra note 14 (arguing that institutional contexts such as statutory 
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142 See infra Part IV. 
143 The FWS) administers the national wildlife refuges through its authority under the 
National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act. See 16 U.S.C. § 668dd (2006). 
144 The NPS manages the national parks through the authority granted it under the National 
Park Service Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
145 See 3 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 131, at pt. H (characterizing the organic 
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the NPS’s “pride in wearing the stewardship mantle”); Doremus, supra note 132, at 282 
(describing the FWS as an agency whose mission is primarily resource conservation). 
147 See Fischman, et al., supra note 9, at 993. 
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System (NWRS), seek to preserve those lands, typically by reference to an 
historical baseline.  Importantly, agency interpretations and management 
“ha[ve] historically been based on the idea of maintaining current 
environmental conditions or restoring species and habitats to some desired 
former condition.”148    For NPS lands and wildlife refuges in Alaska or that 
include official wilderness, the preferred if not required approach is 
minimalist management to non-intervention.  Official wilderness that is part 
of the National Wilderness Preservation System is subject to management 
mandates under the Wilderness Act of 1964 that are most closely rooted in 
non-intervention.   
Neither the historical nor wildness preservation goal fits well with 
the management approaches needed to promote ecological health in a 
changing climate.  Climate change may obliterate historical conditions, 
making management to retain them very costly if not impossible.  It also 
will increasingly require active management to retain or restore ecological 
health.  In short, the NWRS’s integration of historical preservation with 
more flexible sustainability goals makes it subject to a moderate level of 
substantive legal adaptive capacity; national parks, which are more heavily 
tied to historical preservation, are governed under a regime with limited 
substantive legal adaptive capacity; while the emphasis on non-intervention 
in official wilderness provides the least adaptive capacity.   
It is therefore not surprising to us that these regimes have not 
incorporated climate change adaptation into their decision-making 
frameworks yet to the same extent that the USFS has.  In fact, the extent of 
adaptation activities correlates with the substantive adaptive capacity of the 
land regime, with refuges having made more progress on adaptation, 
followed by national parks.  In the context of wilderness management, 
climate change adaptation has essentially gone missing. 
A. Executive Branch and Department-Wide Initiatives 
 President Barack Obama has consistently prioritized climate 
preparedness.  He issued an executive order in 2009 establishing a task force 
to create an initial adaptation strategy and directing all federal agencies to 
develop vulnerability assessments and adaptation plans.149  Subsequently, 
the President directed agencies to protect biodiversity and conserve natural 
resources in the face of climate change.150  A second executive order issued 
in 2013 replaced the initial task force with a multi-agency Council on 
                                                          
148 GAO, supra note 111, at 19 (2013). 
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Climate Preparedness and Resilience tasked with recommending actions to 
encourage climate preparedness and resilience.151  
 In 2014, the Council issued a report152 identifying priority strategies 
to make the nation’s natural resources more resilient to climate change, 
including (1) fostering climate-resilient lands and waters and (2) 
modernizing federal programs to build resilience.153  The report concluded 
that despite progress in pursuing the first strategy,154 “management at the 
landscape scale is not yet the norm.”155  It directed agencies to develop and 
provide decision-support tools to improve their capacity to manage for 
resilience and to select priority areas for conservation, restoration, or other 
investments to build resilience.156  The report further directed specific 
agencies, including DOI and USDA, to develop “resilience metrics.”157  
With respect to the second priority, the Council directed agencies with 
natural resources responsibilities to identify best practices for applying 
resilience criteria to program management.158  For the most part, the 
Council’s directives apply to all federal agencies with natural resources-
related responsibilities.  The details of implementation in many cases, 
however, are left to departments or individual agencies within departments.  
 DOI has long engaged in department-wide climate change 
adaptation initiatives.  In 2001, the Interior Secretary issued an order 
directing DOI agencies to consider climate change impacts in planning, 
priority-setting, and resource management.159  In 2009, Interior Secretary 
Kenneth Salazar replaced that order with Secretarial Order 3289,160 which 
established a Climate Change Response Council to execute a coordinated 
Department-wide strategy.161  The Secretary directed the Council to work 
with the USGS to rename previously created “regional hubs” as Regional 
                                                          
151 Exec. Order No. 13653, Preparing the United States for the Impacts of Climate Change, 
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Climate Change Response Centers (CSCs) to develop adaptation tools for 
use by DOI managers.162 It also called for the development of Landscape 
Conservation Cooperatives (LCCs) to coordinate regional adaptation 
efforts.163  With the FWS serving as primary coordinator, each LCC serves 
as a conduit for interagency communication on regional landscape 
conservation.164  Like its predecessor, Order 3289 imposed uniform 
mandates on all DOI agencies. 
 In 2012, DOI included in its Departmental Manual new provisions 
relating to climate change adaptation.165  The provisions commit DOI to 
integration of climate change adaptation strategies into its policies, 
planning, programs, and operations, including park, refuge, and public land 
management; habitat restoration; species and ecosystem conservation; 
water management; and land acquisition.166  The Manual specifies that DOI 
will manage uncertainty through tools such as scenario planning and 
adaptive management, and will promote landscape-scale, ecosystem-based 
management approaches to enhance resilience and sustainability of linked 
human and natural systems.167  It commits DOI to develop performance 
metrics in management plans and regularly assess whether such measures 
are succeeding.168  Bureau and office heads must incorporate adaptation into 
planning processes, develop and implement adaptation plans, and update 
decision-making processes to integrate the policy’s principles and values.169  
However, DOI specified that the policy is only designed to improve its 
internal management, creates no enforceable rights, and “does not alter or 
affect any existing duty or authority of individual bureaus.”170 
 The DOI issued a Climate Change Adaptation Plan in 2013 that 
recognized that “[v]ulnerabilities to climate change impacts vary widely 
across the Department’s mission areas.  Bureaus’ climate change adaptation 
priorities and needs depend on the particular vulnerabilities of their mission 
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and assets.”171 The plan nevertheless enunciated “guiding principles” for all 
bureaus and offices.  These included ensuring enhancing the ability of 
ecosystems and wildlife populations to absorb change and maintain key 
qualities through means such as protection and restoration of contiguous 
blocks of un-fragmented habitat and enhanced connectivity among habitat 
blocks.172  The plan also stated that DOI would require individual agencies 
to establish adaptation-related planning priorities.173 
 In 2014, DOI issued a more elaborate plan, which described its 
“evolving” approach to climate change adaptation.174   This plan identified 
climate adaptation priorities for the three DOI land management agencies.  
For the BLM, these included conducting vulnerability assessments and 
strengthening landscape level planning efforts.175  For the NPS, they 
included developing guidance for incorporating climate change science into 
park and strategic plans and implementing those plans at the field level, and 
evaluation of risk and prioritization of adaptation actions to protect facilities 
and cultural and historical resources.176  For the FWS, the priorities included 
facilitating sustainable landscapes through LCC-based collaborative 
planning and management and developing a climate change policy 
framework.177   
 The 2014 plan also identified five principal strategies for managing 
climate risks and building resilience.  One strategy is to mainstream and 
integrate climate change adaptation into both agency-wide and regional 
planning efforts.  An example is the FWS’s efforts through LCCs and CSCs 
to develop shared adaptation goals with conservation partners and develop 
resilient landscape designs.  As of fiscal year 2014, the design of these 
efforts was underway or project activity had been initiated.178  Another 
strategy is to enforce protocols that reflect projected health and safety 
impacts of climate change.  One example is NPS efforts to factor sea level 
rise and storm surge science into hurricane response plans for coastal parks.  
Progress is again seemingly described as rudimentary: design underway or 
project activity initiated.179  Yet another strategy involves updating external 
                                                          
171 Department of the Interior Climate Change Adaptation Plan for FY 2013, at 1, 
http://www.doi.gov/greening/sustainability_plan/upload/DOI_Climate_Adaptation_Plan_
for_FY2013_for_release.pdf.  
172 Id. at 4-8. 
173 Id. at 11-12. 
174 Department of the Interior, Climate Change Adaptation Plan 2014, at 3, 
http://www.doi.gov/greening/sustainability_plan/upload/2014_DOI_Climate_Change_Ad
aptation_Plan.pdf.  
175 Id. at 11. 
176 Id. at 12-13. 
177 Id. at 13. 
178 Id. at 26-27. 
179 Id. at 28. 
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programs and policies (e.g., through grants and technical assistance) to 
incentivize planning for and addressing climate impacts.  What is striking 
about all of these examples is how far from broad scale, on-the-ground 
implementation all of them appear to be. 
 USDA began planning for climate change about a decade after DOI.  
Departmental Regulation 1070-001, issued in 2011, established a USDA-
wide directive to integrate climate change adaptation planning and actions 
into programs, policies, and operations.180  The Regulation required USDA 
agencies to analyze how climate change may affect missions and program 
objectives, identify necessary budgetary adjustments, and specify areas in 
which legal analysis is needed to implement the Regulation.181  It also 
directed agencies to consider climate impacts in long-term planning.182 
 Two years later, USDA issued a Strategic Sustainability Plan that 
committed it to develop, prioritize, implement, and evaluate actions to 
minimize climate risks.183  The plan identified nine sustainability goals, the 
last of which was promoting climate change resiliency.184  By fiscal year 
2014, USDA would implement agency-specific adaptation plans.185  It 
would also incorporate preparedness and resilience into planning and 
implementation guidelines for specific projects.186 
 USDA’s 2014 Climate Change Adaptation Plan noted the need for 
flexibility to adapt to the uncertainty reflected in climate change 
projections.187  The Plan identified five strategic goals,188 including 
ensuring that the national forests are “conserved, restored, and made more 
                                                          
180 USDA, Departmental Regulation 1070-001, at 1 (June 3, 2011), available at 
http://www.ocio.usda.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2012/DR%201070-
001%20USDA%20Policy%20on%20Climate%20Change.pdf.  USDA had issued a 
strategic plan the year before which included as one of four strategic goals promoting 
resilience to climate change.  It also released a Climate Change Science Plan that year, 
which sought to incorporate climate change into USDA’s scientific missions.  USGCRP, 
SYNTHESIS, supra note 8, at 16-17. 
181 Id. at 2. 
182 Id. at 2-3. 
183 USDA, 2013 Strategic Sustainability Performance Plan iii (June 21, 2013), available at 
http://www.dm.usda.gov/emd/docs/2013%20USDA%20Strategic%20Sustainability%20P
erformance%20Plan.pdf.  
184 Id. at xi-xii. 
185 Id. at 33. 
186 Id. at 34. 
187 USDA Climate Change Adaptation Plan 1 (June 2014), available at 
http://www.usda.gov/oce/climate_change/adaptation/adaptation_plan.htm.  
188 USDA had previously identified these goals in its Strategic Plan for fiscal years 2014-
2018.  USDA, Strategic Plan FY 2014-2018, at 3, available at 
http://www.usda.gov/documents/usda-strategic-plan-fy-2014-2018.pdf. 
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resilient to climate change.”189  The Plan included adaptation plans by 
individual USDA agencies, including the USFS’s plan,190 which is 
discussed below.191 
B. The National Forests 
 The USFS’s management of national forests entails considerable 
legal adaptive capacity as a result of both flexible substantive management 
goals that focus on promoting sustainable ecological function and the 
integration of flexible processes for resource management.  The USFS has 
leveraged this substantial legal adaptive capacity to engage in the most 
extensive climate-related planning of the four land management agencies 
and to integrate consideration of and preparation for climate change into its 
management processes. 
1. Adaptive Capacity under NFMA 
 The USFS derives its management and regulatory authority from the 
National Forest Management Act (NFMA).192  NFMA’s focus on 
promoting long-term ecological sustainability and diversity as part of a 
multiple-use, sustained-yield regime provides a flexible resource 
management goal that is able to accommodate ecological change.   
 In advancing its focus on long-term productive use of national 
forests, NFMA is replete with references to the need to accommodate 
change in management.  The statute’s very first subsection includes a 
congressional finding that “the management of the Nation’s renewable 
resources is highly complex and the uses, demand for, and supply of the 
various resources are subject to change over time.”193  The statute 
enunciates that the public interest is served by the Forest Service’s 
                                                          
189 USDA Climate Change Adaptation Plan, supra note 187, at 2.  To achieve that goal, 
USDA sought to improve forest and grassland heath, lead efforts to mitigate and adapt to 
climate change, protect and enhance water resources, and reduce the risk of catastrophic 
wildfire.  USDA, Strategic Plan FY 2014-2018, supra note 187, at 3, 14-18.  USDA 
established seven regional climate hubs to strengthen resource management under 
increasing climate variability.  Id. at 20.  These hubs involve USDA coordination with DOI 
CSCs and LCCs, as well as other agencies.  Id. at 26-27.  The USFS hosts five of the hubs.  
Id. at 67. 
190 Id. at 57-88. 
191 See infra Part III.B.2.  In 2015, USDA issued a directive on the establishment and 
revision of its climate change adaptation plan.  The directive requires USDA agencies to 
integrate climate change adaptation planning, implementing actions, and performance 
metrics into its programs, policies, and operations.  It also requires agencies to identify 
areas in which budget adjustments or legal analysis is needed to carry out actions identified 
in the directive.  USDA, Departmental Regulation 1070-001 (June 15, 2015), available at 
http://www.ocio.usda.gov/document/departmental-regulation-1070-001. 
192 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1687 (2006). 
193 Id. § 1600(1). 
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assessment of the nation’s renewable resources and periodic preparation, 
review, and updating of a national renewable resource program.194  Other 
indications that Congress sought to afford the USFS the tools to react to 
changing conditions and needs are reflected in congressional findings that 
new knowledge derived from scientific research will promote “a sound 
technical and ecological base for effective management, use, and protection 
of the Nation’s renewable resources,”195 and that the USFS has a 
responsibility and opportunity to “be a leader in assuring that the Nation 
maintains a natural resource conservation posture that will meet the needs 
of our people in perpetuity.”196  NFMA also directs the USFS to maintain 
on a continuing basis a detailed, comprehensive inventory of National 
Forest System lands that “reflect[s] changes in conditions and identif[ies] 
new and emerging resources and values.”197 
 Indeed, in a provision added by the Food, Agriculture, 
Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990,198 NFMA specifically requires the 
periodic resource assessment to include “an analysis of the potential effects 
of global climate change on the condition of renewable resources on the 
forests and grasslands of the United States.”199  Similarly, the 1990 
amendments to NFMA require the USFS to periodically prepare and submit 
to the President a Renewable Resource Program which must include 
management recommendations which “account for the effects of global 
climate change on forest and rangeland conditions, including potential 
effects on the geographic ranges of species, and on forest and rangeland 
products.”200 
 The USFS’s authority (and duty) to manage the forests in light of 
changing conditions is also integrally woven into NFMA’s basic 
management standards.  The statute declares a policy that the forests be 
maintained in appropriate forest cover “to secure the maximum benefits of 
multiple use sustained yield management in accordance with land 
management plans.”201  It requires the USFS to periodically adopt detailed 
management plans for each national forest and assure that the plans 
                                                          
194 Id. § 1600(2). 
195 Id. § 1600(4). 
196 Id. § 1600(6). 
197 Id. § 1603. 
198 Pub. L. No. 101-264, § 2408(a)(3), 104 Stat. 3359.  The committee reports provide 
relatively little explanation.  See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 101-916, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5286, 
5738 (1990 (“The Senate bill amends [NFMA] by requiring a detailed analysis of the 
potential effects of climate change on renewable resources and a detailed analysis of 
forestry opportunities to mitigate and reduce the risk of climate change from global climate 
change.”). 
199 16 U.S.C. § 1601(a)(5) (2006). 
200 Id. § 1602(5)(F). 
201 Id. § 1601(d)(1). 
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“provide for multiple use and sustained yield of the products and services 
obtained therefrom.”202  The USFS must “determine forest management 
systems” in light of multiple-use and sustained-yield principles,203 as 
borrowed from the Multiple-Use, Sustained Yield Act of 1960.204  The 1960 
Act defines multiple use as management of the national forests so that they 
are used in the combination that best meets the nation’s needs, providing 
“sufficient latitude for periodic adjustments in use to conform to changing 
needs and conditions.”205 
 NFMA therefore provides the USFS considerable flexibility in 
determining the appropriate balance of multiple uses in its planning and 
management activities.206 As indicated above, the courts have described the 
multiple-use, sustained-yield standards as “breathing discretion at every 
pore.”207  They also have characterized those standards as failing to provide 
any guidance on how to assess agency management activities.208  
 Nevertheless, the NFMA imposes some substantive constraints on 
agency discretion.  It requires that land and resource management plans 
“provide for diversity of plant and animal communities . . . in order to meet 
overall multiple-use objectives” in light of the suitability and capability of 
a particular national forest unit.209  Further, the multiple-use, sustained-yield 
management mandate can be read to encompass management for ecosystem 
health.210   
 Even viewed from the narrowest perspective of its role—as an 
agricultural manager of timber production—sustainability and adaptation to 
future conditions threatening to disrupt forest function has always been 
critical to the USFS’s mission.  However, the USFS has in recent years 
demonstrated a much broader commitment to ecological sustainability, as 
                                                          
202 Id. § 1604(e)(1).  The statute identifies recreation, range, timber, watershed, wildlife 
and fish, and wilderness as relevant multiple uses.  Id. 
203 Id. § 1604(3)(2). 
204 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (2006). 
205 Id. § 531(a).  The 1960 Act defines “sustained yield of the several products and services” 
as “the achievement and maintenance in perpetuity of a high-level annual or regular 
periodic output of the various renewable resources of the national forests without 
impairment of the productivity of the land.  Id. § 531(b).  Both the USFS and the BLM 
“have effectively applied that definition only in the context of one resource, timber.”  3 
COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 131, at § 32:27. 
206 See JAN G. LAITOS, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 163 (2002). 
207 Perkins v. Bergland, 608 F.2d 803, 806 (9th Cir. 1979). 
208 Sierra Club v. Marita, 845 F. Supp. 1317, 1328 (E.D. Wis. 1994), aff’d, 46 F.3d 606 (7th 
Cir. 1995). 
209 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B) (2006).  It also requires “to the degree practicable, for steps 
to be taken to preserve the diversity of tree species similar to that existing in the region 
controlled by the plan.” Id. 
210  See 3 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 131, at § 30:5 (arguing that “multiple use, 
sustained yield management “may implicitly encompass” ecosystem management). 
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reflected in its latest planning and roadless rules.  The stated purpose of the 
agency’s 2012 planning regulations is to produce plans that: 
promote the ecological integrity of national forests and grasslands 
and other administrative units of the [National Forest System 
(NFS)].  Plans will guide management of NFS lands so that they 
are ecologically sustainable and contribute to social and economic 
sustainability; consist of ecosystems and watersheds with 
ecological integrity and diverse plant and animal communities; 
and have the capacity to provide people and communities with 
ecosystem services and multiple uses that provide a range of 
social, economic, and ecological benefits for the present and into 
the future.211 
Similarly, the USFS justified its 2001 regulations restricting timber 
harvesting and road construction as necessary to protect the social and 
ecological values and characteristics of roadless areas, whose watershed 
values and ecosystem health would be at risk without immediate action.212  
These commitments increase the likelihood that the USFS will take rapid 
and extensive adaptation planning and implementation seriously. 
 The USFS’s expansive substantive legal adaptive capacity is 
accompanied by its embrace of procedural legal adaptive capacity through 
flexible adaptive management procedures in its planning rules.   The USFS 
has integrated adaptive management and similar back-end mechanisms into 
and throughout its management process.  The regulations, adopted in 2012, 
define the planning process as an “iterative” one comprised of assessment, 
plan development or revision, and monitoring.213  Indeed, one of the defects 
in the 1982 planning regulations that the 2012 regulations sought to remedy 
was their failure to reflect current adaptive management practices.214  
Among other things, agency officials must prepare monitoring evaluations 
indicating whether or not a change to management activities may be 
warranted based on the new information, and use the results to inform 
adaptive management of the plan area.215  Courts have endorsed the USFS’s 
use of adaptive management processes in national forest management.216  
Both substantively and procedurally, the USFS has ample legal adaptive 
                                                          
211 36 C.F.R. § 219.1(c) (2014). 
212 Special Areas; Roadless Area Conservation, 66 Fed. Reg. 3244, 3247 (Jan. 12, 2001). 
213 36 C.F.R. §219.5(a) (2014).  “Monitoring is continuous and provides feedback for the 
planning cycle by testing relevant assumptions, tracking relevant conditions over time, and 
measuring management effectiveness . . . .”  Id. § 219.5(a)(3). 
214 National Forest System Land Management Planning, 77 Fed. Reg. 21,162, 21,164 (Apr. 
9, 2012). 
215 36 C.F.R. § 219.12(d)(2) (2014). 
216 See, e.g., Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. Grantham, 2013 WL 1420259, *9 (E.D. 
Cal. 2013).   
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capacity that should situate it well to respond to changing needs and 
conditions arising from climate change. 
2. Evaluating Adaptation Activities of the USFS 
 The USFS’s legal adaptive capacity has translated into the most 
extensive adaptation planning and integration of adaptation into 
management processes of any of the federal land management agencies.  As 
early as 2008, the USFS developed a Strategic Framework for responding 
to climate change.217  That Framework characterized climate change as 
one of the greatest challenges to sustainable management forests 
and grasslands and to human well-being we have ever faced, 
because rates of change will likely exceed many ecosystems’ 
capabilities to adapt naturally.  Without fully integrating 
consideration of climate change impacts into planning and 
actions, the Forest Service can no longer fulfill its mission.218   
The agency recognized that many forest ecosystem services may be lost or 
significantly altered if forests are not managed adaptively.219  It asserted 
that “strategies based on historical or current conditions will need to be 
adjusted or replaced with approaches that support adaptation to the 
changing conditions of the future.”220  The agency announced its intention 
to engage in “facilitated adaptation,” which would include both 
anticipatory and opportunistic actions.221  The Framework established 
seven goals, including understanding the environmental, economic, and 
social implications of climate change;222 enhancing the capacity of forests 
to adapt to climate stresses so as to maintain ecosystem services; and 
integrating climate change into USFS policies, program guidance, and 
communications.223  The Framework included five pages of specific 
recommendations to achieve the seven goals.224 
                                                          
217 USFS, STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK (2008), 
http://www.fs.fed.us/climatechange/message.shtml. 
218 Id. at 2. 
219 Id. at 4. 
220 Id. at 3-4. 
221 For a description of the difference between anticipatory and opportunistic actions, see 
id. at 4. 
222 In 2009, the USFS also issued its Global Change Research Strategy to guide its research 
efforts to bolster capacity to sustain and provide ecosystem services, including research 
concerning adaptation.  USGCRP, SYNTHESIS, supra note 8, at 18-19. 
223 USFS, STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK, supra note 217, at 7.  The document stated that “[t]he 
primary focus of efforts on National Forest System lands will be to facilitate the adaptation 
of ecosystems to the effects of climate change.”  Id. at 8. 
224 Id. at 14-18.  For example, the agency recommended assessment of how management 
measures may be modified to facilitate adaptation at various spatial scales.  Id. at 15. 
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 In 2010, the USFS adopted a “performance scorecard” to be 
completed annually by each unit of the NFS.225  The scorecard provides an 
annual assessment of unit performance in four areas – organizational 
capacity, engagement, adaptation, and mitigation and sustainable 
consumption.  Among the questions relating to adaptation is whether an 
adaptation strategy is in place that helps incorporate resource vulnerability 
into priority setting and management actions.226  By 2015, each unit should 
be able to answer “yes” to seven of the ten scorecard questions.227 
 The next year, the USFS issued a National Roadmap for Responding 
to Climate Change.228  It provided a litany of actions to facilitate adaptation 
in three areas:  assessment of climate risks and knowledge gaps, 
engagement with employees and stakeholders, and management for 
resilience.229  In each area, the Roadmap identified ongoing, immediate, and 
longer-term initiatives.  For example, the ongoing management actions 
included treating overgrown forests to make them less vulnerable to wildfire 
and insects, controlling invasive species, relocating roads and facilities to 
resist floods, and reforesting land damaged by fires or weather events.230 
The immediate actions included connecting habitats through measures such 
as removal of impediments to the movement of species most likely to be 
affected by climate change.231  Longer-term initiatives included restoring 
disturbed areas by replanting stock from seed sources and species capable 
of adapting to changing conditions, developing seed and plant stocks 
appropriate for re-vegetation, and development of comprehensive strategies 
to maintain and restore habitat connectivity.232 
 In 2012, the USFS issued perhaps its most forceful adaptation 
initiative through its revised planning regulations.233  The regulatory 
preamble identified eight overriding purposes and needs, two of which 
relate explicitly to climate change:  emphasize restoration of natural 
                                                          
225 The Forest Service Climate Change Performance Scorecard, 2010, available at 
http://www.fs.fed.us/climatechange/pdf/Scorecard.pdf.  
226 Id. 
227 See USFS, Performance Scorecard for Implementing the Forest Service Climate Change 
Strategy, available at http://www.fs.fed.us/climatechange/advisor/scorecard.html.  For a 
list of the ten questions, see USFA, National Forests and Climate Change: The Forest 
Service Climate Change Performance Scorecard, available at 
http://www.fs.fed.us/climatechange/advisor/scorecard/FSCCpostcard.pdf.  
228 USFS, National Roadmap for Responding to Climate Change (Feb. 2011), available at 
http://www.fs.fed.us/climatechange/advisor/roadmap.html. 
229 Id. at 4.  The three “modes of action” were meant to be “dynamic and mutually 
reinforcing.”  Id. 
230 Id. at 23. 
231 Id. at 25. 
232 Id. at 26. 
233 National Forest System Land Management Planning, 77 Fed. Reg. 21,162 (Apr. 9, 
2012). 
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resources to enhance resilience; and contribute to sustainability by ensuring 
that plans will be responsive and can adapt to challenges such as climate 
change.234  Consistent with the Roadmap and Scorecard, the regulations 
incorporate a strategic framework for adaptive management to help 
determine if there are measurable changes related to climate change and 
other stressors that need to be addressed.235  Most significantly, the 
regulations require agency officials to take climate change into account 
when developing plan components for ecological sustainability.236  
Officials also must consider climate change when providing for ecosystem 
services and multiple uses.237   
In 2015, the USFS issued Land Management Planning Directives 
that revised Forest Service Handbook and Manual provisions establishing 
procedures and responsibilities for implementing the planning 
regulations.238  The Directives address the role of climate change in the 
planning process in greater detail than the regulations.  For example, the 
regulations require planners to identify and evaluate information for system 
drivers of key ecosystem characteristics, including a changing climate.239  
The Directives elaborate: 
The Interdisciplinary Team240 should assess predominant climatic 
regimes by reviewing existing information such as vulnerability 
assessments and scenario planning. . . .  Note that climate change 
is both a system driver and a stressor.  The Interdisciplinary Team 
shall document the assumptions used to assess predominant 
climate regimes.241 
The Directives also guide agency officials in designing plan components to 
sustain functional ecosystems, defined as those that sustain critical 
                                                          
234 Id. at 21,164, 21,173. 
235 77 Fed. Reg. at 21,176. 
236 36 C.F.R. § 219.8(a)(1(iv) (2014). 
237 Id. § 219.10(a)(8).  In 2012, the USFS also issued a Climate Project Screening Tool to 
that included a detailed list of recommended actions to address climate change in 
connection with activities such as fuels management, restoration, grazing, road 
maintenance and construction, recreation planning, and mitigation.  Toni L. Morelli et al., 
Climate Project Screening Tool: An Aid for Climate Change Adaptation, Research Paper 
PSW-RP-263, at 6-7, 16-21 (Feb. 2012), available at 
http://www.fs.fed.us/psw/publications/documents/psw_rp263/psw_rp263.pdf.  
238 See National Forest System, Land Management Planning Directives, 80 Fed. Reg. 6683 
(Feb. 6, 2015).  
239 36 C.F.R. § 219.6(b) (2014). 
240 The USFS’s planning regulations require planning officials to “establish an 
interdisciplinary team” to prepare assessments and plan revisions and monitoring 
programs.  Id. § 219.5(b).  The regulations do not further define the term. 
241 Directive 12.31(2), available at http://www.fs.fed.us/cgi-
bin/Directives/get_dirs/fsh?1909.12. 
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ecological functions over time to provide ecosystem services.242  In doing 
so, planners must take into account the effects of a changing climate.243  
Specific climate-related issues that may be relevant to planning and 
management decisions include the effects of climate change on stream 
flows that may affect the size of riparian management zones,244 changes in 
occurrence of extreme storm events that may affect soil productivity,245 and 
warming trends at higher elevations, which may alter the capability of some 
forests to provide ecological conditions needed to maintain viable 
populations of species such as the American pika.246 
 Some national forests have already incorporated these requirements 
into specific management plans or otherwise addressed climate change.247  
The 2013 Land and Resource Management Plan for the San Juan National 
Forest in Colorado, for example, devotes an eight-page appendix to climate 
change trends and management strategies for species and ecosystems that 
are already changing.248  Other plans address climate-related impacts such 
as declines in permanent snowpack that provides a water source for 
wildlife249 or effects on wildlife habitat, physiology, phenology, and biotic 
interactions.250  The agency has developed a template for assessing climate 
change impacts and management options,251 and is applying it in revising 
                                                          
242 Id. 23.11. 
243 Id. 23.11(2)(d). 
244 Id. 23.11e(1)(f). 
245 Id. 23.12b(2)(f). 
246 Id. 23.13c(4)(c). 
247 Officials at several national forests have entered partnerships with other federal 
agencies, states, tribes, and non-governmental organizations in community-based 
adaptation efforts.  See USGCRP, SYNTHESIS, supra note 8, at 19-20.  They also have 
partnered with scientists within the agency and at local universities to facilitate adaptation.  
Id. at 22-23. 
248 SAN JUAN NATIONAL FOREST LRMP (2013), 
http://www.fs.usda.gov/detail/sanjuan/landmanagement/planning/?cid=stelprdb5432707.  
These strategies include: (1) securing a reliable source of local seed stock for native species 
to be used for re-vegetation and restoration after disturbance; (2) enhancing the resiliency 
of alpine ecosystems and providing refugia for alpine-dependent species by removing non-
climate stressors such as unmanaged livestock grazing and motorized recreation from 
alpine habitat; (3) allowing fires to promote the heterogeneity of spruce-fir forests; and (4) 
eradicating invasive species.  Id. Appendix G, at G-3 to G-4, available at 
http://www.fs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/stelprdb5435653.pdf.  The 
descriptions in the appendix merely summarize references to climate challenges and 
responsive management strategies discussed throughout the plan itself.  Id. at G-2. 
249 E.g., Tongass National Forest, Land and Resource Management Plan, at 6-5 (Jan. 2008), 
available at https://fs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/stelprdb5367422.pdf.  
250 See, e.g., Kaibab National Forest’s Climate Change Approach for Plan Revision, at 7, 
available at http://www.fs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/stelprdb5446462.pdf.  
251 Welcome to TACCIMO v.3.0, available at 
http://www.taccimo.info/TACCIMO/tbl_sector_list.php. 
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land use plans.252  It has conducted vulnerability assessments at NFS units 
to identify management constraints and options.253  It is also has conducted 
pilot assessments in eleven national forests of potential hydrologic changes 
and watershed vulnerability.254 
 In its 2014-2018 Strategic Plan, USDA estimated that as of 2012, 
35% of national forests and grasslands were in compliance with a climate 
change adaptation and mitigation strategy.  Its goal was 100% compliance 
by 2020.255  USDA also estimated that 58.5 million acres in the NFS were 
in a desired condition to reduce catastrophic wildfire risks in 2009, a figure 
it sought to increase to 60.7 million acres by 2018.256  By the end of fiscal 
year 2013, 49% of NFS units had met the performance scorecard target.257  
Specific initiatives also had made progress.  For example, studies on how 
to conserve genetic diversity in the face of climate change were completed 
or underway.258 A climate-sensitive version of the agency’s Vegetation 
Simulator Model was implemented for the western conterminous United 
States.259  Resource constraints such as insufficient field resources, 
however, slowed the pace of land use plan revisions,260 restoration work 
needed to increase resilience,261 treatment of forests infested with western 
bark beetles,262 and conservation of genetic diversity.263 
 The USFS clearly has prioritized climate change adaptation, 
required that forest plans address it, established fairly specific guidance and 
                                                          
252 See, e.g., Francis Marion National Forest Land and Resource Management Plan 
Revision - Climate Change Integration, available at http://www.fs.usda.gov/ccrc/climate-
projects/adaptation-examples/francis-marion-national-forest. 
253 See Climate Change Vulnerability Assessments: Synthesis, available at 
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254   Assessing the vulnerability of watersheds to climate change: results of national forest 
watershed vulnerability pilot assessments (2013), available at 
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255 USDA, Strategic Plan FY 2014-2018, at 13, available at 
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tools to assist in planning, and begun to apply the guidance at the unit level.  
If not for budgetary constraints, the agency would have done even more.264   
Though historically not an agency particularly associated with proactive 
ecological conservation, its relatively substantial legal adaptive capacity 
makes it less surprising that the USFS would be the resource agency most 
engaged in climate change adaptation planning and implementation.265 
 The 1990 amendments to NFMA266 long ago added specific 
mandates that renewable resource assessments include an analysis of the 
effects of climate change on resource conditions.267  These statutory 
changes and the USFS’s periodic Renewable Resource Program 
recommendations may account for the effects of climate change on forest 
and rangeland conditions,268 have driven the agency’s efforts to address 
climate change.  There is no evidence to support that hypothesis, however.  
The 2010 Strategic Framework, the 2011 National Roadmap and, most 
notably, the 2012 planning regulations and accompanying preamble all lack 
even a single reference to these statutory provisions relating to climate 
change.269  Indeed, the preamble to the planning regulations explains that 
provisions to meet the purpose and need of the environmental impact 
statement prepared in connection with the regulations “but not otherwise 
required by NFMA, were included . . . to ensure that plans would be 
responsive to the challenges of climate change . . . .”270  Instead, the agency 
attributed the planning requirements relating to climate change to the 
statutory multiple-use mandate.271  The agency’s expansive substantive 
                                                          
264 The fiscal year 2016 budget justification for the Forest Service refers repeatedly to the 
need for actions to prepare for and respond to forest management challenges that are being 
exacerbated by climate change, including drought, invasive species, wildfires, and insect 
and disease outbreaks.  U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FOREST SERV., FISCAL YEAR 2016 BUDGET 
OVERVIEW 6 (Feb. 2015), http://www.fs.fed.us/sites/default/files/media/2015/07/fy2016-
budget-overview-update.pdf; see also id. at 9, 10, 12, 20, 30.  The agency sought a $20.7 
million increase in funding above enacted 2015 levels for wildfire management, and a 
$16.5 million increase for land acquisition, which it described as intended to meet the goals 
of the President’s Climate Action Plan for species conservation.  Id. at 10, A-1. 
265 The USFS also has a history of leadership on some conservation issues, such as 
wilderness preservation, that may have contributed to its early commitment to addressing 
climate-related threats to ecological function.  See Robert L. Glicksman, Wilderness 
Management by the Multiple Use Agencies: What Makes the Forest Service and the Bureau 
of Land Management Different?, 44 ENVTL. L. 447 (2014). 
266 See supra notes 198-200 and accompanying text. 
267 16 U.S.C.§ 1601(a)(5) (2006). 
268 Id. § 1602(5)(F). 
269 The preamble to the planning regulations cite as the underlying legal authority NFMA 
§§ 1604 and 1613, not 1601 or 1602.  77 Fed. Reg. at 21,260.  The preamble states that 
“[c]onsideration of changing conditions in planning is not new to the Forest Service,” but 
makes no reference to the 1990 amendments bearing on climate change.  Id. at 21,176. 
270 Id. at 21,170 (emphasis added). 
271 Id. (citing 36 C.F.R. § 219.10, which requires that land and resource management plans 
“provide for ecosystem services and multiple uses”). 
  
 
41 
legal adaptive capacity appears to be a more important factor in explaining 
its progress on planning and managing for climate change. 
C. The Public Lands 
 In contrast with the USFS, the BLM has been much slower off the 
mark in engaging in climate change adaptation on the public lands it 
manages.  The BLM has legal adaptive capacity that is analogous to that 
available to the USFS, and its parent agency, DOI, began establishing 
mechanisms for integrating climate change adaptation considerations into 
its planning and management before USDA did.  As discussed in Part IV, 
we attribute the BLM’s hesitation to other factors. 
1. Adaptive Capacity under FLPMA 
 FLPMA, which is the chief statute governing BLM management of 
the public lands,272 imposes on the BLM essentially the same multiple-use, 
sustained-yield mandate that governs USFS management of the national 
forests.  FLPMA lacks the multitudinous references to the need for 
adjustments in management policies and approaches in response to 
changing needs and conditions found in NFMA, and it does not explicitly 
refer to climate change.  Like NFMA, however, it dictates management on 
the basis of multiple-use, sustained-yield principles,273 and it requires the 
BLM to apply those principles through the adoption and implementation of 
land use plans called resource management plans.274  Moreover, FLPMA’s 
definition of “multiple use,” like the one that governs the USFS under the 
1960 Multiple-Use, Sustained Yield Act,275 refers to management that 
“provide[s] sufficient latitude for periodic adjustments in use to conform to 
changing needs and conditions.”276  The courts have construed the multiple-
use, sustained-yield mandate to vest broad discretionary authority in the 
BLM, just as they have for the USFS under NFMA.277 
 FLPMA also incorporates very flexible ecological goals.  The 
statutory definition of “multiple use” refers to “harmonious and coordinated 
                                                          
272 FLPMA defines “public lands” as lands owned by the United States and managed by 
the BLM, with certain exceptions.  43 U.S.C.A. § 1702(e) (2006). 
273 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(7) (2006). 
274 Id. § 1732(a).  
275 See supra notes 204-205 and accompanying text. 
276 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (2006).  For FLMPA’s definition of “sustained yield,” see id. 
§ 1702(h).  FLPMA also requires the BLM to maintain a public lands inventory “so as to 
reflect changes in conditions and to identify new and emerging resources and other values.”  
Id. § 1711(a).  The statute adds, however, that the inventory “shall not, of itself, change or 
prevent change of the management or use of public lands.”  Id. 
277 See, e.g., Theodore Roosevelt Conservation P’ship v. Salazar, 616 F.3d 497, 518 (D.C. 
Cit. 2010) (stating that the BLM has “wide discretion to determine how these principles 
should be applied”). 
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management of the various resources without permanent impairment of the 
productivity of the land and the quality of the environment.”278  BLM lands, 
however, are not subject to any requirement akin to the NFMA’s diversity 
requirement; the only definitive BLM planning standards require the 
designation and protection of areas of critical environmental concern and 
compliance with pollution control laws.279  The statute requires that the 
BLM, in managing the public lands, “by regulation or otherwise, take any 
action necessary to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the 
lands.”280  In addition, the BLM must manage areas being studied for 
possible designation as wilderness so as “to prevent unnecessary or undue 
degradation or to afford environmental protection.”281 
 The lack of procedural specificity in FLPMA has likewise allowed 
the BLM to resort to procedural devices of its choosing.  Within limits, the 
courts have often approved the BLM’s use of adaptive management 
measures, just as they have for the USFS.282 
 FLPMA thus creates a flexible core mission for the BLM to manage 
the public lands to promote the sustainability of ecological resources in 
service of consumptive and other utilitarian goals, recognizing that the 
particular ecological constituents that promote this objective are likely to 
change over time.  This malleable mandate, coupled with the agency’s use 
of procedurally adaptive techniques such as adaptive management, appears 
to afford the BLM legal adaptive capacity perhaps even greater than the 
USFS’s under NFMA.  It ought to provide the BLM with the tools needed 
to manage in the face of climate change.   
2. Evaluating the BLM’s Adaptation Activities 
 Yet, the BLM’s climate-related efforts appear to pale in comparison 
to the USFS’s initiatives.  The BLM claims to have embarked on a 
“landscape approach” comprised of five interconnected components:  rapid 
                                                          
278 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (2006). 
279 Id. § 1712(c)(3), (8).  Areas of critical environmental concern are defined at id. § 
1702(a). 
280 Id. § 1732(b). 
281 Id. § 1782(c). 
282 See, e.g., Theodore Roosevelt Conservation P’ship v. Salazar, 616 F.3d 497, 515–17 
(D.C. Cir. 2010); Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 822 F. Supp. 2d 933, 
942–43 (D. Ariz. 2011), aff'd on other grounds, 2013 WL 2303526 (9th Cir. 2013) (table); 
In re Montana Wilderness Ass’n, 807 F. Supp. 2d 990, 996 (D. Mont. 2011), aff'd in part, 
rev'd in part on other grounds, 725 F.3d 988 (9th Cir. 2013).  But see Klamath Siskiyou 
Wildlands Center v. Boody, 468 F.3d 549, 555–60 (9th Cir. 2006) (refusing to allow timber 
sales inconsistent with a resource management plan on ground that sales were “adaptive 
management modifications” contemplated by the plan). 
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ecoregional assessments (REAs),283 ecoregional direction, field 
implementation, monitoring for adaptive management, and science 
integration.284  REAs map areas of high ecological value and gauge 
potential climate risks.  Ecoregional direction seeks to use the results of the 
REAs to identify management priorities and priority areas for conservation 
and development, and provide a “blueprint” for implementing these 
priorities.  Field implementation will put management strategies identified 
in ecoregional direction into practice on the ground, such as by amending 
resource management plans or revising mitigation measures for authorized 
land uses.  Monitoring will provide information for adaptive management 
that refines implementation actions.  Finally, science provided by the DOI’s 
CSCs and other sources should facilitate implementation of measures to 
adapt to climate impacts.285 
 Unfortunately, these efforts largely are not yet reflected in 
significant management activities, such as resource management plans or 
project approvals, and some of the actions taken are short on substantive 
analysis of climate change impacts or strategies for responding to them.  A 
47-page report issued by the BLM in 2010 on “lessons learned” from 
ecological assessment processes included only two vague references to 
climate change, and one of those was in the literature review portion of the 
report.286  Another report, issued in 2011, describing the BLM’s 
Assessment, Inventory and Monitoring Strategy (AIM) developed in 
connection with the monitoring component of the landscape approach 
referred to climate change just once.287 
 Consistent with the cursory nature of these reports, the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) concluded in May 2013 that the 
BLM lacked strategic direction to help guide field and district offices in 
addressing climate change.288  The GAO opined that the BLM’s ecoregional 
assessments eventually “may prove useful in addressing climate change 
                                                          
283 Citations to the reports on REAs are collected at USGCRP, SYNTHESIS, supra note 8, at 
44-45. 
284 The BLM’s Landscape Approach for Managing Public Lands, 
http://www.blm.gov/wo/st/en/prog/more/Landscape_Approach.html#secr.  
285 Id. 
286 MARSHA BRACKE & MAGGIE MCCAFFREY, LESSONS LEARNED REPORT: ECOREGIONAL 
ASSESSMENT PROCESSES 6, 31 (Nov. 2010), available at 
http://www.blm.gov/style/medialib/blm/wo/Communications_Directorate/public_affairs/l
andscape_approach/documents1.Par.51236.File.dat/20101110_EcoregionalAssessment_L
essons_Learned_Report_FINAL_v2.pdf.  
287 GORDON R. TOEVS ET AL., ASSESSMENT, INVENTORY, AND MONITORING STRATEGY: 
FOR INTEGRATED RENEWABLE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 9 (Aug. 2011), available at 
http://www.blm.gov/style/medialib/blm/wo/Information_Resources_Management/policy/
ib_attachments/2012.Par.53766.File.dat/IB2012-080_att1.pdf.  
288 GAO, supra note 111, at 51.   
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adaptation.”289  It also noted with approval the BLM’s pending adoption of 
a field guide for vulnerability assessments.290  The GAO noted BLM’s plans 
to develop a high-level climate adaptation strategy by the end of the summer 
2013,291 but as of February 2015, no such strategy had been publicly 
released.  The GAO also reported that the BLM had not provided guidance 
to its offices on how to incorporate climate change adaptation into natural 
resource planning and management, although agency guidance on issues 
such as drought and invasive species may indirectly help resource managers 
address climate change.292 
 In addition, the little work BLM is doing on climate change has 
mostly been limited to gathering information on resource vulnerabilities 
rather than developing management strategies. The GAO found that some 
of REAs are important first steps.  The Colorado Plateau REA, for example, 
notes that invasive species such as cheatgrass and tamarisk have the 
potential to shift their ranges in response to climate change.293  The agency 
considered multiple climate projections in preparing the REA,294 and the 
resulting report includes a “climate change scenario” section which 
revealed that prairie dogs and sage grouse are at risk of very high climate 
stress by 2060, while big sagebrush and pinyon-juniper woodland also are 
likely to be adversely affected.295  The REA poses a series of management 
questions, several of which focus on climate change.296  Other completed 
REAs include similar discussion.297  Such analyses are steps to assist BLM 
resource managers account for climate change, but they are assessments 
rather than decisions that reflect on-the-ground management decisions.298 
 Though still inchoate, the BLM has issued a wildfire management 
strategy that recognizes a variety of stressors, including climate change, that 
                                                          
289 Id. 
290 Id.at 54. 
291 Id.at 51. 
292 Id. 
293 BLM, Colorado Plateau Rapid Ecoregional Assessment Report x (May 2012), available 
at 
http://www.blm.gov/style/medialib/blm/wo/Communications_Directorate/public_affairs/l
andscape_approach/documents1.Par.82149.File.dat/COP_1_Final_Ch_1_2_and_3.pdf.  
294 Id. at x. 
295 Id. at xi-xii. 
296 Id. at 11 (including questions about where/how the distribution of dominant native and 
invasive species may change from climate change in 2060; where species distribution 
change between 2010 and 2060 will be; and which aquatic/riparian areas are at risk from 
climate change). 
297 See, e.g., BLM, Sonoran Desert Rapid Ecoregional Assessment Report 126-52 (May 
2012), available at 
http://www.blm.gov/style/medialib/blm/wo/Communications_Directorate/public_affairs/l
andscape_approach/documents1.Par.39003.File.dat/SOD_1_Final_Ch_1_2_and_3.pdf.  
298 For links to REAs at various stages of completion, see BLM Rapid Ecoregional 
Assessments, http://www.blm.gov/wo/st/en/prog/more/Landscape_Approach/reas.html.  
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are exacerbating fire risks and sketches out the broad parameters of an 
approach to manage those risks.  In January 2015, Interior Secretary Jewell 
issued an order establishing a Rangeland Fire Task Force to reduce the 
likelihood and severity of rangeland fires and commit resources to 
preparation for and response to such fires.299  The Task Force issued a report 
later that year outlining a recommended strategy for managing wildfire risks 
in the 2015 and 2016 Western fire seasons, although many of the actions 
discussed  are not scheduled for completion until well after that time or are 
framed in broad generalities.300  Nonetheless, the report provides that the 
strategy should consider “risks from climate change, fire, invasive species, 
development, and other change agents,”301 and the task force identified 
focus areas for science and research, one of which is the “[i]mplications of 
climate change, grazing and other land uses.”302  A few of the climate-
related recommendations are more specific, such as the development of a 
strategy to create a long-term seed bank to ensure conservation of 
germplasm to promote climate resilience and rangeland health.303  If 
adopted by the Secretary, the strategy represents a series of early steps in a 
recommended approach to managing climate-related threats to ecosystem 
health. 
Significantly, in marked contrast to the USFS’s planning 
regulations, as of mid-2015, the BLM’s land use planning regulations did 
not include a single reference to climate change.304  Neither did the BLM 
Manual provisions on land use planning.305  In 2014, the BLM did unveil 
                                                          
299 Secretarial Order No. 3336 §§ 5-6 (Jan. 5, 2015), reproduced in FIRE MANAGEMENT, 
supra note 114, at 76-80. 
300 See, e.g., FIRE MANAGEMENT, supra note 114, at 31 (recommending development of a 
conservation and restoration strategy for the sagebrush-steppe “that considers emerging 
science, particularly ecological resistance, and resilience in habitat management, fuels 
treatment and restoration projects.”). 
301 Id. at 32.  Similarly, the report recommends development of a national invasive species 
detection and response program in response to a directive in President Obama’s calls to 
increase the climate resilience of America’s natural resources.  Id. at 37. 
302 Id. at 39. 
303 Id. at 42. 
304 The authors conducted a search in Westlaw’s database for federal regulations for “43 
C.F.R.” and “climate change.”  The result produced no documents. 
305 BLM MANUAL, Part 1601 – Land Use Planning, 
http://www.blm.gov/style/medialib/blm/wo/Information_Resources_Management/policy/
blm_manual.Par.31036.File.dat/1601.pdf.  The authors’ search for “climat” in this 
document resulted in no hits.  We got the same result when we search the Manual 
provisions on Land Health.  Id. Part 4180, 
http://www.blm.gov/style/medialib/blm/wo/Information_Resources_Management/policy/
blm_manual.Par.83364.File.dat/4180.pdf.  The provisions governing Forest Management, 
id. Part 5000-1, 
http://www.blm.gov/style/medialib/blm/wo/Information_Resources_Management/policy/
blm_manual.Par.81503.File.dat/5000-1_Forest_Management_(Public_Domain).pdf, 
included one reference to “climatic trends” or conditions, requiring managers to consider 
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its “Planning 2.0” initiative,306 which seeks to create a more dynamic 
planning process and plan across landscapes and at multiple scales.307  
Adoption of changes to the agency’s planning regulations do not seem 
imminent, however.  In any event, the agency’s Summary Report on the 
initiative made only one minor reference to climate change, noting that 
public comments urged the agency to designate in resource management 
plans restoration, innovation, and observation zones.308  Even on this issue, 
the report provides no indication of how the agency might respond. 
 At the individual unit level, adaptation planning by the BLM also 
appears embryonic.  A 2013 draft RMP from the Billings Field Office 
identified as a goal management of “diverse, healthy landscapes to be 
resilient to stresses, including climate change, and incorporate flexible 
management actions to adjust to changing climatic conditions.”309  It also 
endorsed the use of adaptive management.310  The draft plan is devoid of 
specific management components, however, providing only that the agency 
will “[p]rovide for flexible, adaptive management that allows for timely 
responses to changing climatic conditions” and that planning officials 
should “[a]djust the timing of BLM-authorized activities as needed to 
accommodate long-term changes in seasonal weather patterns.”311  Other 
recently released draft plans include similarly vacuous prescriptions.312  In 
its budget request for fiscal year 2016, the BLM noted the need to support 
landscape-level conservation to address the impacts of stressors such as 
                                                          
what roles weather conditions played in the establishment of existing vegetation, and what 
those influences will be in the future.  Id. § 5000-1.12B(2)(b)(3).  The provisions on 
National Landscape Conservation System Management (Part 6100), Conducting 
Wilderness Characteristic Inventory of BLM Lands (Part 6310), Considering Lands with 
Wilderness Characteristics in the BLM Land Use Planning Process (Part 6320), 
Management of BLM Wilderness Study Areas (Part 6330), Management of Designated 
Wilderness Areas (Part 6340), and even Fire Planning (Part 9211), all fail to include any 
mention of climate change. 
306 BLM, Planning 2.0: Improving the Way We Plan Together, 
http://www.blm.gov/wo/st/en/prog/planning/planning_overview/planning_2_0.html.  
307 Id. at 2.  
308 Id. at 7. 
309 BLM, Billings Draft Resource Management Plan and Environmental Impact Statement 
2-52 (March 2013), available at 
http://www.blm.gov/mt/st/en/fo/billings_field_office/rmp/drmp.html.  
310 Id. (“Adapting management . . . allows the BLM to adjust management to best meet the 
challenges of climate change.”). 
311 Id. at 2-53. 
312 See, e.g., BLM, Winnemucca District Proposed Resource Management Plan and Final 
Environmental Impact Statement 4-12 (August 2013), available at 
http://www.blm.gov/nv/st/en/fo/wfo/blm_information/rmp/proposed_final_rmp.html 
(“This RMP is also based on the concept of adaptive management, so it is dynamic enough 
to account for changes in resource conditions (such as changes due to climate change or 
large-scale wildfire), new information and science, and changes in regulation and 
policies.”). 
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climate change.  The budget purportedly sought to broaden the scope of 
BLM programs to enhance understanding of and preparation for climate 
change.313  Yet, of the $1.2 billion increase sought over the previous year’s 
enacted budget, only $10 million (or less than one percent) was specifically 
earmarked for these purposes, an amount that does not appear to prioritize 
climate-related initiatives.314 
D. The National Wildlife Refuges 
 As compared to other federal land management agencies, the FWS 
has engaged in a relatively moderate level of adaptation planning and 
integration of adaptation measures into refuge management.  This pace and 
extent of adaptation is congruent with the moderate level of legal adaptive 
capacity that the FWS enjoys in managing the national wildlife refuges. 
1. The FWS’s Adaptive Capacity 
 The goals and orientation of the National Wildlife Refuge System 
Improvement Act (NWRSIA)315 allow the FWS a moderate level of 
flexibility in selecting management goals and the means to achieve them, 
though the FWS has interpreted the NWRSIA to require an emphasis on 
historical preservation.  The FWS must administer the NWRS “for the 
conservation, management, and where appropriate, restoration of the fish, 
wildlife, and plant resources and their habitats within the United States for 
the benefit of present and future generations of Americans.”316 It must “plan 
and direct the continued growth of the System in a manner that is best 
designed to accomplish” this mission, or, significantly, “to contribute to the 
conservation of the ecosystems of the United States.”317  In addition, the 
NWRSIA directs the FWS to manage each individual refuge to fulfill not 
only the mission of the System as a whole, but also the specific purposes 
for which that refuge was established.318  Accordingly, the goals of 
individual refuges may vary depending on the specific purposes of that 
refuge.  In this sense, the goals of NWRS management are more 
individually tailored and fragmented than that of other federal lands.319 
                                                          
313 Budget, Bureau of Land Management at BH-10, 
http://www.blm.gov/style/medialib/blm/wo/Communications_Directorate/public_affairs/
news_release_attachments.Par.13179.File.dat/BLM_Budget%20Highlights.pdf.  
314 Id, at BH-10, BH-16 (referring to increased funding for the Challenge Cost Share 
program and climate resilient landscapes). 
315 Pub. L. No. 105-57, 111 Stat. 1252 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 668dd to 668ee (2006). 
316 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(2) (2006). 
317 Id. § 668dd(a)(4)(C). 
318 Id. § 668dd(a)(3)(A).  The term “purposes of the refuge” is defined by reference to the 
purposes derived from the law that established or authorized a refuge.  Id. § 668ee(10). 
319 Cf. Fischman, supra note 83, at 463 (“Statutes attempting to provide comprehensive 
authority and management requirements for the Refuge System explicitly limit their 
application to circumstances where they do not conflict with the particular purposes 
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 Considering only the language of NWRSIA, this management 
regime is not necessarily restricted to preserving historical ecological 
conditions.  The FWS’s mandates include “conservation” and 
“restoration,”320 terms that might be interpreted as envisioning retention or 
re-creation of historical conditions.  However, the statutory definition of 
“conservation” is broader than historical preservation.  The term means “to 
sustain and, where appropriate, restore and enhance, healthy populations of 
fish, wildlife, and plants.”321  The statutory reference to conservation of 
ecosystems322 arguably reinforces the FWS’s duty to conserve function, not 
a pre-existing resource mix or state.  Moreover, the statute authorizes the 
use of management methods and procedures “associated with modern 
scientific resource programs, including propagation and transplantation.”323  
The reference to transplantation seems potentially broad enough to cover 
the movement into a refuge of species that were never there before.  The 
statute directs the FWS to “ensure that the biological integrity, diversity, 
and environmental health of the System are maintained. . . .”324  While 
maintenance seems geared toward retention of the status quo, what the FWS 
is supposed to maintain is biological integrity and environmental health, not 
particular historical conditions.  The FWS also has a little-used emergency 
power to “temporarily suspend, allow, or initiate any activity… if the 
Secretary determines it is necessary to protect the health and safety of the 
public or a fish or wildlife population.”325 
 Professor Fischman asserts that the mandate to ensure maintenance 
of the Refuge System’s biological integrity, diversity, and health is “the 
most ecologically informed, of any legislative criterion for public land 
management.  Congress clearly intended that the refuges should protect 
nature in accordance with the latest scientific understanding.”326  He argues 
that the 1997 amendments to the FWS’s organic statute reflects “a 
heightened emphasis on integrity as an overarching management goal.”327  
Although he concedes that the meaning of the key statutory provision328 is 
                                                          
established for individual refuges.”).  Nonetheless, direct conflict between individual unit 
purposes and the NWRSIA is rare.  See id. at 592. 
320 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(2) (2006). 
321 Id. § 668ee(4). 
322 Id. § 668dd(a)(4)(C). 
323 Id.. 
324 Id. § 668dd(a)(4)(B).   
325 Id. § 668dd(k).  Judicial interpretations of this provision provide limited direction on its 
scope.  See, e.g., Wyoming v. United States, 279 F.3d 1214, 1240 (10th Cir. 2002) 
(indicating only that because the program at issue was commenced “over a decade ago . . . 
the ‘temporary’ nature of FWS’s action has long since passed”). 
326 Robert L. Fischman, The Meanings of Biological Integrity, Diversity, and 
Environmental Health, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 989, 992 (2004).   
327 Id. at 991. 
328 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(4)(B) (2006). 
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“not self-evident,”329 by closely parsing the statutory text and analyzing 
statutory context and legislative history, he concludes that the reference to 
integrity reflects “the emerging consensus meaning of ‘integrity,’ [which] 
encompasses all of the pieces now understood to constitute functioning 
landscapes,” and that this provision has the potential to equal the NFMA’s 
diversity provision as a strong constraint on agency discretion.330   
 Accordingly, notwithstanding a conservation-oriented mandate, the 
NWRSIA provides the FWS some ability to manage wildlife refuges in 
ways that allow modification of ecological constituents over time.  As a 
result, taken alone the statute appears to provide the agency a significant 
amount of substantive legal adaptive capacity in its management of refuges.  
That flexibility could be a valuable management tool as climatic changes 
make existing refuges less compatible with certain historically occurring 
species and more harmonious with others. 
 However, even Professor Fischman acknowledges that “[t]he 
temporal dimension of integrity and health addresses the dynamic variation 
in ecological processes through the limits of historic conditions.”331  
Moreover, a review of the FWS’s internal rules interpreting Congress’s 
delegation reveals a reluctance by the FWS to recognize or take full 
advantage of its available statutory substantive legal adaptive capacity.  The 
FWS’s current interpretation of the biological integrity provision is 
contained in the agency’s manual for refuge management, which serves as 
policy guidance to FWS officials.332  It defines biological integrity as 
“[b]iotic composition, structure, and functioning at genetic, organism, and 
community levels comparable with historic conditions, including the 
natural biological processes that shape genomes, organisms, and 
communities,” and environmental health as “c]omposition, structure, and 
functioning of soil, water, air, and other abiotic features comparable with 
historic conditions, including the natural abiotic processes that shape the 
environment.”333  Id (emphasis added).  The agency defines “historic 
conditions” as “[c]omposition, structure, and functioning of ecosystems 
resulting from natural processes that we believe, based on sound 
professional judgment, were present prior to substantial human related 
changes to the landscape.”334  These definitions reflect a commitment to 
                                                          
329 Fischman, supra note 326, at 992. 
330 Id. at 1024-25. 
331 Id. at 1025. 
332 Though not enforceable through judicial review, both the FWS Manual and FWS Refuge 
Manual nonetheless strongly influence FWS actions.  See McGrail & Rowley v. Babbitt, 
986 F. Supp. 1386, 1394 (S.D. Fla. 1997). 
333 See Biological Integrity, Diversity, and Environmental Health, 601 FW 3, 
http://www.fws.gov/policy/601fw3.html (emphasis added).   
334 Id. 
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preserve historic conditions which the statutory text arguably does not 
compel. 
 The agency’s treatment of non-native species points in the same 
direction as these manual definitions.  The FWS has customarily been, and 
still remains, largely focused on promoting native species and ecosystems 
where they have historically existed.  It has interpreted the NWRSIA, for 
example, to allow non-native introductions, but only in rare situations.  Both 
the FWS’s Manual335 and Refuge Manual336 address non-native 
introductions.  The FWS Manual generally prohibits introduction of 
“species on refuges outside their historic range.”337   However, an exception 
is made for circumstances in which “such introduction is essential for the 
survival of a species and prescribed in an endangered species recovery plan, 
or is essential for the control of an invasive species and prescribed in an 
integrated pest management plan.”338  Even when undertaking such non-
native introductions, the FWS states that it strives “to minimize unnatural 
effects and to restore or maintain natural processes and ecosystem 
components to the extent practicable without jeopardizing refuge 
purpose(s).”339  The FWS Refuge Manual is also restrictive, barring 
reintroduction of naturally extirpated exotics, exotic birds, or species 
anticipated to be invasive or to cause detrimental effects on the receiving 
area.340  Other provisions consistently emphasize that the primary 
ecological goal of the refuges is promoting historical conditions.341  
Moreover, some individual units may have individual unit purposes that 
seek to promote particular preexisting species.342  The FWS has at times 
decided to “privilege (sometimes outdated) individual [unit] purposes over 
                                                          
335 U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE MANUAL (1992), available at 
http://www.fws.gov/policy/manuals/ [hereinafter FWS MANUAL]. 
336 See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE SYSTEM MANUAL 
(2008) [hereinafter FWS REFUGE MANUAL]. 
337 FWS MANUAL, supra note 335, pt. 601, § 3.14(F). 
338 Id. 
339 See id. pt. 601, § 3.11(C). 
340 See FWS REFUGE MANUAL, supra note 336, §§ 7-8.6(B), 8.7. 
341 FWS MANUAL, supra note 335, pt. 601, § 3.10(B)(1) (“The System’s focus is on native 
species and natural communities such as those found under historic conditions.”); id. pt. 
601, § 3.14 B; id. pt. 601, § 1.9(A) (“The overarching goal of the Refuge System is to 
conserve a diversity of fish, wildlife, and plants and their habitats . . . with a focus on native 
species.”); id. pt. 601, § 3.15C (“We do not allow refuge uses or management practices that 
result in the maintenance of non-native plant communities unless we determine there is no 
feasible alternative.”); FWS REFUGE MANUAL, supra note 336, pt. 7, § 8.1; id. pt. 7, § 12.2. 
342 See, e.g., Richard L. Schroeder, Jeanne I. Holler  & John P. Taylor, Managing National 
Wildlife Refuges for Historic or Non-Historic Conditions: Determining the Role of the 
Refuge in the Ecosystem, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1185, 1199 (2004) (describing FWS 
decision that the goal of managing the Sherburne National Wildlife Refuge should be “the 
restoration and maintenance (as close as possible with present constraints) of the historic 
upland landscape, including the globally endangered oak savanna ecotype, while providing 
migratory habitat for waterfowl.”). 
  
 
51 
the superb (modern) system ones to a greater extent than that required by 
legislation.”343 
 This focus on historical fidelity had the advantage of serving as a 
clear and concrete counterweight to those interests more focused on 
maximizing refuges for hunting uses.344  However, the FWS’s focus on 
promoting native species and ecosystems where they have historically 
existed also may be in part a product of its dual role as refuge manager and 
principal implementer/enforcer of the Endangered Species Act (ESA)345 for 
land and freshwater species.346 The FWS’s implementation of the ESA has 
traditionally been heavily based on maintaining historical baselines, 
protecting species in their pre-existing range, and conserving and restoring 
native ecosystems and native species.347  For example, the ESA’s extensive 
protections only apply if a species is listed as “endangered,” which is 
expressly defined as occurring only if the species is “in danger of extinction 
throughout all or a significant portion of its range.”348   
 Moreover, the ESA heavily focuses its conservation and recovery 
activities in historically native areas.  FWS regulations implementing the 
ESA make clear that non-native introduction is supposed to be very rare, 
and the FWS goes to great pains to limit such introductions.  ESA 
regulations allow the introduction of an experimental population “outside 
of the species’ current natural range,” but generally only “within its 
probable historic range.”349  The only circumstance in which an introduction 
outside of a species’ historical native range is allowed is in “the extreme 
case that the primary habitat of the species has been unsuitably and 
                                                          
343 Id. at 94, 94 n.63 (providing specific examples).  Individual refuge unit purposes “may 
be as much as a century old.”  Robert L. Fischman, From Words to Action: The Impact and 
Legal Status of the 2006 National Wildlife Refuge System Management Policies, 26 STAN. 
ENVTL. L.J. 77, 116 (2007); see also id. at 80 (noting that “individual refuge purposes, 
which tend to focus more on traditional fish and game concerns than on the newer 1997 
systemic mission”); id. at 86 (referring to the centrifugal tendency of refuges to hew to 
local custom and individual purposes at the expense of promoting distinctive system 
goals”). 
344 See Camacho, supra note 128, at 245-46.  See also infra note 500 and accompanying 
text.  
345 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2006). 
346 See id. § 1532(15); id. § 1533(a)(2).  The FWS shares responsibility for implementing 
the ESA with the Commerce Department’s National Marine Fisheries Service.  The FWS’s 
historical focus also may stem from its commitment to maintaining a network of migratory 
bird habitats that meets “important life history needs” of these species.  See U.S. FISH & 
WILDLIFE SERV., THE FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE MANUAL pt. 601, § 1.8 (describing the 
goals of the refuge system). 
347 See Camacho, supra note 53, at 15.  As two prominent scholars put it, the ESA “offers 
a minefield of historic baselines.”  Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 1, at 38. 
348 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (2012).    
349 50 C.F.R. § 17.81(a) (2013). 
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irreversibly altered or destroyed.”350  The FWS, in adopting this regulation, 
emphasized that nonnative introductions should be extremely rare,351 and 
the agency in fact has only allowed non-native introductions in two 
circumstances, both of which were supposed to be temporary.352  In doing 
so, the FWS affirmed the importance of focusing conservation efforts on 
promoting species where they existed historically and minimizing exotic 
species.353    Perhaps as a result of this dual role, the FWS’s management of 
the NWRS has also been heavily influenced by promoting historical 
fidelity.354  Thus, though the NWRSIA may allow the FWS to actively 
manage national wildlife refuges away from historical conditions, the FWS 
rules and policies have cabined this substantive legal adaptive capacity to a 
moderate degree.    
 The NWRSIA affords the FWS procedural legal adaptive capacity 
that is of a piece with the capacities of the USFS under NFMA and the BLM 
under FLPMA.  The statute requires the FWS to adopt a conservation plan 
for each refuge or complex of refuges and revise the plan “as may be 
necessary,” but at least once every fifteen years.355  Notably, the statute 
directs the FWS to revise a plan “at any time if [it] determines that 
conditions that affect the refuge or planning unit have changed 
significantly.”356  It must then manage the refuge in a manner consistent 
with the plan.357  The statute establishes procedural requirements for the 
planning process, but they do not appear to be particularly onerous, 
encompassing the usual inter-agency coordination and public participation 
opportunities.358  The NWRSIA also provides a boilerplate general grant of 
rulemaking authority to the FWS in its management of the refuges.359 
 The FWS has also embraced iterative decision-making processes.  
Of the nine goals of refuge planning it identified after adoption of the 
NWRSIA, one is providing a basis for adaptive management.360  One study 
                                                          
350 Id.  
351 See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Experimental Populations, 49 Fed. 
Reg. 33,885, 33,890 (Aug. 27, 1984). 
352 See Camacho, supra note 128, at 203. 
353 See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Experimental Populations. 49 Fed. 
Reg. 33,885, 33,890 (Aug. 27, 1984). 
354 See supra notes 335-341 and accompanying text.  
355 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(e)(1)(A)(iii)-(iv) (2006). 
356 Id. § 668dd(a)(1)(E). 
357 Id. § 668dd(e)(1)(E). 
358 Id. § 668dd(e) (3)-(4). 
359 Id. § 668dd(b)(5). 
360 Refuge Planning Policy Pursuant to the National Wildlife Refuge System 
Administration Act as Amended by the National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement 
Act of 1997, 65 Fed. Reg. 33,892, 33,906 (2000).  The FWS has embraced adaptive 
management in its administration of the ESA, too.  See, e.g., In re Polar Bear Endangered 
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found, however, that the FWS’s recently adopted land use plans tend to lack 
specific criteria for success, making it difficult for refuge managers to know 
whether and how to adjust management actions on the basis of information 
generated by monitoring.361  The FWS nevertheless has ample procedural 
legal adaptive capacity, both under the NWRSIA and its own planning 
regulations, to pursue the changes needed to effectively respond to climate 
change. 
2. Evaluating the FWS’s Adaptation Activities 
 In light of this moderate level of substantive legal adaptive capacity, 
it makes sense that the FWS has taken significant steps to engage in climate 
change adaptation, but has mostly confined these measures to conceptual 
organizational initiatives, vulnerability assessments, and vague goals that 
have yet to lead to concrete integration of climate change adaptation into 
land management.  Other than serving as the primary facilitator for the 
DOI’s LCCs,362 the FWS’s primary climate change adaptation activities in 
its capacity as manager of the national wildlife refuges has been drafting the 
National Fish, Wildlife, and Plants Climate Adaptation Strategy finalized in 
2012.363  The 2012 Strategy establishes seven broad climate adaptation 
goals: (1) enhancing the capacity for effective management; (2) supporting 
adaptive management; (3) increasing knowledge on impacts and responses 
of fish, wildlife and plants; (4) increasing awareness and motivating action 
to safeguard fish, wildlife, and plants; (5) reducing non-climate stressors to 
help ecosystems adapt; (6) conserving habitat to support healthy fish, 
wildlife, and plant populations and ecological functions; and (7) managing 
species and habitats to protect ecological function and provide sustainable 
cultural, subsistence, recreational, or commercial use.364  Encouragingly, 
the last two goals suggest a possible re-thinking of conservation approaches.  
The Strategy explains that the goal is not to keep current conservation areas 
as they are, but rather to ensure that a network of habitat conservation areas 
maximizes the chances that the majority of species will have sufficient 
                                                          
Species Act Listing and 4(d) Rule Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d 65, 112 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d on 
other grounds, 709 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
361 Fischman, et al., supra note 9, at 999; see also Vicky J. Meretsky & Robert L. Fischman, 
Learning from Conservation Planning for the U.S. National Wildlife Refuges, 28 
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1415 (2014) (discussing obstacle to adaptive management 
arising from lack of specific criteria in FWS comprehensive conservation plans). 
362 See supra notes 163-164 and accompanying text. 
363 FWS, NATIONAL FISH, WILDLIFE, AND PLANTS CLIMATE ADAPTATION STRATEGY 
(2012), http://www.wildlifeadaptationstrategy.gov/strategy.php [hereinafter FWS, 
CLIMATE ADAPTATION STRATEGY].  The FWS prepared a Strategic Plan for Responding 
to Accelerated Climate Change in 2010, which addressed the effects of climate change on 
fish and wildlife.  A draft action plan for implementing the strategic plan was never 
finalized, although the draft continues to provide guidance.  See USGCRP, SYNTHESIS, 
supra note 8, at 51. 
364 FWS, CLIMATE ADAPTATION STRATEGY, supra note 363, at 54. 
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habitat somewhere.365  However, this broad policy document has yet to 
affect any existing management processes used by the FWS. 
 Until recently, most of the agency’s focus has been on facilitating 
assessments of the potential effects of climate change on NWRS resources.  
However, in 2013 the agency adopted a new chapter in the FWS Manual 
that established overarching FWS policy and staffing responsibilities on 
climate change adaptation.366  These manual provisions tend to be couched 
in broad generalities, such as establishing a policy “to effectively and 
efficiently incorporate and implement climate change adaptation measures 
into the Service’s mission, programs, and operations”; use the best available 
science in coordinating appropriate adaptive responses; integrate adaptation 
strategies into all aspects of policy, planning, programs, and operations; 
work with partners and LCCs; “deliver landscape conservation actions that 
build resilience or support the ability of fish, wildlife, and plants to adapt; 
and monitor populations and habitats to assess the impacts of management 
strategies in the face of climate change.367 
 Segments of new FWS guidance do attempt to grapple with the 
difficulties of managing climate change, including the challenge of 
promoting historical fidelity despite a changing climate.  In July 2014, the 
FWS published guidance for resource managers across agencies on scenario 
planning for managing uncertainty, including from climate change.368  Later 
that year, it issued generalized guidance to NWRS managers that illustrates 
the challenges the FWS faces in managing for substantial changing 
conditions despite its internal constraints on substantive legal adaptive 
capacity.369  The guidance provides examples of potentially appropriate 
management actions to adapt to climate change, such as revision of land 
acquisition plans and restoration of acquired lands to enhance resilience.370   
                                                          
365 Id. 
366 FWS MANUAL 056 FW 1 (July 22, 2013), http://www.fws.gov/policy/056fw1.html. 
367 Id. § 1.6.  Another new Manual chapter, issued in 2014, established the FWS Climate 
Adaptation Network to guide the agency “to enhance preparedness, adaptation, and 
resilience in the face of the impacts of climate change and its interaction with non-climate 
influences” on fish, wildlife, plants, and ecosystems.  FWS MANUAL 056 FW 2 (June 
20,2014), http://www.fws.gov/policy/056fw2.html.  
368 FWS, CONSIDERING MULTIPLE FUTURES: SCENARIO PLANNING TO ADDRESS 
UNCERTAINTY IN NATURAL RESOURCE CONSERVATION (2014), 
http://www.fws.gov/home/feature/2014/pdf/Final%20Scenario%20Planning%20Docume
nt.pdf. The guidance provides several examples of scenario planning.  Id. at 89, 101, 129, 
137. 
369 FWS, PLANNING FOR CLIMATE CHANGE ON THE NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE SYSTEM, 
http://www.fws.gov/refuges/vision/pdfs/PlanningforClimateChangeontheNWRS.pdf. 
370 Id. at 9.  In describing several case studies, the guidance provided examples of possible 
management actions to address particular problems. See, e.g., id. at 40-41 (construction of 
deep wetlands); id. at 49 (strategic fire management). 
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 Importantly, the FWS continues to assert that the framework for 
fulfilling the NWRSIA’s mandate to maintain biological integrity, diversity, 
and environmental health is to maintain “historic conditions,” but it 
reframes historical conditions to focus on preexisting processes rather than 
particular constituents of the ecosystem.  It defines “historic conditions” as 
“[c]omposition, structure, and functioning of ecosystems resulting from 
natural processes that we believe . . . were present prior to substantial human 
related changes to the landscape.”371  The agency added that its goal is “to 
induce management for natural conditions and with natural processes, using 
historic conditions to help identify such conditions and processes.”372  The 
FWS expressly acknowledged that “[t]he concept of ecological integrity 
and the cohesion of ecological integrity policies are challenged and 
undermined by anthropogenic climate change.”373  It also noted that 
managers have “a certain degree of latitude and flexibility in responding to 
climate change,” and that “prospective adaptation” may be appropriate to 
“’fit’ ecologically with climate change trajectories.”374  The FWS thus 
continues to treat retention of historical conditions as the key substantive 
goal, but it is attempting to reinterpret a fixed historical baseline to allow 
more flexible application as ecological conditions change. 
 Despite this activity, relatively little of this guidance has found its 
way into refuge management plans—the core management regime for 
national wildlife refuges.   A 2014 study found that many NWRS units lack 
land use plans that meaningfully address climate change adaptation.375  
Only 73 of the 185 refuges for which comprehensive conservation plans 
(CCPs) were completed between 2005 and 2011 even mentioned 
prescriptions for climate change.376  Coastal refuges were most advanced, 
integrating planning for rises in sea level, but many refuges failed to 
consider sufficiently the spread of harmful parasites and diseases and the 
                                                          
371 Id. at 14.  As Professors Ruhl and Salzman have argued, “There is no other way to 
manage for historic conditions than to use a historic baseline.”  Ruhl & Salzman, supra 
note 12, at 18.  The FWS’s frame of reference extends from 88 to 1800 AD.  Id. at 14. 
372 Id. 
373 Id. 
374 Id.  The FWS also issued in 2014 a progress report on its implementation of the 2012 
Climate Adaptation Strategy describing projects in which the FWS has begun to implement 
some of the 2012 Strategy’s recommendations.  FWS, NATIONAL FISH, WILDLIFE & 
PLANTS CLIMATE ADAPTATION STRATEGY, TAKING ACTION: A PROGRESS REPORT 5 
(2014), available at http://www.wildlifeadaptationstrategy.gov/pdf/Taking-Action-
progress-report-2014.pdf. 
375 See Fischman, et al., supra note 9, at 993.  Cf. Archie et al., supra note 14 (finding that 
the FWS “may be the farthest along” of the four land management agencies in 
incorporating climate change adaptation in its land use planning, based on surveys and 
interviews conducted in 2011 (before the USFS amended its planning regulations) in three 
western states). 
376 Id. at 994.  Later plans were more likely to address management actions than earlier 
ones.  Id. 
  
 
56 
potential increase in wildfires.377  Of those that prescribe adaptation 
measures, most focused on continued monitoring and assessment or 
persisted in the same conservation activities in which refuges engage to 
maintain resilience generally.378  The plan prescriptions generally did not 
meet the FWS’s own criteria that prescriptions be specific, measurable, 
achievable, results-oriented, and time-fixed.379  Scenario planning, which 
can describe plausible futures using quantitative or qualitative data, was not 
evident in the plans.380  The study concludes that the CCPs adopted between 
2005 and 2011 increased the extent to which they described climate-change 
impacts,381 but did not consistently respond to those impacts with 
prescriptions for adaptive responses to monitoring results.382   
 The agency’s commitment to pursuing concrete measures to 
facilitate adaptation fortunately appears to be increasing.  In September 
2014, the FWS incorporated a new Strategic Growth Policy in the FWS 
Manual.  Among its objectives are ensuring that future growth of the refuge 
system furthers “an ecologically-connected network of public and private 
lands that are resilient to climate change and support a broad range of 
species under changed conditions.”383  Even though this reference to 
changed conditions appears in a portion of the Manual governing new 
additions to the refuge system, it may reflect an emerging broader 
recognition that movement away from a solely historic focus is necessary 
in an era of disruptive climate change.384   
In addition, in its fiscal year 2016 budget request, the FWS 
identified climate change adaptation as a priority goal.  In particular, it 
indicated that by September 2015, the Interior Department “will 
demonstrate maturing implementation of climate change adaptation . . . 
                                                          
377 Id. at 993. 
378 Id. at 994 (“Although the majority of plans prescribed monitoring, much less than half 
indicated an intent to act on the results of monitoring or described specific actions that 
should follow from monitoring results.”). 
379 Id. 
380 Fischman, et al., supra note 9, at 997. 
381 See also Meretsky & Fischman, supra note 361, at 1418 (calculating proportion of CCPs 
completed between 2005 and 2011 that addressed various climate-change threats). 
382 Fischman, et al., supra note 9, at 1003.  At the same time, however, the study postulates 
that “the CCPs tend to be more current than plans for other public land systems and are 
therefore more likely to address climate change.”  Id. at 994.  That assessment, however, 
relates to plans prepared before the 2012 amendments to the USFS planning regulations 
described above.  See supra notes 233-237 and accompanying text.  As Professor Fischman 
has noted elsewhere, “the prescriptive sections [of CCPs] are the engines that generate real 
management actions.”  See also Meretsky & Fischman, supra note 361, at 1423.   
383 FWS, FWS MANUAL 602 FW 5, § 5.2 (SEPTEMBER 4, 2014), 
http://www.fws.gov/policy/602fw5.html.  
384 See id. § 5.5A(1) (noting the increasing importance in planning and directing the growth 
of the Refuge System of recognizing the “[u]nparalleled changes related to climate change 
and non-climate stressors”). 
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when implementing strategies in its Strategic Sustainability Performance 
Plan.”385  The agency plans to track progress on a quarterly basis to consider 
the incremental level of accomplishment achieved in development of 
policies or processes, or the number of “deliverables” or completed 
projects.386  The strategic goals include mainstreaming and integrating 
climate change adaptation into agency-wide and regional planning actions, 
ensuring that agency principals demonstrate commitment to adaptation 
efforts through internal communications and policies, ensuring that 
workforce protocols reflect projected health and safety impacts of climate 
change, constructing or modifying facilities and infrastructure with 
consideration for potential climate impacts, and updating external programs 
and policies to incentivize planning for and addressing the impacts of 
climate change.387  The FWS also requested budget increases for specific 
activities linked to climate change adaptation, including fish passage 
improvements, ecosystem restoration, and development of adaptive 
science.388  
 In sum, the FWS has engaged in a moderate level of climate change 
adaptation planning, which has recently accelerated as the agency has 
completed CCPs.  The NWRSIA and the FWS’s interpretive regulations 
provide the FWS with some substantive legal adaptive capacity that may be 
useful in adapting to climate change, even if not as much as that provided 
by the statutes that govern management of the multiple use lands.  The FWS 
also has committed to the use of adaptive management (and, to a lesser 
extent, scenario planning), thereby affording itself procedural legal adaptive 
capacity, though the absence of meaningful metrics has detracted from the 
value of these iterative processes.   
 Nevertheless, the agency’s evaluation of the threats to refuge 
resources posed by climate change has by and large not yet translated into 
specific management prescriptions, even in most recently adopted CCPs.  
Moreover, the FWS’s adaptation efforts have been restrained, at least until 
very recently, by a fundamental focus on promoting ecological historical 
fidelity, so that it arguably has not taken full advantage of the substantive 
legal adaptive capacity that its organic statute provides.  The agency may 
have begun to remove these self-imposed shackles, as its Strategic Growth 
Policy and most recent budget request seem to indicate.  Resource 
constraints may have limited the FWS’s progress in incorporating 
adaptation goals into plans and management actions, and may continue to 
                                                          
385 U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., BUDGET JUSTIFICATIONS AND 
PERFORMANCE INFORMATION, FISCAL YEAR 2016 AT EX-19, 
http://www.fws.gov/budget/2015/FY2016_FWS_Greenbook.pdf.  
386 Id. 
387 Id. at EX-19 to EX-20. 
388 Id. at EX-11, ES-16 (California Bay Delta restoration), SS-3. 
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do so even if the agency does more fully shift away from a focus on historic 
preservation.389 
E. The National Parks 
 The NPS has undertaken even less climate change adaptation 
planning and integration of adaptation measures than the FWS in managing 
the National Park System.  The limited adaptation activity is again 
consistent with the System’s fairly limited substantive legal adaptive 
capacity due to its primary focus on promoting historical conditions.   
1. The NPS’s Adaptive Capacity 
 The NPS must manage the National Park System under the National 
Park Service Organic Act’s core preservation mandate to “conserve the 
scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein and to 
provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means 
as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.”390  
Like the FWS, the NPS “is primarily a nature preservation agency.”391  
Although the NPS has broad discretion in interpreting its statutory 
authority, 392 it is constrained in the ways it can use that authority to address 
climate change.  Climate change is causing and will continue to cause 
fundamental ecological changes from prior conditions, creating tension 
with the Organic Act’s historical preservation mandate.393   
 The NPS has long interpreted the Organic Act to require it to focus 
on protecting historical conditions and preexisting biota.394  Established 
NPS interpretations stipulate that the NPS should take a historical 
preservationist approach to existing natural resources in national parks.  If 
                                                          
389 See GAO, supra note 111, at 44-45. 
390 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).  See also U.S. NAT’L PARK SERV., MANAGEMENT POLICIES § 1.4.3 
(2006), available at http://www.nps.gov/policy/MP2006.pdf [hereinafter NPS 
MANAGEMENT POLICIES] (The fundamental purpose of the national park system, 
established by the Organic Act . . . , as amended, begins with a mandate to conserve park 
resources and values.”).  The NPS defines “conserve” to mean “to protect from loss or 
harm.  Historically, the terms conserve, protect, and preserve have come collectively to 
embody the fundamental purpose of the NPS—preserving, protecting and conserving the 
national park system.”  Id. at 1565 (Glossary). 
391 Keiter, supra note 146, at 955. 
392 See Davis v. Latschar, 202 F.3d 359, 365 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
393 Camacho, supra note 12, at 1426 (arguing that prioritizing preservationism and 
minimizing human interaction with natural systems “is incongruent with the dynamic 
nature of ecosystems and the pervasiveness of the human-nature relationship, particularly 
in light of modern anthropogenic climate changes”). 
394 See NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 390, § 4.4.1 (“The National Park Service 
will maintain as parts of the natural ecosystems of parks all plants and animals native to 
park ecosystems.”); id. § 4.1 (“[P]reserving park resources and values unimpaired is the 
core or primary responsibility of NPS managers.”). 
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any management strategy or adaptation measure could lead to the 
impairment of park resources or values, it cannot be approved.395    As such, 
the NPS often engages in active steps to promote or restore preexisting 
ecological conditions.396  This focus on preserving historical conditions is 
congruent with the NPS’s other programs directed at historic preservation 
of the built environment.  These include administering National Historical 
Parks, National Historic Landmarks, National Heritage Areas, the National 
Register of Historic Places, and historic preservation grants and historic 
rehabilitation tax credits.397 
 Paired with that historical goal is a secondary presumption that the 
agency must protect existing natural resources from human activity or 
management,398 as well as a strong preference for relying on “natural” 
processes for protecting and restoring pre-existing native species.399 Yet 
even then historical preservation remains the primary goal;400 the agency 
has declared that it will not intervene in natural biological or physical 
processes except “to restore natural ecosystems functioning that has been 
disrupted by past or ongoing human activities.”401  If biological or physical 
processes have been altered in the past by human activities, active 
management may be appropriate, but the goal of such action is 
                                                          
395 Id. § 4.1. 
396 See id. § 4.4.2.2 (stating that the NPS “will strive to restore extirpated native plant and 
animal species . . . .”); id. § 4.4.2.5 (“In altered plant communities managed for a specified 
purpose, plantings will consist of species that are native to the park or that are historically 
appropriate for the period or event commemorated.”); id. § 4.4.2.3 (“The Service will 
survey for, protect, and strive to recover all species native to national park system units 
that are listed under the [ESA] . . . . [T]he Service will inventory other native species that 
are of special management concern to parks . . . and will manage them to maintain their 
natural distribution and abundance.”); id. § 4.4.1.2 (“The Service will strive to protect the 
full range of genetic types (genotypes) of native plant and animal populations in the 
parks.”). 
397 See NORMAN TYLER ET AL., HISTORIC PRESERVATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO ITS 
HISTORY, PRINCIPLES, AND PRACTICE 33 (2ND ED. 2009). 
398 See NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 390, § 4.1 (“In cases of uncertainty as to 
the impacts of activities on park natural resources, the protection of natural resources will 
predominate.”).  Cf. id. at 36 (“The Service recognizes that natural processes and species 
are evolving, and the Service will allow this evolution to continue—minimally influenced 
by human actions.”). 
399 Id. § 4.4.2 (“Whenever possible, natural processes will be relied upon to maintain native 
plant and animal species and influence natural fluctuations in populations of these 
species.”). 
400 In fact, some NPS policies conflate historical preservation with non-intervention by 
purporting to promote native species through minimizing human management. See id. 
§ 4.4.1.2 (“The Service will strive to protect the full range of genetic types (genotypes) of 
native plant and animal populations in the parks by perpetuating natural evolutionary 
processes and minimizing human interference with evolving genetic diversity.”). 
401 Id. § 4.1.  Additional limited justifications for such intervention are congressional 
authorization, emergencies that pose risks to human life and property, and as needed to 
protect other park resources, human health and safety, or facilities.  Id. 
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fundamentally historical preservationist:  “to restore them to a natural 
condition or to maintain the closest approximation of the natural condition 
when a truly natural system is no longer attainable.”402  Legislation creating 
individual NPS units may reinforce the agency’s focus on maintaining 
historic conditions.403 
 The NPS’s approach to its statutory management mandate generally 
functions to minimize the possibility of proactive management to promote 
future ecological function.  NPS managers have the discretion (and 
sometimes obligation) to reintroduce extirpated populations of vulnerable 
native species.404  NPS managers generally are prohibited from introducing 
non-native species except when needed to meet a specific management 
need, all feasible measures are taken to reduce the risk, and the introduced 
species is closely related to an extirpated native species or improved variety 
of a native species where the natural variety cannot survive current, human-
altered environmental conditions.405  NPS managers are expected to actively 
seek to remove any non-native species.406   
 This focus on promoting historical fidelity provides limited 
substantive legal adaptive capacity for NPS managers to engage in proactive 
adaptation measures.  The tension between fostering active climate change 
adaptation strategies that seek to advance future ecological health and the 
NPS’s fundamentally historical preservation goals is obvious.407  The 
                                                          
402 Id. § 4.1.   
403 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 79a (2006) (stating purpose of creating Redwood National Park 
as “preserv[ing] significant examples of the primeval coastal redwood (Sequoia 
sempervirens) forests and the streams and seashores with which they are associated for 
purposes of public inspiration, enjoyment, and scientific study”); id. § 160 (stating that the 
purpose of establishing Voyageurs National Park “is to preserve, for the inspiration and 
enjoyment of present and future generations, the outstanding scenery, geological 
conditions, and waterway system which constituted a part of the historic route of the 
Voyageurs who contributed significantly to the opening of the Northwestern United 
States”).  The historic preservation focus is even more explicit for units such as national 
historical parks.  See, e.g., id. § 282 (describing the purpose of San Juan Island National 
Historical Park as “interpreting and preserving the sites of the American and English camps 
on the island, and of commemorating the historic events that occurred from 1853 to 1871 
on the island in connection with the final settlement of the Oregon Territory boundary 
dispute”). 
404 Id. § 2.3.4 (“Implementation plan details may vary widely and may direct a finite project 
(such as reintroducing an extirpated species . . .”); id. § 4.4.1 (“The Service will 
successfully maintain native plants and animals by . . . restoring plant and animal 
populations in parks when they have been extirpated by past human-caused actions”); id. 
§ 4.4.2.3 (stating that the NPS will “reestablish extirpated populations as necessary to 
maintain the species and the habitats upon which they depend”). 
405 Id. § 4.4.4.1. 
406 Id. 
407 But cf. Keiter, supra note 9, at 334 (arguing that the non-impairment mandate of the 
NPS’s organic statute “constitutes a clear, substantive standard that gives priority to 
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agency is not similarly saddled with low procedural legal adaptive capacity, 
however.  NPS policies encourage the “appropriate” use of adaptive 
management in general management plans for park units408 as “a means for 
providing flexibility in the face of changing natural conditions.”409  In 
addition, NPS policies appear to leave agency officials considerable 
flexibility in determining the appropriate nature and extent of public 
participation in agency planning endeavors.410  They also leave decisions 
about the frequency of general management plan revisions largely to agency 
discretion.411  The processes for implementation of general management 
plan provisions are even more amorphous than the ones that apply to plan 
adoption.412 
2. Appraising the NPS’s Adaptation Activities 
 The NPS has engaged in even more modest climate change 
adaptation activities in managing the National Park System than the FWS.  
NPS actions have primarily focused on developing science and data on the 
possible effects of climate change and seeking to educate the public about 
climate change’s effects.  The agency promoted better monitoring of 
ecological responses to climate change413 and distributed information about 
climate change effects.414  It has begun compiling data on sea level changes 
and storm surges that may be useful in crafting hurricane response plans for 
coastal parks in the Southeast and Northeast Regions.415 
                                                          
protecting the ecological health of national parks over other considerations in the event of 
a conflict”). 
408 The Organic Act mandates the adoption of general management plans “for the 
preservation and use of each unit of the National Park System.”  16 U.S.C. § 1a-7(b) (2006). 
409 NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 390, § 2.3.4. 
410 Id. § 2.3.1.5 (“Public involvement strategies, practices, and activities will be developed 
and conducted within the framework of civic engagement.”). 
411 Id. § 2.3.1.12 (stating that if conditions remain substantially unchanged, deferring 
review of existing plans beyond 10 to 15 years would be “acceptable”). 
412 See id. § 2.3.4. 
413 E.g., NPS, Enhanced Monitoring to Better Address Rapid Climate Change in High-
Elevation Parks: A Multi-Network Strategy, 
http://science.nature.nps.gov/im/units/gryn/monitor/climate_change.cfm; Monitoring 
Ecological Response to Climate Change, 
http://science.nature.nps.gov/im/units/gryn/monitor/climate_change.cfm. 
414 E.g., NPS and USGS, Coastal Vulnerability Index (CVI), 
http://woodshole.er.usgs.gov/project-pages/nps-cvi/ (including maps of vulnerable coastal 
areas that quantify future physical changes on shorelines due to sea level rise). 
415 See NPS, Coastal Change Response Program, Sea Level Change and Storm Surge 
Projections, http://www.nps.gov/subjects/climatechange/upload/Coastal-20Adaptation-
20Project-20Brief-20Nov2013.pdf. 
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 The NPS’s most prominent climate change adaptation initiative to 
date has been its 2012 Climate Change Action Plan.416  The plan outlined 
criteria for incorporating climate change considerations into NPS operations 
and described how NPS managers might anticipate future conditions.417  It 
listed eight high-priority areas of emphasis, but virtually all were either 
modest, “business-as-usual” initiatives or vague and inoffensive 
commitments.  These include: (1) to enhance workforce climate literacy; 
(2) to engage youth and their families; (3) to develop effective planning 
frameworks and guidance; (4) to provide climate change science to parks; 
(5) to implement the Green Parks Plan; (6) to foster robust partnerships; (7) 
to apply appropriate adaptation tools and options; and (8) to strengthen 
communication.418  The agency noted the need to “rethink traditional 
planning process” in light of climate change, but the document was devoid 
of specifics.419  Likewise, the discussion of appropriate adaptation tools 
provided as examples “listening sessions” with NPS employees, pilot 
adaptation planning processes that connect vulnerability assessments and 
scenarios to park planning, decision frameworks for navigating resource 
adaptation options and practices, and a national interpretive plan for climate 
change.420  These measures may provide a necessary underpinning for 
future unit-specific management decisions to deal with climate change, but 
they are couched in much more general terms than the efforts of the other 
federal land agencies.  The plan promised a substantive revision in 2014.421 
As of mid-2015, however, NPS management policies on Park System 
Planning do not refer to climate change even once.422 
                                                          
416 NPS, CLIMATE CHANGE ACTION PLAN 2012-2014 (2012), 
http://www.nps.gov/subjects/climatechange/policyandplanning.htm.  This plan was 
preceded in 2010 by a Climate Change Response Strategy that established general climate 
adaptation goals and identified approaches for on-the-ground planning.  See NPS, CLIMATE 
CHANGE RESPONSE STRATEGY 14-15 (Sept. 2010), available at 
http://www.nps.gov/subjects/climatechange/policyandplanning.htm. 
417 NPS, CLIMATE CHANGE ACTION PLAN 2012-2014, at 7 (2012), 
http://www.nps.gov/subjects/climatechange/policyandplanning.htm. 
418 Id. at 14, 20. 
419 Id. at 15, 20-22. 
420 Id. at 25-26. 
421 Id. at 7. 
422 Park System Planning, http://www.nps.gov/policy/mp/chapter2.htm.  Neither did 
Director’s Order 2-1, Resource Stewardship Planning, 
http://www.nps.gov/policy/DOrders/draftDO2-1.html, or the Handbook for Environmental 
Impact Analysis, http://www.nps.gov/policy/DOrders/RM12.pdf.  Director’s Order #13A, 
Environmental Management Systems, http://www.nps.gov/policy/DOrders/DO-13A.htm, 
mentions climate change once, noting that the environmental management system 
approach “will be used to move the NPS beyond compliance and to encourage 
environmental leadership in all aspects of a facility’s environmental interactions, including 
impacts on climate change.  Id. § VIIB.  The directive governing Natural Resources 
Inventory and Monitoring, Director’s Order 77, 
http://www.nature.nps.gov/nps75/nps75.pdf, refers to global climate change as an example 
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 At the unit or regional level, the agency is developing climate 
change adaptation strategies, but many remain inchoate and unspecific.423  
For example, the NPS Intermountain Region released a 2012 report that 
merely stated that the Region was working on a handbook to refine 
adaptation strategies.424  Some parks seem to have advanced a little further.  
Officials at Glacier National Park, for example, have engaged in research to 
establish baseline measures of species abundance and distribution to detect 
changes in populations of at risk species such as pika.  Park officials have 
also begun planting trees in new habitats, managing invasive plants, and 
restoring native vegetation.425  They indicated that they had no current plans 
to revise the park’s general management plan because they deemed it an 
adequate management tool, even though it does not directly address climate 
change.426  They did indicate that they would develop a “foundation plan” 
describing the park’s purpose, significant resources, and planning needs 
which “likely” will address climate change.427  Efforts to implement 
specific responses to climate change at Glacier seem to be the exception 
rather than the rule, however.428 
 The NPS’s adaptation efforts, like those of the other agencies, have 
suffered from resource limitations.  In fiscal year 2011, the NPS was 
allocated $10 million for adaptation activities.  That figure dropped to $3 
million the next year.429  Efforts to address climate-related threats to park 
resources at Glacier National Park, for example, have suffered due to lack 
of adequate funding for monitoring, vulnerability assessments, and 
responses to insect infestations.430  For fiscal year 2016, the NPS requested 
                                                          
of how priority resource management issues can be used to provide important direction to 
the structure of an inspection and maintenance program.  Id. at 13. 
423 The NPS has conducted climate change scenario planning workshops focused on 
training, research, or the role of adaptation in decision making or strategic plans.  See 
USGCRP, SYNTHESIS, supra note 8, at 50.   
424 NPS, CLIMATE CHANGE ACTION PLAN REPORT: INTERMOUNTAIN REGION, at 33 (2013), 
available at 
http://greatnorthernlcc.org/sites/default/files/documents/nps_ccar_2013_9.pdf.  
425 GAO, supra note 111, at 48. 
426 Id. at 50. 
427 Id.  The NPS has begun to devise strategies to address climate change in preparing its 
National Long Range Transportation Plan, and is working on “foundation documents” 
describing priority issues and planning needs, which are supposed to be completed for all 
parks by 2016.  It is also preparing a “State of the Park” report for each NPS unit, which 
will incorporate information on historical climate observations and projections.  See 
USGCRP, SYNTHESIS, supra note 8, at 50-51. 
428 The NPS’s webpage on its response to climate change does little more than describe the 
use of scenario planning to prepare for the impacts of climate change and recite the 
agency’s general adaptation goals.  NPS, Climate Change: Adaptation, 
http://www.nps.gov/subjects/climatechange/adaptation.htm.  
429 GAO, supra note 111, at 47. 
430 Id. at 51.  This constraint is not limited to the NPS.  See USGCRP, SYNTHESIS, supra 
note 8, at vi (“Federal agencies are making significant progress in climate change 
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$16.4 million for climate change-related activities (out of a total of $213.4 
million in targeted programmatic increases for all NPS activities), 
representing an increase of $13.5 million over the enacted budget for 
2015.431  Of that amount, $3.5 million would be to implement resiliency-
building natural resources projects, assist planning efforts, help agency 
communications with the public, and collaborate with other agencies and 
academic in designing science-based resiliency-building projects in the 
parks.  An additional $10 million would support partnerships with non-
federal entities on projects to increase landscape resilience to extreme 
weather events and the challenges posed by wildfire, flooding, and 
drought.432 
F. Federal Wilderness Areas 
 Wilderness is a special designation Congress overlays on parts of 
already existing federal lands.  The federal agency that manages the land 
before Congressional designation is charged with administering the area 
specifically as wilderness.433  Because wilderness areas were established 
primarily to minimize active human management and secondarily to 
promote historical conditions, they generally have the least legal adaptive 
capacity of all federal conservation lands.434  A prohibition on active 
resource management severely restricts management alternatives in 
response to the effects of climate change.  Moreover, an historical baseline 
for whatever management occurs is likely to create a conundrum if climate 
change precludes retention of or return to that baseline.  Unsurprisingly, 
therefore, wilderness lands have been subject to virtually no climate change 
adaptation planning or incorporation of climate change concerns into its on-
the-ground management by any of the federal land agencies. 
1. Adaptive Capacity under the Wilderness Act  
 The Wilderness Act of 1964435 is not primarily concerned with 
promoting ecological health.  Areas designated by Congress as official 
                                                          
adaptation, although lack of financial resources has slowed implementation of climate-
focused activities.”).  But cf. id. at viii (“The number and quality of adaptation efforts that 
have evolved during a period of declining Federal budgets are encouraging, signaling that 
adaptation has moved from conceptual to real.”). 
431 DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, NATIONAL PARK SERV., FISCAL YEAR 2016 BUDGET 
JUSTIFICATIONS Overview-6, Overview-11, http://www.nps.gov/aboutus/upload/FY-
2016-Greenbook.pdf.  
432 Id. at ONPS-ResStew-5 to ONPS-REsStew-6. 
433 Glicksman, supra note 265, at 448-49. 
434 Camacho, supra note 12, at 1407, 1426-27 (describing the Wilderness Act as the 
primary federal example of a passive resource management statute). 
435 Id.  §§ 1131-1136 (2006). 
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wilderness must be protected above all to preserve their natural conditions 
and wild character.  The Act defines “wilderness” as:  
[A]n area where the earth and its community of life are 
untrammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor who does not 
remain. [It is] an area of undeveloped Federal land retaining its 
primeval character and influence, without permanent 
improvements or human habitation, which is protected and 
managed so as to preserve its natural conditions and which . . .  
generally appears to have been affected primarily by the forces of 
nature, with the imprint of man’s work substantially 
unnoticeable.436 
Federal agencies must ensure that wilderness areas are administered to 
“leave them unimpaired for future use and enjoyment as wilderness” and 
“so as to preserve [their] natural conditions.”437 
 The objectives of the Wilderness Act appear to be limited to either 
minimizing human management (wildness preservation) or active 
management to maintain or restore historical conditions (historical 
preservation).  On the one hand, the statute could be construed to prohibit 
substantial active management.438  Alternatively, it could be understood to 
require active agency management to ensure that human activities do not 
interfere with the statutory goals of preserving wilderness character and 
natural conditions.439  The Act implicitly contemplates some level of 
temporary, ancillary, and insubstantial human interference.440  As such, it is 
not completely opposed to human interaction with and management of 
wilderness areas.  In a few instances, the Act provides explicit authorization 
for active management.  It allows the USFS, for example, to take necessary 
measures “in the control of fire, insects, and diseases.”441 
 The statute and judicial interpretations, however, do not provide 
definitive guidance on how much active management is generally allowed 
                                                          
436 Id.  § 1131(c). 
437 Id. 
438 See Wilderness Soc’y., 316 F.3d at 923-24 (discussing these alternative interpretations).  
439 Wilderness Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 629 F.3d 1024, 1033 (9 th Cir. 
2010) (concluding that Congress did not intend “a museum notion of wilderness’); Izaak 
Walton League of Am., Inc. v. Kimbell, 516 F. Supp. 2d 982 (D. Minn. 2007) (concluding 
that the duty to preserve wilderness character may extend beyond wilderness boundaries). 
440 See 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (2006) (emphasis added) (excluding only “permanent 
improvements or human habitation” and ensuring that an area “generally appears to have 
been affected primarily by the forces of nature, with the imprint of man’s work 
substantially unnoticeable”). 
441 Id. § 1133(d)(1) (2006). 
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or required in wilderness areas.442  Eric Biber and Elisabeth Long contend 
that the Wilderness Act provides significant discretion for agencies to 
engage in active management, stating that “the vast majority of 
management options are available to management agencies in wilderness 
areas.”443  Nonetheless, even their analysis found that some of the more 
active management strategies are not allowed in wilderness and that the 
other strategies that might be allowed could be subject to “some procedural 
and substantive hoops.”444    The statute might allow active management of 
wilderness, but its express language indicates an agency may do so only in 
furtherance of the preservation of pre-existing wilderness character and 
natural conditions.  As such, agencies in charge of wilderness preservation 
may not rely on robust activities primarily oriented toward promoting future 
ecological function at the expense of historical fidelity.445   
 Regardless of the exact scope of the land management agencies’ 
authority to actively manage to preserve wilderness character, climate 
change makes achieving both wildness preservation and historical 
preservation goals increasingly costly or impossible.  It also pits the 
Wilderness Act’s tandem objectives of passive management and historical 
preservation increasingly against each other, as it will be impossible to 
concurrently leave ecosystems alone and keep things as they were.446  More 
significantly, climate change makes each goal increasingly at odds with 
promoting ecological health.447  Wilderness areas thus have the least 
substantive legal adaptive capacity of any federal conservation lands.  They 
also have the least procedural legal adaptive capacity, with minimal 
integration of adaptive management or other flexible processes into 
wilderness management protocols.448 
                                                          
442 In Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 353 F.3d 1051, 1062 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(en banc), one of the few reported cases considering if active management of wilderness is 
permissible, the court addressed whether a fishery enhancement project was allowed in a 
wilderness area.  The initial Ninth Circuit panel considered the permissible level of human 
interference in wilderness areas. See Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 316 
F.3d 913, 924 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding that “[w]hile the wilderness must be ‘protected’ 
so that its natural processes dominate, it also must be ‘managed’ so that human activities 
from outside the area do not interfere unduly”).  The ultimate en banc decision, however, 
sidestepped this issue, concentrating instead on the project’s violation of the Wilderness 
Act’s prohibition on commercial enterprises. Wilderness Soc’y, 353 F.3d at 1067. 
443 Long & Biber, supra note 129, at 627.   
444 Id.    
445 See Camacho, supra note 128, at 199. 
446 Camacho, supra note 12, at 1435.   
447 See Craig, supra note 12, at 18 (urging “an across-the-board shift in legal objectives, 
from preservation and restoration to the improvement of resilience and adaptive capacity”). 
448 BLM, FWS and NPS wilderness regulations and policies do not refer to adaptive 
management.  See Wilderness Management, 65 Fed. Reg. 78,358 (Dec. 14, 2000) (codified 
at 43 C.F.R. part 6300 (2013)); FWS, Wilderness Stewardship, 610 FWS 1; NPS, 
Wilderness Preservation and Management; NPS, Director’s Order #41, Wilderness 
Stewardship (May 13, 2013).  But see Wilderness Stewardship Desk Guide: Management 
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2. Adaptation Activities in Wilderness 
 Congruent with this incompatibility between wilderness goals and 
climate change, the agencies charged with implementation of the 
Wilderness Act have engaged in the least amount of climate change 
adaptation planning and proactive adaptation measures in their respective 
wilderness lands.  When faced with ecological risks from climate change, 
wilderness managers appear to avoid engaging in active measures that 
would promote ecological health. 
 USFS, BLM, and NPS wilderness management policies fail to even 
refer to climate change.449   The one agency that has staked out a position, 
the FWS, seems committed to a non-interventionist approach that may not 
bode well for its ability to nimbly and effectively respond to climate-related 
threats. 
Wilderness preservation allows refuge managers to hedge their 
bets against the possibilities of inaccurate climate change 
projections and experimental management techniques that could 
lead to unintended consequences. . . . 
 However, the congruence of wilderness preservation and 
ecological integrity is not always perfect or absolute, because in 
designated wilderness there is also the need to avoid manipulative 
management to the extent possible.  This is challenging to 
managers who attempt to maintain natural species assemblages for 
purposes of ecological integrity, but find it difficult to accomplish 
without hands-on management.  Most controversial wildlife 
management activities result from the need to balance the ideals 
of natural and non-natural manipulated conditions. . . . 
However, in the context of climate change, the non-
manipulation ideal of wilderness offers one distinct advantage 
over the natural conditions ideal.  The non-manipulation ideal is 
stable and clear in any context, whereas anthropogenic climate 
change results in confusion about the appropriateness and 
techniques for maintaining natural conditions. . . .  In such cases, 
the non-manipulation ideal tilts the scales toward leaving species 
and community evolution to take its own course. . . .450 
                                                          
Practices for Wilderness in the National Forests 85 (March 2010) (describing wilderness 
managers’ use of adaptive management). 
449 See USFS, Wilderness Stewardship Desk Guide: Management Practices for Wilderness 
in the National Forests 85 (March 2010); BLM, Wilderness Management, 65 Fed. Reg. 
78,358 (Dec. 14, 2000) (codified at 43 C.F.R. part 6300 (2013)); NPS, Wilderness 
Preservation and Management; NPS, Director’s Order #41, Wilderness Stewardship (May 
13, 2013). 
450 FWS, PLANNING FOR CLIMATE CHANGE ON THE NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE SYSTEM 
70-71 (emphasis added). 
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 To date, agencies with wilderness management duties have done 
little to adapt to the effects of climate change in wilderness areas.  For 
example, on Isle Royale National Park in Lake Superior, the wolf 
population has been reduced to a record low of one pack with eight 
individuals.  In the past, wolves from the mainland introduced new genes 
into the isolated population by migrating to the island over the frozen lake.  
Climate change has decreased ice bridges that allow such migrations, and 
these bridges are not expected to form after 2040.  Ostensibly to promote 
wilderness values of passive management, the NPS has not intervened.451  
One wilderness advocacy group opposes genetic rescue, even with the 
threat of genetic and harmful trophic cascades.  It asserts that wilderness 
conservation should not include active management because wilderness in 
national parks must be kept “untrammeled.”452  This approach appears to be 
representative of how the land management agencies are preparing for 
climate-related threats to wilderness areas.   
 The agency that appears to have done the most to accommodate 
wilderness management policies to climate change is the USFS, but even 
its actions are of limited scope.  In 2012, the USFS Climate Change 
Resource Center published a report on wilderness and climate change.453  It 
recognized the incongruity between the Wilderness Act’s “hands-off” 
approach to management and maintaining “natural conditions” in light of 
climate change.454  It also argued for the need to redefine what it means to 
maintain and protect natural conditions to include active management.455  
Yet even this analysis is merely exploratory.  No agency, including the 
USFS, has demonstrated a sustained effort to consider how if at all to 
incorporate strategies for adapting to the extensive effects of climate change 
on valued wilderness resources. 
IV. LEGAL ADAPTIVE CAPACITY AND OTHER FACTORS SHAPING 
CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION  
 As Part III illustrates, there appears to be a significant relationship 
between legal adaptive capacity and the extent to which federal land 
management agencies have engaged in climate change adaptation.  With 
one key exception, the range of progress in adaptation largely reflects the 
adaptive capacity of the various governing laws/regulations to address 
dynamic ecological change.  Of the land management systems considered 
in Part III, wilderness areas are subject to the legal regime that is most tied 
to non-interventionist management structures.  Because wilderness 
management requirements are least congruent with active management, the 
                                                          
451 Id. 
452 Phil Bencomo, What This Winter’s Ice Bridge to Isle Royale Means for the island and 
its Wolves, LAKE SUPERIOR MAG., Feb. 17, 2014. 
453 David Cole & Steven Boutcher, Wilderness and Climate Change (May 17, 2012).  
454 Id. 
455 Id. 
  
 
69 
agencies that manage wilderness have very little substantive legal adaptive 
capacity.  Wilderness areas to date are virtually climate change adaptation 
free, and the inaction in the face of climate-related threats to wilderness 
areas reflects that limited capacity. 
 The national parks are managed under a statute that reflects a 
historical preservation priority and, to a somewhat lesser extent, a 
presumption against active management.  The NPS Organic Act and NPS 
policies interpreting and applying it primarily focus on keeping preexisting 
resources where they are and keeping out those not there before.  It is as if 
the agency took a snapshot of each park as it existed at some point in the 
past when the agency regarded it as well serving statutory purposes, and has 
used that photograph as a blueprint for future management actions so that 
conditions can be preserved as they were.  This focus on historical and 
wildness preservation, however, is in tension with managing for future 
ecological conditions.  The NPS’s previous management strategy may have 
worked well for much of the past century, when ecological conditions 
varied within a relatively narrow range, but it is not well suited to promoting 
long-term ecological health in the context of unprecedented ecological 
stress resulting from global climate change.   
 Not surprisingly, the NPS, which therefore lacks substantive legal 
adaptive capacity, also has not responded with alacrity to the threats posed 
to the national parks by climate change.  As at least a partial consequence 
of this limited legal adaptive capacity, the NPS has developed broad 
planning goals in its action plan, but few concrete adaptation strategies.  The 
agency’s limited ability or reluctance to accommodate the need to depart 
from a historical preservation orientation and a hesitation to engage in active 
management may be hindering, and is certainly not facilitating, its efforts 
to get a meaningful adaptation program underway. 
 Federal wildlife refuge goals provide moderate flexibility to manage 
as needed for future ecological conditions.  The NWRSIA’s mandate to 
ensure maintenance of the biological integrity and environmental health of 
the national wildlife refuges affords the FWS more expansive substantive 
legal adaptive capacity than that provided by either the Wilderness Act or 
the NPS Organic Act.456  Consistent with our thesis that the scope of an 
agency’s substantive legal adaptive capacity affects its ability to integrate 
climate change adaptation into management policies and programs, the 
FWS has taken climate change adaptation planning and implementation 
further than the NPS or any of the agencies in their management of 
wilderness areas.  Its actions include establishing agency-wide adaptation 
goals and proposed adaptation requirements for new acquisitions.457  
Moreover, the FWS’s commitment to meaningful analysis of and responses 
                                                          
456 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(4)(B) (2006). 
457 See supra notes 364-374 and accompanying text. 
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to the effects of climate change on the wildlife refuges appears to be 
accelerating. 
 Nevertheless, the FWS’s interpretations of the NWRSIA as 
requiring it to rely on a historical management approach has constrained its 
ability to move forward on its climate change adaptation commitments.  
Moreover, the NWRSIA’s commitment to decentralized goal setting, in 
which place-based individual refuge goals take precedence over system-
wide objectives,458 further limits the program’s legal adaptive capacity.  
This fragmented approach to goal-setting is of particular concern in an era 
of climate change; if shifting climatic conditions radically alter the 
ecological characteristics of a refuge, the original individualized purpose 
for creating that refuge are particularly vulnerable to not being 
achievable.459  Consistent with this level of substantive legal adaptive 
capacity, the FWS has only moderately adapted its management decisions 
to climate change.   
 As indicated above, DOI’s 2014 climate change adaptation plan 
enunciated the priorities of the NPS and the FWS in preparing to manage 
for climate change.460  The plan’s identification of the need for development 
of NPS guidance for incorporating climate change science into planning and 
developing a FWS climate change policy framework is particularly striking.  
DOI has demanded these initiatives of its component agencies since at least 
2001.  That these fundamental tasks remain unaccomplished after thirteen 
years reflects poorly on the status of climate change adaptation policy 
efforts at both agencies. 
 The USFS and the BLM both have broader substantive legal 
adaptive capacity to adjust to changing conditions than the NPS or the FWS.  
In the past, this flexibility has allowed these agencies to be less 
conservation-oriented.  However, it also provides the most adaptive 
capacity to manage the effects of climate change on vulnerable ecological 
resources.  The USFS has taken advantage of this capacity, most notably by 
requiring development of responses to climate-related threats in the 2012 
planning rule, as well as in early efforts to craft management approaches for 
individual projects that take account of climate change.  The U.S. Global 
Change Research Program has singled out the USFS for developing 
systematic accountability for developing adaptation strategies, requiring 
field units to assess resource sensitivity to climate change and develop 
adaptation responses (as reflected in the USFS Climate Change 
                                                          
458 See supra notes 318-319 and accompanying text. 
459 Changes in temperature or precipitation, for example, have the potential to alter refuge 
habitat in ways that drive out species that historically populated a refuge and facilitate 
invasion and entrenchment by non-native species. 
460 See supra notes 174-177 and accompanying text. 
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Performance Scorecard), and adopting regulations that require that climate 
change be considered in development of target conditions and management 
actions in restoration planning.461 
 In contrast, the BLM has taken no concrete steps other than 
conducting some vulnerability assessments.  FLPMA’s goals and 
delegations of management authority afford the BLM substantive legal 
adaptive capacity in its management of the public lands that is analogous to 
the USFS’s adaptive capacity under NFMA.  In addition, the BLM seems 
as committed to the use of adaptive management processes as the USFS.  
Yet, the BLM has lagged behind its sister multiple-use agency in its climate 
change adaptation planning and implementation.   
 The absence of clear and enforceable directives to exercise legal 
adaptive capacity is a potential factor in explaining the difference between 
BLM and USFS adaptation.  The criteria for development and revision of 
land use plans are much more amorphous under FLPMA than under 
NFMA,462 arguably affording the BLM that much more freedom to 
determine appropriate management policies and uses for particular parcels. 
As one court put it, the BLM planning process acts as nothing more than a 
“course filter.”463  FLPMA’s mandate “to prevent unnecessary or undue 
degradation” of the public lands464 could easily be construed to require the 
BLM to take affirmative steps to tackle climate-related threats to the public 
lands with the potential to cause resource degradation.  The BLM, however, 
has at times interpreted this mandate narrowly,465 and the judicial 
interpretation has significantly weakened if not eliminated this anti-
degradation duty.466 
                                                          
461 USGCRP, SYNTHESIS, supra note 8, at 62. 
462 Compare 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c) (2006) with 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g) (2006).  See also 2 
COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 131, §16:19 (noting FLPMA § 1712’s “open-ended” 
planning mandate and stating that, unlike NFMA, “FLPMA does not require promulgation 
of substantive, detailed planning regulations”). 
463 Chihuahuan Grasslands Alliance v. Norton, 507 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1221 (D.N.M. 2007), 
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 545 F.3d 884 (10th Cir. 2008). 
464 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (2006). 
465 See, e.g., Gregory M. Adams, Bringing Green Power to Public Lands: The Bureau of 
Land Management’s Authority and Discretion to Regulate Wind-Energy Developments, 21 
J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 445, 474 (2007) (arguing that regulation interpreting §1732(b) in the 
context of mining activities established a “prudent operator standard” that “completely 
ignored the requirement for prevention of undue degradation”). 
466 In Theodore Roosevelt Conservation P’ship v. Salazar, 661 F.3d 66 (D.C. Cir. 2011), 
for example, the court equated § 1732(b)’s anti-degradation mandate with FLPMA’s 
overarching multiple-use, sustained-yield standard: 
[B]y following FLPMA’s multiple-use and sustained-yield mandates, 
the Bureau will often, if not always, fulfill FLPMA’s requirement that it 
prevent environmental degradation because the former principles already 
require the Bureau to balance potentially degrading uses—e.g., mineral 
extraction, grazing, or timber harvesting—with conservation of the 
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 Whether regulatory adaptation is permissive or mandatory may 
affect legal adaptive capacity and the extent to which an agency actually 
uses it to address changed conditions.  Thus, the permissiveness in the 
BLM’s legal framework toward adapting its substantive goals may account 
for its failure to translate delegated adaptive authority into adaptation 
activities as extensively as the USFS has done under NFMA’s imperatives 
to adjust its management strategies as uses, demand for, and supply of forest 
resources change.467   
 Although the focus of this Article is on substantive legal adaptive 
capacity, two aspects of procedural adaptive capacity bear mentioning as 
possible explanations for the BLM’s relatively poor record on adaptation 
compared to that of the USFS.  First, agency organizational structure may 
have played a role in the delayed BLM response to climate change.  The 
BLM has a more decentralized decision-making structure,468 which may 
have contributed to its delays in prioritizing climate change adaptation for 
two reasons.  Local officials may have greater discretion to choose not to 
respond to changes in policy direction at the top,469 leading to a less 
widespread inculcation of the importance of adaptation throughout the 
agency.470  Second, a local decision-making locus may have made BLM 
resource managers more susceptible to capture by proponents of 
consumptive and extractive uses important to local economies.471  The 
interests of these parties do not necessarily align with the changes in 
                                                          
natural environment.  If the Bureau appropriately balances those uses 
and follows principles of sustained yield, then generally it will have 
taken the steps necessary to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation. 
Id. at 76.   
467 16 U.S.C. § 1600(1) (2006). 
468 See Tomas M. Koontz & Jennifer Bodine, Implementing Ecosystem Management in 
Public Agencies: Lessons from the U.S. Bureau of Land Management and the Forest 
Service, 22 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 60, 67 (2008) (noting perceived tendency of BLM 
managers “to manage their district or state like a ‘fiefdom’ “); 1 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, 
supra note 131, § 7:8 (citing descriptions of the BLM as “highly decentralized” and as a 
“line-and-staff organization”). 
469 BLM land managers reported in 2011 that lack of specific agency direction was the 
most important barrier to adaptation planning.  Archie et al., supra note 14.  The percentage 
of BLM employees identifying this factor as a barrier to adaptation planning was higher 
than for any of the other three agencies.  Id. at Fig. 7.   
470 In contrast, the congressional practice of dictating USFS decisions line by line in the 
agency’s budget may have contributed to the absence of comparable local discretion in 
USFS officials.  See 1 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 131, § 7:11 (citing John H. 
Cushman, Forest Service Is Rethinking Its Mission, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1994, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/04/24/us/forest-service-is-rethinking-its-mission.html). 
471 Cf. Keiter, supra note 9, at 336 (“[L]ong accustomed to meeting the commodity needs 
of local Western communities, some agency employees harbor the suspicion (shared by 
many local residents) that ecosystem-management proposals will ignore local economic 
concerns”). 
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management approaches that may be needed to respond effectively to 
climate change.472 
 The second aspect of procedural adaptive capacity that may be 
relevant relates to the manner in which the two multiple-use agencies factor 
scientific considerations into their decisional processes.  The NFMA 
integrates scientific input into the USFS’s decision-making processes in a 
way that FLPMA does not.  The NFMA requires the Secretary of 
Agriculture to appoint a committee of scientists not employed by the agency 
to provide scientific and technical advice to assure that “an effective 
interdisciplinary approach” is used in the adoption of USFS planning 
regulations.473  The committee has induced the agency to pursue 
management approaches that are responsive to changed conditions.474  
FLPMA does not institutionalize the role of scientific input into BLM 
decision-making processes in a similar manner, and, according to at least 
some observers, the result has been that the agency sometimes pays less 
                                                          
472 Cf. Glicksman, supra note 110, at 465-69 (describing the impact of different agency 
cultures and organizational structures on wilderness management policies). 
473 16 U.S.C. § 1604(h)(1) (2006). 
474 See Erin Madden, Seeing the Science for the Trees: Employing Daubert Standards to 
Assess the Adequacy of National Forest Management Under the National Forest 
Management Act, 18 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 321, 332 (2003) (“In the Committee's opinion, 
a regulatory system that required “continued evaluation and periodic revisions” when new 
information became available was critical.  Moreover, the Committee understood the vital 
role that research would play in managing forests based on the evolving body of scientific 
knowledge of forest ecosystems.”); cf. Robert B. Keiter, Taking Account of the Ecosystem 
on the Public Domain: Law and Ecology in the Greater Yellowstone Region, 60 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 923, 969 (1989) (“The NFMA’s mandate to appoint an independent committee of 
scientists to provide ‘scientific and technical advice’ on the proposed implementing 
regulations reflects a serious congressional commitment to integrating ecologically based 
management principles into the Forest Service's multiple-use practices.”).  The USFS also 
may be better situated than the Interior Department agencies to integrate the latest science 
into its management decisions.  The Interior Secretary in the 1990s transferred most FWS 
scientists, for example, to the National Biological Survey, which Congress then 
incorporated into the U.S. Geological Survey.  As a result, as the leading legal academic 
on the national wildlife refuges has surmised, the FWS “suffers from . . . a dearth of 
scientists. . . .  So, without sufficient scientific expertise to determine the full range of 
consequences of a use, and without funding for new studies to better understand impacts, 
the Service may fail to forecast many interferences with or detractions from the purposes 
of the refuge.”  Fischman, supra note 83, at 555.  The NPS’s science arm suffered a similar 
fate.  See Paul C. Pritchard, Our National Parks: Assumptions, Metaphors and Policy 
Implications, 8 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 421, 424 (1997) (stating that the NPS “research 
function has been decimated in recent years,” with “many Park Service researchers have 
been transferred to the National Biological Survey (NBS) in the interest of efficiency and 
increased effectiveness”).  The level of scientific input into NPS management decisions 
dropped sharply after those shifts.  Id. at 424-25. 
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attention to current science than it should, in part because of the influence 
of consumptive users referred to above.475 
 The difference between the climate adaptation track records of the 
USFS and the BLM may also be the result of factors that have nothing to 
do with either the substantive or procedural legal adaptive capacities of the 
two agencies.476  The USFS has long had a top-down management culture, 
which places a premium on following policy directions established by 
agency leadership.477  Relatedly, one possibility is that the BLM historically 
has a less robust tradition of natural resource protection even as compared 
to the USFS.  The USFS, for example, has long played a leadership role in 
wilderness preservation that the BLM has not.478  Similarly, it is possible 
that there has been a mistaken belief that natural resources on BLM lands – 
such as range – are not as vulnerable to a changing climate as USFS lands, 
or that, even if they are, they are less ecologically valuable and therefore 
not worth devoting as many resources to save.  Some have referred to the 
BLM lands as “the lands no one wanted,” having been unclaimed and 
unreserved during the federal government's disposition of the public 
domain, and “many viewed them as a vast arid wasteland of little use to 
anyone.”479 The wooded areas and spectacular scenery characteristic of 
                                                          
475 See, e.g., Debra L. Donahue, Western Grazing: The Capture of Grass, Ground, and 
Government, 35 ENVTL. L. 721, 782 (2005) (“Of all federal agencies, however, the BLM 
best epitomizes rancher capture. Its bias is frequently apparent in management decisions 
that disregard available science and policy guidance.”). 
476 Others have noted the role of extra-statutory factors in other agencies’ failure to pursue 
adaptive approaches.  See Archie et al., supra note 14 (concluding that “[d]ifferences 
between the . . . BLM and USFS were apparent [in survey responses from land managers 
at the two agencies] despite their similar multiple use mandates,” and attributing dissimilar 
management practices to different “structure and culture, funding, use of science, 
collaboration with   stakeholders, and political power”); Flatt & Tarr, supra note 123, at 
1499 (attributing U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ failure to use statutory flexibility in 
managing water storage to factors such as the absence of analogous past challenges, inertia, 
close relationships with interests that benefit from entrenched ways of doing things, 
resource constraints, and decentralized decision-making structures). 
477 Glicksman, supra note 265, at 468-69; 1 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 131, 
§ 7:11 (concluding that, despite the USFS’s professed adherence to a strong tradition of 
delegated authority, “for a variety of reasons,” including “the professionalism and esprit 
de corps that are also a part of the Forest Service tradition,” local officials tend to conform 
to policies established at higher levels within the agency).  Another reason for this tendency 
of local officials to defer to policies and decisions of higher-level officials is the agency’s 
decision to pattern decision-making practices “on the top-heavy, hierarchical business 
management practices of the 1940s and the 1950s.”  Id. 
478 See Glicksman, supra note 265, at 460.  According to Archie et al., supra note 14, “more 
robust leadership in natural resource management can facilitate improved transitioning to 
new management styles.” 
479 Nolen, supra note 135, at 774. 
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some national forest tracts, on the other hand, may more readily prompt the 
conclusion that adaptation to preserve ecological function is critical.480 
 The BLM lands do have ecological value, however, and one of 
FLPMA’s goals is management that protects ecological and environmental 
values.481  Moreover, even if some BLM lands may be less ecologically rich 
than other federal lands, this may change (or need to change) as the climate 
does.  The nearly 248 million acres of BLM lands—the largest of the federal 
land agencies482—may be essential components of a resilient approach to 
resource management as climate conditions shift and biota need to migrate 
to more compatible locations.  Finally, degree of historical commitment to 
resource preservation is not itself determinative—the NPS and, to a 
somewhat lesser extent, the FWS, have lagged in their management 
responses to climate change notwithstanding strong resource protection 
traditions.  Perhaps the Forest Service’s more robust response to the 
challenges of climate change stems from the highly visible adverse impacts 
already being experienced in the national forests from drought, heat, insect 
infestation, and disease.483  The threats that climate change poses to some 
of the national parks and wildlife refuges, such as glacial melting and 
saltwater intrusion from sea level rise,484 are more gradual, more 
geographically confined, and perhaps, at least to some, more contestable as 
to causation. 
 Resource constraints also may contribute to the BLM’s less 
impressive performance.485  Congress provided significantly higher levels 
of discretionary funding to the USFS than the BLM between 2001 and 2014.  
The USFS received $63.5 billion dollars in discretionary spending, 
compared to $21.3 billion for the BLM for the same period,486 even though 
the BLM manages more acreage.487  This differential seems consistent with 
a longer pattern of congressional failure to adequately fund the BLM, which 
may have forced it to prioritize some management goals and initiatives at 
                                                          
480 Cf. Glicksman, supra note 265, at 459 (noting that the national forests “tend to feature 
more spectacular scenery and opportunities for hiking and camping in wooded areas” than 
the public lands). 
481 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(8) (2006). 
482 Gorte et al., supra note 2, at 13. 
483 See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
484 See supra notes 111-113 and accompanying text. 
485 Cf. Ruhl & Fishman, supra note 102, at 442 (“[W]e cannot expect agencies to carry out 
projects for which they have no funding.”). 
486 See Department of the Interior, Office of Budget, 
http://www.doi.gov/budget/index.cfm# (last visited February 20, 2015); Department of 
Agriculture, Budget and Performance, http://www.fs.fed.us/about-agency/budget-
performance (last visited February 20, 2015). 
487 Glicksman, supra note 265, at 450 (193 million acres for the USFS, compared to 247 
million acres for the BLM). 
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the expense of others.488  It would not be surprising if the BLM were to 
respond to resource shortages by moving climate change adaptation, a task 
with which it is relatively unfamiliar, to the back burner. 
 Regardless of the persuasiveness of these potential alternative 
explanations, the salient point here is that differences between the two 
agencies do not seem linked to significant differences in their substantive 
legal adaptive capacities.  Substantive legal adaptive capacity may therefore 
be a necessary but not sufficient precondition to effective land management 
agency responses to climate change.  Without sufficient substantive legal 
adaptive capacity, even agency personnel committed to accommodating 
climate change will be unable to do so in a manner that conforms to rigid, 
inapt goals.  If, however, statutory goals are expansive and malleable 
enough to permit management shifts to meet the challenges of climate 
change, an agency’s recalcitrance to make those shifts can stymie 
significant progress in implementing adaptation measures. 
V. IMPROVING FEDERAL LAND LEGAL ADAPTIVE CAPACITY 
 Climate change poses significant challenges to management of all 
the major federal natural resource systems.  It would have been surprising 
if the management agencies had responded to these challenges with equal 
alacrity and enthusiasm, notwithstanding government-wide presidential 
decrees to anticipate climate change.  If differences were to exist, one might 
have expected the land systems most closely tied to resource protection—
the national parks, the national wildlife refuges, and official wilderness 
areas—to best reflect integration of climate change adaptation 
considerations into management decisions.  That is not what has happened.  
Climate change adaptation has been almost entirely absent from wilderness 
management, the NPS has not moved much beyond information-gathering 
and establishment of planning frameworks, and the FWS has gone 
somewhat but not considerably further than the NPS.  Instead, the agency 
that is most advanced in its commitment to climate change adaptation is the 
USFS, an agency maligned for much of its history as a captured agency 
concerned more with maximizing timber cuts than protecting ecological 
forest health.  The only agency whose climate-related posture is neither 
notably beyond nor behind what its past management priorities might have 
predicted is the BLM. 
                                                          
488 See, e.g., Archie et al., supra note 14 (quoting BLM employee, who identified as 
significant resource-based barriers to additional progress in climate change adaptation 
because the agency lacks “the capacity to fund adaptation projects, or to hire the staff to 
participate in the projects.”); see also George Cameron Coggins & Parthenia Blessing 
Evans, Multiple Use, Sustained Yield Planning on the Public Lands, 53 U. COLO. L. REV. 
411, 447-48 (1982) (attributing the BLM’s inability to plan in part to inadequate funding); 
Edith Sanders, Alternative Ranch Experiments: Better than the BLM, 27 WM. & MARY 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 265, 276 (2002) (noting repeated cuts during the 1970s to BLM 
budgets and personnel, which “reflected the control of ranch interests”). 
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 We suggest that these largely counterintuitive results stem from the 
four agencies’ relative legal adaptive capacities.  Although scholars have 
recognized the role of legal adaptive capacity in the pursuit of statutory 
goals, their focus on procedural adaptive capacity has obfuscated another, 
perhaps more important, factor—substantive legal adaptive capacity. The 
disparate responses of the land management agencies to climate-related 
threats demonstrates the critical role that factor plays in an agency’s 
response to changed circumstances such as those caused by global climate 
change. The statutory regimes that govern management of official 
wilderness and the national parks are rooted in historical and wildness 
preservation goals that impair agencies’ ability to meet climate-related 
threats.  The FWS’s organic statute seems more amenable to addressing 
climate change given its emphasis on protection of ecological function, but 
the FWS has to a certain degree tied its own hands by interpreting its 
mandate as oriented toward historical preservation.  The USFS and the 
BLM operate under mandates that afford them ample authority to adjust 
management strategies as resource conditions change, positioning them 
well to prepare for climate-related impacts.  The USFS has taken advantage 
of this substantive legal adaptive capacity, setting an example for the other 
agencies.  The BLM has not, for reasons that may include agency culture, 
organizational structure, and resource limitations. 
Given these differential responses, and in light of the pervasive 
threats that climate change poses to all federal lands systems, we urge 
refashioning the standards, statutory and otherwise, that govern federal 
lands to enhance the land management agencies’ substantive legal adaptive 
capacity.  The reforms we envision would remove the shackles that 
currently create a mismatch between the relatively constrained legal 
adaptive capacity of some agencies and their duties to achieve applicable 
management goals in a changing world.   
The fact that the USFS, which has expansive adaptive capacity, has 
done the most to date to integrate climate change considerations into its 
policies and programs does not suggest that the only or best way to enhance 
the adaptive capacity of the other agencies to manage climate change is 
through adoption of multiple use, sustained-yield goals for all land systems.  
Instead, we favor as the touchstone the promotion of ecological health on 
all federal land systems.489  Moreover, the emphasis should be on protecting 
the integrity of ecosystems or essential ecological processes and functions 
(such as biodiversity, carbon sequestration, water cleaning, waste 
decomposition, or nutrient cycling) instead of individual species or 
resources at risk because of climate change.490  The question is how to craft 
                                                          
489 See Camacho, supra note 12, at 1407-08 (urging legal changes to permit better 
adaptation to a dynamic world, “includ[ing] an increased emphasis not on preserving the 
past or minimizing human involvement, but rather on limiting bad interactions and 
promoting the function of valuable ecological processes and constituents.”). 
490 Glicksman, supra note 95, at 881-84; Camacho, supra note 128, at 249-50. 
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management regimes that afford the agencies adequate legal adaptive 
capacity to pursue that goal without unduly sacrificing other valuable ends, 
such as historical or wildness preservation, with which efforts to promote 
ecological function may conflict in the climate change era. 
 Put differently, not all substantive legal capacity is created equal; 
the flexibility of the goal is just one factor to be considered in evaluating 
how much and what kind of adaptive capacity to provide.  In the federal 
lands context, two flexible goals might differ and have different results.  For 
example, a consumptive but flexible goal (such as that sometimes pursued 
by the USFS and the BLM under multiple-use, sustained-yield management 
standards) might be harmful to ecological health, but a flexible goal that 
requires promoting future ecological health or biodiversity might be 
beneficial for ecological function.  Similarly, historical preservation and 
wildness preservation are both rigid goals but they are very different from 
each other.   
 To make the legal regimes governing national parks, national 
wildlife refuges, and wilderness areas more responsive to climate change, 
we recommend at least a partial shift away from current mandates to 
premise management strategies primarily on preservation of obsolete 
historical norms or non-interventionist approaches of questionable efficacy 
that increasingly may be harmful to ecological health.  The use of historical 
baselines, while useful in some contexts (such as historical preservation), 
limit government’s adaptive capacity in a dynamic world to conserve 
healthy ecological resources.  Similarly, a hands-off posture is increasingly 
likely to disrupt the functioning of climate-challenged systems in ways that 
interfere with continued ecological health.  These changes may come in the 
form of statutory amendments to the Park Service Organic Act or the 
Wilderness Act to require primacy for promoting long-term ecological 
health, articulated through the protection of specific ecological processes.  
In some cases, however, the changes could originate administratively.  The 
NWRSIA’s substantive goals and mandates are flexible enough to 
accommodate a shift by the FWS away from its past emphasis on 
maintenance of historical baselines and toward protecting the integrity of 
ecosystems or essential ecological processes and functions.491 
                                                          
491 For a discussion of the FWS’s commitment to preserving historical baselines, see supra 
notes 335-354 and accompanying text.  Fischman and Adamcik argue that, in addressing 
climate-related threats, the FWS’s management objectives for the national wildlife refuge 
system “can no longer rely solely upon past population levels and habitat relationships or 
even upon heretofore known species assemblages and biotic communities.”   Robert L. 
Fischman & Robert S. Adamcik, Beyond Trust Species: The Conservation Potential of the 
National Wildlife Refuge System in the Wake of Climate Change, 51 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 
26 (2011).  Instead, they posit that “[a] core complementary focus” on protecting trust 
species and “ecosystem function and services, ecological integrity, and natural systems” is 
better suited to providing a robust response to climate change.”  Id. at 27.  “The adaptation 
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 The changes we recommend in the governing mandates of the 
multiple use agencies would not all result in an expansion of their 
substantive legal adaptive capacity, which is already ample.  Rather, they 
would shift from one flexible substantive mandate to another.  The multiple 
uses to which the national forests and the public lands are committed 
include various extractive uses.  These lands have mineral and renewable 
resources from which the nation should continue to benefit.  If multiple use 
management on either land system interferes with ecological health, 
however, it should yield to strategies that preserve the health of the affected 
lands and resources.492  One way to accomplish that would be to replace the 
goal, reflected in the current definition of “sustained yield,” of maintaining 
“a high-level annual or regular periodic output” of renewable resources on 
the public lands493 with a goal of maintaining well-functioning ecological 
processes or ecosystem services.494  Additionally, as detailed below, the 
BLM’s experience suggests that a further desirable change unrelated to the 
scope of its legal adaptive capacity may be to reduce or eliminate agency 
discretion not to manage adaptively.495  
 Just as there are tradeoffs implicated by expanding procedural legal 
adaptive capacity through techniques such as adaptive management,496 
similar tradeoffs necessarily accompany expansion or contraction of 
substantive legal adaptive capacity.497  In the federal land management 
context, rigid goals that require maintaining an historical baseline or that 
require non-intervention in federal lands have value.  For historical 
baselines, one possible set of benefits mirrors the reasons for historic 
preservation law generally.498  There may be cultural, educational, aesthetic, 
or economic reasons for maintaining or restoring property or resources to a 
prior state, as a reminder of how things are or used to be.499  Furthermore, a 
rigid historical baseline is relatively clear, and at least previously 
                                                          
actions commonly recommended for protected areas, such as connectivity enhancement 
and protection of climate change refugia, more directly emerge from an ecological 
approach than one primarily prioritizing species.”  Id.   
492  Cf. Glicksman, supra note 95, at 876-77 (urging a change in the balance of permitted 
federal land uses). 
493 43 U.S.C. § 1702(h) (2006). 
494 The uses that in particular contexts might clash with ecological health are not limited to 
resource extraction; certain forms of intensive recreational use also may do so. 
495 See infra notes 513-517 and accompanying text. 
496 See, e.g., Doremus, supra note 1, at 1460 (“Both the decision to employ adaptive 
management and decisions about how to implement it involve tradeoffs.”); Biber, supra 
note 90, at 955 (discussing “tradeoffs [that] are present in making decisions about whether 
and how to pursue adaptive management”). 
497 See supra Part I.C. 
498 See, e.g., National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470(b)(4) (2006) (finding that 
the preservation of “irreplaceable” heritage is in the public interest). 
499 Camacho, supra note 12, at 1435. 
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proponents may have considered it a rough but sufficient proxy for guarding 
ecological health against consumptive use.500 
 For passive wildness preservation, many have identified 
economic,501 scientific,502 psychological,503 spiritual,504 and existence 
value505 from the maintenance of undisturbed landscapes.  In light of the 
pervasiveness of global anthropogenic climate change—making virtually 
every land at least indirectly shaped by human activities506—those benefits 
might more appropriately be identified as the value of maintaining less 
disturbed, or at least less directly disturbed, lands.  Moreover, the rigidity 
of at least the strictest version of non-intervention is well-defined, providing 
relative ease in its application.  A baseline of minimal management also by 
definition helps ensure relatively low administrative costs for management 
activities. 
 Efforts to increase substantive legal adaptive capacity by allowing 
agencies to deviate from historical or wildness preservation dictates in the 
face of climate change will necessarily diminish or forfeit some of these 
benefits.  In their analysis of the Wilderness Act, Eric Biber and Elisabeth 
Long queried whether the procedural and substantive barriers to active 
management “might still be too much of a constraint to allow for effective 
adaptation to climate change.”507  However, stating that they “do not think 
so,” they argue that the costs from the Wilderness Act’s constraints on legal 
adaptive capacity are worth the “substantial benefits to restraint and passive 
management for climate change adaptation—at least in the particular 
context of wilderness areas.”508   
                                                          
500 Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 1, at 14 (noting that a historic baseline can provide “a clear 
goal and temporal reference point”); Camacho, supra note 128, at 245-46. 
501 See Jan G. Laitos & Rachael B. Gamble, The Problem with Wilderness, 32 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 503, 511-12 (2008) (describing tangible economic benefits to non-users 
from the existence of wilderness). 
502 CHRIS MASER, THE REDESIGNED FOREST 174 (1988) (“[W]e have to maintain some 
original, unmanaged old-growth forest, mature forest, and young-growth forest as parts 
catalog, maintenance manual, and service department from which to learn to practice 
restoration forestry.”). 
503 See William Cronon, The Trouble with Wilderness, in THE GREAT NEW WILDERNESS 
DEBATE 471, 483 (J. Baird Callicott & Michael P. Nelson eds., 1998) (“[W]ilderness offers 
us the illusion that we can escape the cares and troubles of the world in which our past has 
ensnared us.”). 
504 See, e.g., John Copeland Nagle, The Spiritual Value of Wilderness, 35 ENVTL. L. 955, 
979-84 (2005) (detailing the repeated emphasis on the spiritual significance of wilderness 
in congressional hearings on the Wilderness Act). 
505 See, e.g., John V. Krutilla, Conservation Reconsidered, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 781 
(1967) (“There are many persons who obtain satisfaction from mere knowledge that part 
of wilderness North America remains . . . .”). 
506 Camacho, supra note 128, at 225-26; Camacho, supra note 12, at 1432-33. 
507 See Long & Biber, supra note 129, at 627. 
508 Id. 
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 Though we agree that there undoubtedly are benefits to more passive 
and reactive strategies as well as tradeoffs from more active management, 
with the projected rapid and even convulsive effects of climate change we 
think the scales tilt heavily toward adjusting public land laws more toward 
more substantive legal adaptive capacity at the expense of rigid adherence 
to historical preservation or nonintervention.  Climate change substantially 
increases the costs in ecological function of absolute bars and/or significant 
impediments to active management strategies.  Relying on inflexible 
regulatory goals that emphasize stasis and/or minimal management will 
severely limit the ability of resource managers to manage the detrimental 
ecological effects of climate change.509  Perhaps the starkest quandary 
facing an agency subject to those constraints will be choosing between 
translocating endangered species to lands upon which they have never 
previously existed or presiding over species extinction.510  Moreover, 
climate change will increasingly render the two goals of wildness 
preservation and historical preservation irreconcilable.  Additionally, each 
also will be increasingly incompatible with the need of promoting 
ecological functions in a rapidly changing world.511  As such, we maintain 
that the ecological costs of non-intervention or historical fidelity will 
increasingly outweigh the precautionary or cultural benefits. 
 Nonetheless, the general expansion of substantive legal adaptive 
capacity we favor need not, and probably should not, apply uniformly, even 
to lands currently governed by historical or wildness preservation mandates.  
For some landscapes, the historical and cultural benefits of historical 
preservation and the lower administrative costs of wildness preservation 
may trump the benefits of a more flexible, adaptive management approach.  
Such an approach, for example, might be appropriate when an area is 
expected to be fairly ecologically stable notwithstanding climate change, is 
exceptionally pristine, or has a poorly understood ecological functions.512  
For other lands, maintaining historical conditions will be increasingly costly 
and even impossible.  Avoiding human disturbance will almost always be 
possible, but it too may generate unacceptable costs.  Thus, if historical or 
wildness preservation remains the goal, it should be because policymakers 
decide that pursuit of that goal is worth the resulting loss of ecological 
diversity and/or productivity. 
                                                          
509 Cf. IRIS BRAVERMAN: WILD LIFE: THE INSTITUTION OF NATURE 9-10 (Stanford Univ. 
Press 2015) (arguing that climate change is among the factors making existing species 
habitat less viable, so that “[i]n many cases, what conservationists refer to as natural habitat 
must be actively managed alongside the construction of an alternative one”). 
510 Camacho, supra note 128, at 181-83. 
511 See Camacho & Beard, supra note 117, at 235 (urging a shift away from maintaining 
historical baselines and avoiding human management and toward maximizing ecological 
function in light of climatic and other changing environmental conditions). 
512 Camacho, supra note 12, at 1446-47. 
  
 
82 
 
 Finally, the Article’s analysis of substantive legal adaptive capacity 
provides broader insights about the contours of delegated agency discretion 
generally.  As illustrated through the federal lands context, agency 
discretion and legal adaptive capacity are related but distinct phenomena.  
In the context of procedural legal adaptive capacity, there is a temptation to 
equate more management flexibility with more agency discretion.513  
However, a process may be flexible but still promote accountability through 
constraints on when or how the agency is allowed to exercise that 
flexibility.514  For example, a governing authority may compel stakeholder 
participation, use of adaptive management, or the integration of clear 
triggers within an adaptive management process, rather than make them 
optional.515 
Likewise, the comparison of BLM and USFS management in the 
face of climate change illustrates that the effectiveness of substantive legal 
adaptive capacity may vary depending on whether it is mandatory or 
permissive.  The absence of directives in the BLM’s governing legal regime 
requiring the agency to adjust management strategies in response to changes 
in information or circumstances may have played a role in its failure to 
engage in adaptation activities.  In one sense, requiring compliance with a 
flexible substantive goal reduces agency discretion, but in a way that 
minimizes the potential for other factors to derail effective adaptation to 
change.  For example, if a statute requires an agency to use its adaptive 
capacity, it is less likely that the agency will respond to budgetary 
constraints by deferring or giving short shrift to efforts to adapt to change 
than if the agency has unconstrained discretion to take advantage of its 
adaptive capacity or leave it lying dormant.  Similarly, if a statute demands 
that an agency take an adaptive posture, agency leadership may face less 
resistance in imposing top-down directives to alter management approaches 
to address novel challenges.  Such directives may generate buy-in 
throughout the agency even if, like the BLM, the agency has a decentralized 
structure that tends to hinder changes in policy direction from the top or 
deviations from traditional operating practices.  Required flexibility also 
                                                          
513 DOREMUS ET AL., supra note 76, at 3 (discussing risk that adaptive management will 
promote unbounded agency discretion). 
514 Cf. Craig, supra note 12, at 64 (describing ways to minimize potential for abuse of 
discretion from regulatory flexibility). 
515 See, e.g., Camacho I, supra note 1, at 331, 349-51 (detailing the limited effectiveness 
of an adaptive management experiment that allowed but did not require procedural 
adaptation); DOREMUS ET AL., supra note 76, at 11 (calling for integration in adaptive 
management of clear benchmarks mandating when decisions must be adapted to account 
for new information or changed circumstances). 
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may promote accountability by providing a basis for more meaningful 
judicial review.516    
It therefore may be desirable to reduce an agency’s “regulatory 
discretion” by precluding it from deciding not to act adaptively, even when 
a change in “legislative discretion” is not needed because the agency 
operates under a substantive mandate that affords it adequate flexibility to 
respond to changing needs and conditions.517  Mandating the advancement 
of, and periodic re-assessment against, a flexible regulatory goal—such as 
the promotion of ecological health in light of changing conditions—may 
maximize the chance for effective adaptation to change rather than impede 
it. 
CONCLUSION 
The degree of an agency’s flexibility, procedural and substantive, in 
implementing its statutory mandate can significantly influence both its 
capacity and willingness to adapt to changing needs and circumstances.  As 
a rich literature attests, an agency’s exercise of procedural legal adaptive 
capacity through techniques such as adaptive management can facilitate its 
responsiveness to change, albeit at the potential cost of a loss of 
accountability.  As the comparative analysis of the five federal land systems 
above illustrates, substantive legal adaptive capacity plays at least as 
significant a role in supplying an agency with the tools it needs to meet the 
challenges posed by changing conditions such as those arising from climate 
change.  Policymakers designing the contours of substantive legal adaptive 
capacity must make several judgments.  They need to consider the tradeoffs 
implicated in affording more or less legal adaptive capacity.  If such 
capacity is desirable, they should recognize that alternative programmatic 
goals may be equally flexible, but that some may prove more effective in 
accommodating change than others.  Finally, unused legal adaptive 
capacity, no matter how it is defined, will not effectively accommodate 
change, so it may be appropriate to narrow agency discretion to decide 
whether or not to act adaptively. 
                                                          
516 A mandate to act adaptively may check agency discretion by facilitating suits to compel 
agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.  5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2006).  
Similarly, such a mandate may increase accountability by triggering less deferential review 
under the arbitrary and capricious test.  Id. § 706(2)(A).   
517 See Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the 
Quiet Revolution in Administrative Law, 1988 DUKE L.J. 819, 821 (1988) (distinguishing 
between an agency’s “‘regulatory discretion,’ or its authority to determine whether to 
regulate, and its ‘legislative discretion,’ or its authority to determine how to regulate. 
Congress can choose constraints that maximize or minimize each type of discretion.”). 
